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Abstract
Any computer program processing input from the user or network must validate the
input. Input-handling vulnerabilities occur in programs when the software component responsible for filtering malicious input—the parser—does not perform validation adequately. Consequently, parsers are among the most targeted components
since they defend the rest of the program from malicious input. This thesis adopts
the Language-Theoretic Security (LangSec) principle to understand what tools and
research are needed to prevent exploits that target parsers.
LangSec proposes specifying the syntactic structure of the input format as a formal
grammar. We then build a recognizer for this formal grammar to validate any input
before the rest of the program acts on it. To ensure that these recognizers represent
the data format, programmers often rely on parser generators or parser combinators
tools to build the parsers.
This thesis propels several sub-fields in LangSec by proposing new techniques
to find bugs in implementations, novel categorizations of vulnerabilities, and new
parsing algorithms and tools to handle practical data formats. To this end, this
thesis comprises five parts that tackle various tenets of LangSec.
• First, I categorize various input-handling vulnerabilities and exploits using two
frameworks. First, I use the mismorphisms framework to reason about vulnerabilities. This framework helps us reason about the root causes leading to
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various vulnerabilities. Next, we built a categorization framework using various
LangSec anti-patterns, such as parser differentials and insufficient input validation. Finally, we built a catalog of more than 30 popular vulnerabilities to
demonstrate the categorization frameworks.
• Second, I built parsers for various Internet of Things and power grid network
protocols and the iccMAX file format using parser combinator libraries. The
parsers I built for power grid protocols were deployed and tested on power grid
substation networks as an intrusion detection tool. The parser I built for the
iccMAX file format led to several corrections and modifications to the iccMAX
specifications and reference implementations.
• Third, I present SPARTA, a novel tool I built that generates Rust code that
type checks Portable Data Format (PDF) files. The type checker I helped build
strictly enforces the constraints in the PDF specification to find deviations. Our
checker has contributed to at least four significant clarifications and corrections
to the PDF 2.0 specification and various open-source PDF tools. In addition
to our checker, we also built a practical tool, PDFFixer, to dynamically patch
type errors in PDF files.
• Fourth, I present ParseSmith, a tool to build verified parsers for real-world
data formats. Most parsing tools available for data formats are insufficient to
handle practical formats or have not been verified for their correctness. I built
a verified parsing tool in Dafny that builds on ideas from attribute grammars,
data-dependent grammars, and parsing expression grammars to tackle various
constructs commonly seen in network formats. I prove that our parsers run in
linear time and always terminate for well-formed grammars.
• Finally, I provide the earliest systematic comparison of various data description
iii

languages (DDLs) and their parser generation tools. DDLs are used to describe
and parse commonly used data formats, such as image formats. I conducted
an expert elicitation qualitative study to derive various metrics that I use to
compare the DDLs. Next, I also systematically compare these DDLs based on
sample data descriptions available with the DDLs—checking for correctness and
resilience.
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Preface
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thesis document primarily discusses my research through my Ph.D., I’ve also written
it to serve as a handbook for anyone looking to pick up research in Language-Theoretic
Security (LangSec). I have not assumed any prior knowledge in Systems Security or
LangSec.
Chapter 2, in particular, discusses the state of research in LangSec and some of the
related fields in detail. Anyone interested in understanding how LangSec ties to these
other research ideas and what open problems remain would benefit from Chapter
2. Likewise, Chapter 7 focuses on understanding Data Description Languages, their
features, capabilities, and pitfalls. This chapter includes an expert elicitation study
and an evaluation of existing tools to understand future research directions.
For those in a hurry, the thesis outline in Chapter 1 includes a reading guide that
would point out the most significant results of this thesis without diving deeper into
the background and related work.
Readers can contact me by email at prashant@prashant.at.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Programs reading formatted input rely on a parser to check the input and transform
it into an appropriate internal representation. Unfortunately, programmers often fail
to explicitly define the set of valid input a program must accept. As a result, when
a program receives unanticipated input, the program may reach a state that was not
accounted for by the developers.
The parser—the code that checks user input to ensure validity and creates a
structured representation for the rest of the program—is the most targeted portion
of software since it must defend the rest of the program from malicious input. Unfortunately, in the year 2021, there have been over 1000 entries in the MITRE Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database for various parser vulnerabilities.1
Despite several advances in memory safety and fault isolation, parser bug discovery
continues unabated. Hence, we need a paradigm shift in handling input in code.
The field of language-theoretic security (LangSec) posits that defending against
attacks that exploit the lack of adequate input validation requires a paradigm shift.
We need to take a principled approach to validate input that uses formal language
1

We looked at the following Common Weakness Enumeration (CWEs) to estimate the CVEs
with parser vulnerabilities: (1) Improper Input Validation, (2) Deserialization of untrusted data, (3)
Uncontrolled format strings, and (4) Buffer overflows https://www.cvedetails.com/cwe-details/
502/cwe.html
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theory fundamentals. At its core, we can distill the core principles of LangSec to the
following:
• Formal languages and data formats principle: We must define the set of valid
or acceptable inputs to a program using formal grammars.
• Principle of least expressiveness: The formal grammar used to define the input
formal must not be more complex than necessary in the Chomsky Hierarchy.
• “Full recognition before processing” principle: We must use a parser for the
formal grammar to validate all input before acting on it.
• Principle of parser equivalence: Different parsers deciding the same language
must be functionally equivalent.

Input

Parser

Accept
Valid
Input

Decider for
Input Language

Program Internals
Perform Computation
on Accepted Input and
Only on Accepted Input

Reject
Invalid
Input

Figure 1.1: An overview of the LangSec methodology from my earlier paper [11].
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the overall LangSec methodology. We describe the input
language as a formal grammar and build a decider for this input language. The
program internals must only access well-typed, valid input. The parser must also be
separate from the rest of the codebase to ease auditing the parser.
The Chomsky hierarchy (Figure 1.2) demonstrates various classes of formal grammars based on their computational complexity. In this hierarchy, regular grammars
2
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unrestricted
grammar

Turing
machine

context-sensitive
grammar

linear-bounded
automaton

non-deterministic
context-free
grammar
deterministic
context-free
grammar
regular
grammar

non-deterministic
pushdown
automaton
deterministic
pushdown
automaton
finite
state
machine
Decidability Boundary
Parser Equivalence
Decidability Boundary

Figure 1.2: Chomsky Hierarchy Extended With LangSec Boundaries (from my earlier
paper [11]).
are the simplest form and can be decided by a finite state automaton. Context-free
grammars are the following level of grammars and can describe languages L taking the
form L = {an bn | n > 0}. Regular languages cannot handle grammars of this form.
Deterministic context-free grammars form a strict subset of unrestricted context-free
grammars. We can prove parser equivalence for deterministic context-free and regular
languages and parse them in linear time.
Proving parser equivalence is necessary to ensure that two parsers that perform
the exact computation are equivalent and interoperable. Equivalent parsers directly
address parser differentials—a LangSec anti-pattern we have commonly seen in the
wild. An example of such an anti-pattern is the recent iOS attack demonstrated in
the Psychic paper [247]. The attack leverages the fact that iOS uses four different
XML parsers in different situations, and all of them differ in subtle ways in how they
handle comments in XML. As a result, an adversary can trick one of the parsers
into believing that a particular data element is in a comment, whereas the other
parsers may consider it data. Using the same formal grammar to recognize the XML
3
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structures in iOS could limit this problem.
Staying within the deterministic context-free language class is not a realistic expectation, however. Most network protocols and file formats extensively use the
tag-length-value construct (TLV). In this construct, we parse a tag, followed by a
length. This length field specifies how long the value is going to be. The TLV format
reduces the burden on the parser since the parser can process a fixed number of bytes
and continue parsing. Hence, parsing tools tackling real-world formats, such as network protocols and file formats, must handle some context-sensitive constructs, such
as TLV, repeat fields, and offsets, commonly seen in these formats.

Parser Combinators and Data Description Languages. Parser combinator
toolkits and data description languages provide ways to enforce these LangSec principles in code. Parser combinators allow users to define grammar directly in code. For
example, suppose a developer wanted to define a parser for the domain name service
(DNS) networking protocol in their C code. They could use a parser-combinator
library, such as Hammer, to describe this syntax. Unfortunately, robust parsercombinator toolkits may not be available for every target language.
In contrast, data description languages are domain-specific languages designed to
capture data format syntax and constraints. These languages include accompanying
tools that can be used to validate the descriptions, run the description on input,
and, most importantly, generate code. Developers can then use this generated code
with the rest of their codebase. To adopt data description languages, we need code
generators for a wide range of languages.
Both these approaches have their merits and pitfalls. Parser combinators are easy
to import into existing codebases and have a smaller learning curve. However, when
developers write validation code in their programming language of choice, porting the
parser code from one language to another while ensuring equivalence can prove chal4
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Figure 1.3: Outline of my thesis
lenging. Hammer and Nom are popular parser-combinator toolkits to tackle practical
data formats [214, 66].
On the other hand, data description languages are appealing since they provide
a single interface to generate code in multiple target languages. The designers of
the language and the corresponding tools ensure that the various implementations
are identical and interoperable. However, these domain-specific languages can prove
harder to learn, and designing code generators for multiple popular programming
languages is an engineering challenge. Kaitai Struct bridges this gap by providing
code generators to Python, C++, Java, and many other popular languages [295].
LangSec vulnerabilities stem from violations of one or more of the core principles.
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Hence, each of these principles serves as an avenue for LangSec research. Figure 1.3
provides an overview of this thesis. The thesis chapters are aligned with the principles
that they enforce. First, in Chapters 4 and 6 I present work where we build parsers
that can augment existing software to validate input. These parsers can be used with
existing codebases to enforce the principle of “full recognition before processing.”
Next, in Chapter 5 I compare PDFs generated by different software and document
the differences—especially highlighting errors introduced by software. These errors
indicate violations of the principle of parser equivalence. Then, in Chapter 7, I
systematically compare various data description languages (DDLs) from the LangSec
lens. DDLs present a way to enforce the principle of parser equivalence by defining
machine-readable specifications of data formats. These DDLs are also accompanied
by code generation software that can generate code in multiple target languages.
Hence, DDLs are most appropriate to enforce this principle.
Next, Chapter 4.5 discusses how we inject LangSec parsers into existing code and
what the minimal parser needed is to fix a vulnerability. Finally, Chapter 3 explores
vulnerabilities and ties them to LangSec anti-patterns. We study several popular
vulnerabilities from over the years and dissect them with respect to these LangSec
principles and identify why these vulnerabilities came to be.

Thesis overview
This thesis is divided into five core parts that I summarize below.
• Chapter 3 Understanding exploits and weird machines: As we use more
and more sophisticated fuzzing tools to find new exploits, we need to understand what common anti-patterns developers follow to lead to vulnerabilities.
Researchers find and define various anti-patterns that lead to various inputhandling vulnerabilities. In Chapter 3, I use the mismorphisms framework my
6
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lab developed and which I helped with to reason about vulnerabilities. For example, we can define a parser differential as a mismatch between two or more
developers’ understanding of a specification.
• Chapter 4 Principled parsing with parser combinators: Parser combinators follow a different school of thought from those who propose using DDLs.
Parser combinator toolkits allow developers to define grammars within the programming language of a user’s choice. In addition, parser combinators make
it easy for developers to include their parsers in their existing code base. We
can enforce the “full recognition principle” by augmenting existing code with
parsers. Chapter 4 discusses three of my previous projects where I used parser
combinator libraries to recognize various network protocols and file formats.
(1) I built a parser for the Industrial IoT protocols Message Queuing Telemetry
Transport (MQTT) and Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
using the Hammer parser combinator toolkit. I demonstrated that both these
protocols could be parsed in the order of milliseconds on a Raspberry Pi.
(2) I helped build a parser for the SCADA protocol IEEE C37.118 using the
Hammer parser combinator toolkit. The parser was implemented as a validation filter in an ingress-based network appliance that inspects packets in the
Wide Area Measurement network for potentially malformed inputs.
(3) I built a communication validity detector (CVD) for various Supervisory
Data and Control Acquisition (SCADA) protocols. These protocols are used
extensively in the Power Grid. CVD comprises parsers for six SCADA protocols
and various network configuration validators that alert Power Grid operators of
malicious actions.
(4) I built a parser and static analyzer for the iccMAX color format. iccMAX
is a file format used to share coloring information across operating systems.
7
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Building a parser for this format involved several challenges. This format has
only been available for the last two years, and there are currently no open-source
tools available to generate files in this format. This exercise has led to several
bug reports in the iccMAX specification and the reference implementation.
• Chapter 5 Understanding how different parsers deviate from specifications: As described earlier, to prevent the risk of parser differentials, different parsers for the same input format must implement the same grammar.
However, for a file format such as the Portable Document Format (PDF) that
has been around since the 1990s, numerous softwares are available to generate
these files [36]. Therefore, finding syntactic mismatches between files generated from different PDF creation software requires new tooling. Chapter 5
describes SPARTA, a tool I am building to generate type checker code from a
machine-readable specification of the PDF format. I find the source of these
parser differentials by defining a strict type checker for the PDF format. Our
type checker has contributed to bug reports in PDF creation software that deviate from the specification. I have also proposed numerous corrections and
clarifications to the PDF specification.
• Chapter 6 Verified parser interpreters: As we find new features in popular data formats, we need to extend formal languages to support them. For
example, Calc-Regular Languages [172] were introduced in 2017 to add support
for length fields to regular languages. We also need new algorithms to parse
these new language classes as we create these new languages. In Chapter 6, I
propose extensions to the Packrat and Scaffold Automata parsing algorithms to
support the attribute and data-dependent grammar constructs in the Parsley
Data Definition Language [198].2 I implemented portions of our tool, Parse2

I was part of the team led by Natarajan Shankar and Prashanth Mundkur that build the Parsley
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Smith, and demonstrated it on the Real-Time Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) protocol. I verify ParseSmith for correctness and termination, and use the Dafny
code generator to generate C++, Go, and C# code. Developers can use the
ParseSmith-generated code in these programming languages to validate input.
• Chapter 7 Building principled parsers with data description languages
(DDLs): DDLs are used to describe network formats and file formats. Existing
DDLs such as DFDL [181] and Kaitai [295] have their drawbacks. For example,
DFDL does not support recursion or arbitrary constraints. Similarly, Kaitai
does not include the features necessary to support a format such as PDF and
relies on implementing arbitrary functions in the host programming language.
Several researchers are building newer DDLs to support such complex features
in formats. In Chapter 7 of this thesis, we discuss vital features DDLs require to
support file formats and for broad adoption. Subsequently, we categorize these
DDLs based on these features and evaluate these DDLs on a set of formats.

Real-World Evaluation and Impact
Several portions of this thesis have been deployed to real-world systems or have led
to practical changes to commercial implementations and specifications. I have listed
some of these impacts below.
• Our tool, CVD, outlined in Section 4.3, was deployed to real-world power grid
substation networks as part of the DARPA RADICS project. As a result, we
detected several real-world attack scenarios and malicious activity on power grid
networks using CVD.
• My parser and static analyzer for the iccMAX file format, outlined in Seclanguage and the accompanying tools.

9
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tion 4.4, led to several corrections to the specification document and reference
implementation.
• We have proposed several changes to the PDF specification and the Arlington
PDF Model (the machine-readable PDF specification). Several of these changes
have already been adopted, with a few still under review as of May 3rd, 2022
(Section 5.5).
• Our expert elicitation study in Section 7.1, and the adjacent evaluation in Section 7.2 provides guidelines for future DDL creators and maintainers of current
DDLs. Our image format evaluation also led to corrections to data descriptions
in Kaitai and DFDL that are being reviewed by researchers.
• We identified several parser differentials and mismatches between image format specifications in DFDL and Kaitai, as we demonstrate in Section 7.4. We
have subsequently been in touch with developers of both these DDLs and have
proposed fixes to their format descriptions.

Section 1.1

Outline
First, Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of LangSec theory and prior work.
Second, in Chapter 3 I discuss various categorizations of input-handling vulnerabilities. Third, in Chapter 4, I describe my experiences building parsers for various
network and file formats. Next, Chapter 5 discusses how we can find differentials in
PDF creation tools. Fourth, in Chapter 6, I introduce two parsing algorithms to handle various constructs found in network protocols. Finally, Chapter 7 explores and
compares state-of-the-art data description language implementations: their features,
complexity power, usability, and robustness.
10
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I anticipate three types of audiences for this thesis document. (1) For those
interested in getting an overview of LangSec: the theory, related approaches, and
ways to enforce LangSec principles, I suggest reading Chapters 2 and Chapters 3. (2)
For those who want to understand my work and contributions to computer security, I
suggest reading Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. Finally, (3) for those who want to understand
prior LangSec work and where my work fits in, a complete reading of this thesis may
be helpful.
If you are unwilling to read entire chapters and want to dive directly into the heart
of my work, here is a possible order you could follow.
• Section 3 discusses taxonomies of LangSec vulnerabilities we created.
• Section 4.2 presents a communication validity detector we build for Industrial
Control Systems protocols that was deployed to power grid networks.
• Section 5.3 and 5.5 present our work on generating PDF type checker code
from a machine-readable specification and showcases the bugs we found in the
specification and in PDFs found in the wild.
• Section 6.2 discusses the type system, inference rules, and the core properties
we prove as a part of ParseSmith. Section 6.4 subsequently presents real-world
case studies where we use ParseSmith.
• Section 7.1 presents a first-of-its-kind expert elicitation study to understand
DDLs and their features.

Section 1.2

Prior Publications
This thesis builds on several publications I have worked on with colleagues at Dartmouth and elsewhere.
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My work in Chapter 2 originally appeared in a book chapter.
• Prashant Anantharaman et al. Intent as a Secure Design Primitive, Modeling
and Design of Secure Internet of Things, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2020 [11].
• Prashant Anantharaman et al. Going Dark: A Retrospective on the North American Blackout of 2038. Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop.
2018 [10].
Chapter 3 incorporates content from two papers. The first paper was a collaboration with various students in the Trust lab, Jim Blythe, and Ross Koppel. We built a
mismorphisms framework and categorized various vulnerabilities based on this framework. Next, we surveyed popular vulnerabilities over a few months and categorized
them based on their manifestation.
• Prashant Anantharaman et al. Mismorphism: The Heart of the Weird Machine,
Cambridge International Workshop on Security Protocols, Springer, 2019 [14, 8].
• Sameed Ali, Prashant Anantharaman et al. What we have here is failure to
validate: Summer of LangSec, IEEE Security & Privacy, 2021 [3].
Chapter 4 discusses my prior work from multiple papers. First, I describe how we
build hardened IoT clients using the Hammer parser combinator and state machine
libraries. Next, I describe a parser for the phasor measurement protocol. Then,
I briefly discuss our methodology to patch existing binaries using parsers. Finally,
I detail our approach to building an intrusion detection system and constructing a
static analyzer for the iccMAX file format.
• Prashant Anantharaman et al. Building Hardened Internet-of-Things Clients
with Language-Theoretic Security, IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops
(SPW), 2017 [15].
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• Prashant Anantharaman et al. PhasorSec: Protocol Security Filters for Wide
Area Measurement Systems, IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm), 2018 [16].
• Sameed Ali, Prashant Anantharaman, and Sean W. Smith. Armor Within:
Defending against Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Libraries, IEEE Security and
Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2020 [4].
• Prashant Anantharaman et al. A Communications Validity Detector for SCADA
Networks. Critical Infrastructure Protection XV: 15th IFIP WG 11.10 International Conference ICCIP Revised Selected Papers. Springer, Jan 2022 [12].
• Vijay Kothari, Prashant Anantharaman et al. Capturing the iccMAX calculatorElement: A Case Study on Format Design, IEEE Security and Privacy
Workshops (SPW), 2022 [153].
Although Chapter 5 mostly includes new, unpublished work, portions of section 5.7 will appear later this year. This paper discusses our approach to dynamically
fixing various malformations in PDF files.
• Prashant Anantharaman et al. A Format-Aware Reducer for Scriptable Rewriting of PDF Files, IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2022 [13].
Chapters 6 and 7 include new work that has not appeared in any papers before
this thesis.
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Section 1.3

Prerequisites and Suggested Reading
A reader with a general understanding of computer science and engineering should
be able to follow this thesis. I have assumed no specific background or knowledge
in computer security, networking, theory of computation, or compilers while writing
this document. Instead, I have attempted to ensure that I introduce fundamentals
and theory as I use them to help the reader follow along.
However, several textbooks may help the reader understand concepts better—just
as they’ve helped me through my Ph.D. For an overview of computer security and
various input-handling vulnerabilities and attacks, I suggest:
• Sean Smith and John Marchesini. The Craft of System Security. Pearson Education, 2007 [252].
• Jon Erickson. Hacking: The Art of Exploitation. No starch press, 2008 [88].
• Ross Anderson. Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. John Wiley & Sons, 3rd Edition, 2020 [18].
A lot of the core LangSec concepts stem from formal language theory. I benefited greatly from the following books in understanding formal languages and parsing
algorithms:
• Michael Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation. 3rd Edition, Cengage Learning, 2013 [250].
• Ceriel J.H. Jacobs and Dick Grune, Parsing Techniques: A Practical Guide.
2nd Edition, Springer, 2008 [109].
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The reader may also benefit from a background in networking to follow some of
the concepts in Chapter 4. The following cover fundamentals and modern concepts
in networking:
• William Stallings, Computer Networking with Internet Protocols and Technology. Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2004 [261].
• Gary R. Wright and W. Richard Stevens. TCP/IP Illustrated, Volume 2: The
Implementation. Addison-Wesley Professional, 1995 [287].
Finally, type theory is another related field to LangSec and ties into formal methods and verification. I recommend the following books for a more thorough introduction to these concepts:
• Benjamin C. Pierce, Types and Programming Languages. MIT press, 2002 [218].
• Daniel Jackson. Software Abstractions: Logic, Language, and Analysis. MIT
press, 2012 [133].
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Chapter 2

Language-Theoretic Security
LangSec posits that we need to take a principled approach to input recognition—
rooted in formal language theory—to defend against exploits that rely on unintended
computation [44, 238]. The LangSec methodology requires complete recognition of
input before any processing happens. Once the input is stored in a local buffer, we
must validate it before performing any other processing.

Section 2.1

LangSec in a nutshell
LangSec presents a paradigm to design and implement correct and verified parsers
that exhaustively validate input based on a formal language. At its core, the principles
of LangSec can be boiled down to the following:
• Full recognition before processing: The acceptable or valid set of inputs to a
program must be defined using a formal language.
• Principle of least expressiveness: The formal language is kept as simple as
necessary (following the principle of least expressiveness [91]) in the Chomsky
Hierarchy [58].
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• Principle of parser computational equivalence: Two parsers deciding the same
grammar must be functionally equivalent.
We must separate the input validation process from the rest of the program in
a way that the program never acts on inadequately validated input and acts on
well-typed objects only. The parser must strictly adhere to the grammar and reject
any non-conforming inputs. However, extracting and writing grammars for various
networking protocols and file formats is not a trivial task. Such data formats often
contain dependent fields, length fields, and sometimes arbitrary seek operations.

Recognition Before Computation
LangSec advocates recognizing the input language—or more precisely, deciding the
input language—before the program performs any (non-parser) computation on that
input. That is, the program should be separated into a parser which rejects all invalid
input immediately, only allowing valid input to be passed on to the program internals.

Principle of Least Expressiveness
The principle of least privilege roughly states that an entity within a system, such
as a user or a process, should operate with the least privilege required to perform
the task at hand [237]. LangSec advocates a similar notion for the design of protocol
specifications or grammars and their parser implementations.
The Principle of Least Expressiveness states:
One should always use the least expressive grammar, language, or automaton that achieves the task.
This principle has the following two implications:
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• Protocols should be designed to be minimally expressive: no complex structures
that may be hard to implement.
• Parsers should be no more expressive than is required to decide the languages
specified by the protocols they obey.
Moreover, constraining expressiveness may assist humans in correctly conceptualizing protocol specifications and parser implementations.

Principle of Parser Computational Equivalence
Secure composition is one of the leading security challenges. As such, it is vital to
the security of interfaces. In particular, given two parsers that act on the same input,
those parsers must wholly agree, i.e., for every possible input, either they both accept
the input or they both reject it.
The Principle of Parser Computation Equivalence states:
Secure composition requires any two parsers that should decide the same
language, e.g., due to sharing a component-component boundary, do decide
that language.
Recall that the equivalence problem is not decidable for non-deterministic contextfree languages and more expressive languages, whereas it is decidable for deterministic
context-free languages. When constructing parsers involved in secure composition,
one should, therefore, aim to ensure they are no more expressive than deterministic
context-free.
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Section 2.2

The Halting Problem, Undecidability, and the
Equivalence Problems
LangSec builds upon the theory of computation. Here, I give a very brief primer of
the theory of computation and its branches to provide the requisite language and
machinery to understand the theoretical underpinnings of modern-day exploits. For
the reader who seeks a more complete treatment, I highly recommend Sipser’s acclaimed book [250]. In formal language theory, an alphabet is a non-empty finite set
of symbols. A string over an alphabet is a finite sequence of symbols belonging to that
alphabet. For example, consider what is colloquially considered the English alphabet:
Σ = {a, b, . . . , z}. Here, a ∈ Σ is a symbol belonging to the alphabet and the word
cat ∈ Σ∗ is a string over the alphabet. A language is defined in relation to an alphabet
as a set of strings over that alphabet. A natural way to express a language is to give
a grammar. A grammar specifies rules, each of which is a mapping from a variable to
a sequence of variables and symbols. A grammar comprises a start symbol along with
a sequence of rules. The language of the grammar is simply the language comprising
all strings generated by the start symbol. These language-theoretic notions form the
building blocks of automata theory and computability theory—the connection being
what computation is required to “capture” what language. This in turn lays the
foundation for language-theoretic security.
As suggested by its name, the central focus of automata theory is automata— or
mathematical models of computation— and their capabilities. Core to automata is
the notion of state, which roughly refers to a condition that may dictate a subsequent
course of action. Automata maintain state, often have some form of memory, and
perform computation on input in pursuit of some task, such as generating output
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or determining whether the supplied input is well-formed. The task that we are
concerned with in this chapter, which is perhaps the most common task, is to accept
or reject input. The automaton begins in a start state. The automaton (or perhaps
its operator) then repeatedly examines the state that the automaton is in; based on
that state, it will read symbols from the input and/or the memory that is part of
the automaton, such as a stack or a tape, it may perform an action such as writing a
symbol to memory, and it will transition to the next state. When supplied with input,
the automaton may either run indefinitely or it may terminate when some condition
is met, such as there being no symbols left to process. If the computation terminates,
the state that the automaton is in during termination determines whether the input
is to be accepted or rejected. That is, the automata we’re interested in take as input
a string and either accept or reject the string. An automaton recognizes a language if
the automaton accepts only those input strings that belong to that language. And it
decides a language if it accepts those strings that belong to the language and rejects
those that do not (instead of sometimes merely running forever).
Central to discussion of languages, grammars, and automata is the notion of expressiveness, which enables us to meaningfully differentiate classes of a given type.
A class of languages L is more expressive than a class of language L0 if L is a strict
superset of L0 . Similar notions of expressiveness exist for classes of grammars and
automata, grounded in the languages associated with these grammars and automata.
Thus, this notion of expressiveness intimately links classes of languages, grammars,
and automata, e.g., the grammars corresponding to the finite state automata are regular grammars and the corresponding languages are regular languages. Moreover, it
enables us to develop a nested classification schemes such as the well-known Chomsky Hierarchy. We find, for example, that in this classification hierarchy, finite state
machines (and the corresponding grammar and language classes of regular grammars
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and regular languages) are much less expressive than Turing machines (and the corresponding grammar and language classes of unrestricted grammars and recursively
enumerable languages).
A particularly well-known, expressive class of automata is Turing machines. Running a Turing machine on an input can lead to three outcomes: accept, reject, or loop.
The collection of strings M accepted or recognized by a language L, is denoted by
LM . Turing-recognizable languages are also called Recursively enumerable languages.
When a Turing machine rejects an input, it may reject or simply loop—not providing
a definitive answer. Hence, we prefer machines that halt on all inputs, or decides.
Such Turing machines are called Deciders or decidable languages.
All decidable languages are Turing recognizable. Certain classes of languages are
not recognizable using a Turing machine and there are still more that are undecidable. The classic example of a Turing-undecidable language comes from the Halting
Problem, which involves designing a Turing machine that accepts all (M , IM ) pairs
where M is a Turing machine and IM is an input for which M halts when run on M
and rejects all other Turing machine, input pairs.
It turns out that while the language of the halting problem, LT M , is not decidable,
it is recognizable. However, Turing-unrecognizable languages also exist; one such
example is the complement of LT M [250]. Recursive languages are exactly those
languages that are decidable; notably, the slightly less expressive context-sensitive
languages are also decidable.
Undecidability is relevant to LangSec because if an input language is computationally undecidable, then it cannot be validated—a validation layer will always let
some crafted attack inputs through. In addition, if an input language falls under the
class of recursively enumerable languages but not recursive languages (or Turing recognizable but not Turing decidable), then the validation process may not terminate
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on specific inputs and may end up looping. It is also relevant because of the equivalence problem—determining whether the language of one grammar is equivalent to
the language of another. In terms of LangSec: do two input validation layers accept
the same input? While this problem is undecidable in the general case and for many
context-free languages, it is decidable for deterministic context-free languages [242]
and regular languages.
For most complex data formats that fall beyond the deterministic context-free
boundary in the Chomsky Hierarchy, we cannot reasonably argue about the equivalence of two parsers implementing the same data format. Instead, developers have
usually tackled this problem by visually comparing grammars and implementing the
same parsing algorithms.

Section 2.3

Language-Theoretic Security vs.
Language-Based Security
Since the two names sound similar, it would be very easy for the reader to be confused
between these two separate research areas. Hence, I thought it would be good to
understand what Language-based security is and how the name is the only thing
similar between the two areas for all practical purposes.
The core principles of language-based security [239] can be distilled down to two
points:
• Principle of least privilege: Each software system component must be provided
with the least privilege possible.
• Minimal trusted computing base (TCB): When the TCB is small, it is easier to
argue and reason about its security.
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These principles stem from understanding how common vulnerabilities propagate
and how attacks proceed. For example, since a large software system traditionally
runs as a user or root, the permissions and accesses are set accordingly. However,
each tinier component of the larger system may not need access to all the accessible
files or data.
Language-Based Security argues the need for ways to design fine-grained security
policies and having ways to enforce these policies in the kernel. These techniques
restrict memory access by way of strict policies.
We can enforce policies using type-safe programming languages and theorem
provers where the correctness is guaranteed by the person writing the code. Additionally, security monitors provide another way of monitoring data requests and
ensuring that each data access is valid per the specified policies.
LangSec also argues the need for policies—but policies strictly pertaining to the
parsers. We provide a broad, well-defined notion of a functionally correct parser.
By providing clear definitions of correct parser behaviors, LangSec sits on top of the
stack of these methods. Any software system accepting input must apply LangSec
principles and policies for better guarantees.
LangSec policies cannot be enforced dynamically using monitors in the same sense
as Language-based security—but can be enforced using type checkers and theorem
provers. We can ensure security guarantees for the parser code written.

Section 2.4

Weird Machines
LangSec principles emanate from a deep understanding of exploits—what exploits
are, how they are crafted, and how they stem from unintended, latent computational
capabilities exposed by programs. Core to these threads of inquiry is the weird ma23
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chine [44], the engine of exploitation fueled by meticulously crafted input, which is
the focus of this section.
“Successful exploitation is always evidence of someone’s incorrect assumptions about the computational nature of the system—in hindsight, which
is 20-20.”
To understand the weird machine, let us start with the basics, a program. A program takes (potentially zero) input, performs (potentially zero) computation on that
input, and produces (potentially zero) output. The computation that the program
may perform is specified by the underlying machine upon which it executes. The
machine comprises a set of instructions, and the programmer carefully selects a sequence of instructions, each belonging to the instruction set provided by the machine,
to achieve the programming task at hand.
In many instances, the software programmer creates a program that seems to work
correctly; when given an anticipated input, it looks like it produces the correct output.
However, in practice, it is often the case that carefully selected input may drive hidden
computation that the programmer never intended. For example, supplying a given
input to the program may result in a register value changing on the machine on
which the target program is executed. These small bits of unintended input-driven
computation are referred to as weird instructions.

2.4.1. Programming the weird machine
Thomas Dullien discussed the implications of a weird machine [81]. Dullien described
how weird machines arise when the implementation fails to simulate the abstract
machine correctly.
• Complex programs, if attacked, favor the attacker since they are harder to debug
and isolate.
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• Even the simplest programs may contain sufficient vectors for an attacker to
launch an exploit.
• Automated exploit generation is equivalent to the problem of synthesizing a
program for a machine.
Based on this description, an exploit is essentially a program to the weird machine
that leads to the violation of various security properties in place—such as the integrity
of the heap and stack.

Unexploitability statements It is difficult to claim a specific machine is “unexploitable.” As we saw earlier, an exploit is essentially a program to a weird machine—
proving unexploitability relies on proving security properties on the machine, which
can be incredibly hard. Moreover, such a machine-assisted proof would have to iterate
over every possible input combination and state in the weird machine.

Modeling Vulnerabilities as Developer Errors
Since input-handling vulnerabilities are still on the rise every year, several authors
have created models to capture vulnerabilities as developer errors. These models
capture vulnerabilities to understand why developers make these mistakes and what
we can do to reduce future occurrences of these classes of vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities as blind spots A security blindspot occurs when a developer does
not completely understand what an API is supposed to be doing. Since developers
often do not think through all possibilities for their code and hence end up cutting
corners, Cappos et al. [53] propose viewing software vulnerabilities as blind spots
in a developer’s decision-making process. The authors converted vulnerabilities into
puzzles and proposed presenting these puzzles to a developer to understand these
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blindspots better. These puzzles provide a user with a series of hints to reproduce
the series of steps they followed in producing the flawed vulnerability.
In follow-on work, Oliviera et al. [24] conducted a study with 109 developers to
understand the root causes of vulnerabilities. They presented developers with puzzles
that were a series of questions about the APIs. By modeling security vulnerabilities
as blindspots, they found that programmers find it much harder to detect vulnerable
code in an API blindspot. They also found that even experienced developers find it
harder to detect these vulnerabilities.

A developer survey Although developers are often blamed for software vulnerabilities, not enough research has been done to understand how tightly security fits
into software development lifecycles. Assal et al. [207] explored why developers do
not pay sufficient attention to security by conducting an online study with 123 participants. They reported that developers thought only 19% of their time was spent
on security-related tasks on average. Developers also said they used mental checklists
and various programming tools to ensure secure software.
Such HCI-based studies are vital to understanding why humans introduce so many
vulnerabilities. We need more large-scale studies to understand coding patterns in
large open-source projects, as well as corporations. With this understanding, we could
provide users with more efficient and targeted tools to curb these vulnerabilities at
every stage of the software development lifecycle.

Section 2.5

Parser Combinators
The idea of parser combinators originates from functional programming [122]. A
general approach in functional programming to build recursive descent parser algo-

26

2.5 Parser Combinators

Language-Theoretic Security

rithms is to define each grammar construction operation such as sequences, choices,
and Kleene star as higher-order functions [210, 163, 73, 132]. This approach makes
composing larger parsers using these combinators a lot easier.
A parser-combinator tool is a library that provides these combinator functions—
where each of these functions returns a parser object that can be called on input.
On a successful parse, these parsers return an abstract syntax tree (AST) to provide
access to these parsed objects.
Syntax
h ch
h ch range
h uint8
h int range
h sequence
h choice
h many
h optional

Usage
h ch(‘a’)
h ch range(‘a’,‘z’)
h uint8()
h int range(1,16)
h sequence(h ch(‘a’),h ch(‘a’)
h choice(h ch(‘a’),h ch(‘b’))
h many(h ch(‘a’))
h optional(h (‘a’))

Semantics
Matches a single specified character token.
Matches a single token in the specified character range
Matches a single integer token
Matches a single integer token in the specified range
Performs as the concatenation combinator
Performs the boolean “or” operation
Performs as the Kleene Star operator
Specifies that matching the inner string is optional

Table 2.1: Syntax and usage for Hammer.
Although parser combinators are standard in the functional programming world,
Hammer [214] and Nom [66] were among the first parser combinators to be introduced
in the systems programming universe. Meredith Patterson introduced the Hammer
parser combinator as “Parser combinators for binary formats, in C.” This toolkit introduces several combinators primarily applicable for binary formats. Combinators
such as the ones used to define the endianness format and bit-level parsing are mostly
only applicable to binary formats. Table 2.5 provides an example to the parser combinator syntax used in Hammer. Additionally, Figure 2.1 demonstrates the mapping
of a data format to the parser combinator syntax.
Geoffoy Couprie took this work forward in 2015, introducing the first Rust-based
parser combinator—Nom [66, 57]. They discuss how we can build parsers that are
more suited to streaming protocols while focusing on eliminating memory copy instructions from their tool. They demonstrate how Nom combinators and Hammer
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Figure 2.1: Mapping of a data format to parser combinator syntax (adapted from [11])
combinators can be used to build parsers for the MP4 video format. They found that
Nom outperformed Hammer using less than a third of the time to parse the same
MP4 files.

Section 2.6

Data Description Languages
A different paradigm from parser combinators, where we implement parsers in code,
is the use of Data Description Languages (DDLs). In DDLs, we describe grammar in
particular syntax and run a parser generator to generate code in any target language.
Data Description Languages (DDLs) are essential to standardization efforts.
Standardization bodies can define the syntax and semantics of a data format in a
DDL and rely on the parser generation tools to generate parsers for most languages.
This approach can significantly reduce parser differentials.
RecordFlux defines a domain-specific language with its concrete syntax [228]. It
allows users to specify dependencies in the data using invariants. Next, they generate
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SPARK code to detail the behavior of various software components using contracts.
They use this generated SPARK code to prove the absence of runtime error conditions
and correctness in the generated code. Finally, they demonstrated their tool on
various TLS protocol messages, including heartbeat.
Nail is a parser generator for binary protocols that supports user-defined functions
to implement complex computations such as checksums and length fields [27]. Nail
also supports offsets that DFDL and Kaitai do not support directly. In addition,
nail grammars support real-world data formats such as DNS, UTF-16, and Ethernet
packets. However, since Nail builds on Hammer, it does not free heap memory after
use. Also, Nail generates C code, and the authors do not fuzz test the code to ensure
reliability. Code Snippet 2.6 demonstrates the Nail syntax on a portion of the TCP
segment.
segment = {
src_port uint16
dst_port uint16
seq_num uint32
ack_num uint32
}

Code Snippet 1: An example of the Nail language
Kaitai Struct is a data description language and a parser generation toolkit that
supports runtimes in several languages [295]. It is one of the most used DDLs and
supports various formats in its gallery. Kaitai relies on YAML syntax and unconventionally handles offsets using a syntax where locations and types associated with
those locations are defined. Additionally, they also support a web IDE to build specifications and visualize them with data. Code Snippet 2.6 demonstrates the Kaitai
Struct language on a simple TCP segment example. In this example, the endianness
is set to big-endian. The u2 and u4 types denote unsigned integers of varying lengths.
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meta:
id: tcp_segment
endian: be
seq:
- id: src_port
type: u2
- id: dst_port
type: u2
- id: seq_num
type: u4
- id: ack_num
type: u4

Code Snippet 2: An example of the Kaitai Struct Language
Data Format Description Language (DFDL) is an industry-standard often used
to model text-based and binary data [181]. The DFDL specifications or schemas are
used with the Daffodil runtime to parse data and convert the data to an information
set (infoset). DFDL schemas are described in XML syntax. DFDL is unique in
that it also includes a serializer to restore these infosets into binary data. However,
DFDL does not support complex constructs such as offsets and checksums. The
Code Snippet 2.6 provides an example similar to the TCP segment demonstrated in
Snippet 2.6. This example demonstrates DFDL’s XML syntax.
<xs:complexType name="TCP">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name='TCPHeader'>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="PortSRC" type="b:bit" dfdl:length="16"/>
<xs:element name="PortDest" type="b:bit" dfdl:length="16"/>
<xs:element name="Seq" type="b:bit" dfdl:length="32"/>
<xs:element name="Ack" type="b:bit" dfdl:length="32"/>

Code Snippet 3: An example of the DFDL schema Language
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The DaeDaLus DDL [111] defines data formats in a syntax that closely resembles
Nail [27]—while implementing it as a library within Haskell. Additionally, DaeDaLus
also includes a parser generator for C++. At its core, DaeDaLus relies on various
Haskell features, for example, offsets and other complex constructs.
The Parsley Data Definition Language [198] (hereafter, the Parsley language)
provides users to input data descriptions in a BNF-like syntax while building on other
parsing approaches such as data-dependent languages [138] and parsing expression
grammars [98]. The Parsley language includes a compiler and an interpreter, both
written in OCaml and designed to work for file formats such as PDF and network
formats such as DNS.
DDLs provide a rich syntax to describe data format syntax and their constraints
and dependencies. However, many user studies are still needed to understand the lack
of significant adoption of DDLs in the industry. I envision that DDLs would provide
a machine-readable, concise language to describe data formats instead of the longwinded text specifications available today. In addition, DDLs can play a huge role by
generating parsers in various programming languages from a single machine-readable
specification, bringing us closer to eliminating parser differentials.

Parser Combinators are not DDLs
In the previous section (Section 2.5), we studied parser combinators and their usage.
The use case for parser combinators and DDLs are very similar. They are both used
to produce parsers that can then be imported into existing applications. However,
there are certain differences in their uses, and both methodologies have their positives
and negatives.

31

2.7 Parsing Algorithms

Language-Theoretic Security

Parser combinators normally do not generate code In the parser combinator
approach, we commit to a programming language L and use a combinator library that
supports input in the language L of our choice. DDLs, on the other hand, support
code generation. We define the specification in a DDL and generate code in one of
the languages supported in the code generators.

Porting parser combinator code Once we have a specification implemented using parser combinators, we need to rewrite the format using a new parser combinator
syntax for the second language to port it from the programming language to another language. Unfortunately, even in parsing tools such as Hammer—where the
same tool provides bindings in several languages—the syntax in different programming languages is different. This forces developers to rewrite syntax or build ways to
translate the syntax from one language to another.

Correcting errors in DDLs DDL developers follow a methodology where any
bug fixes are made to the original description in the DDL and not to the generated
code. This means that every time a small tweak has to be made, we generate code
again and import it into the application. In contrast, parser combinator developers
can directly modify the parser code in the application.

Section 2.7

Parsing Algorithms
Parsing algorithms construct a parse tree based on the set of grammar productions
to indicate how the input string can be produced from a given grammar. A parse
tree for an input with n tokens would have n nodes belonging to the terminals and
many nodes of the intermediate non-terminals. A depth-first traversal of the parse
tree should produce the original input string.
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Ambiguity An input that can be represented with more than one parse tree is
known as ambiguous. Although ambiguity could be the only way to be parsed for
some grammars, parsing algorithms for ambiguous grammars is highly inefficient.
The Cocke-Younger-Kasami (CYK) [144, 298, 112] and Earley [83] algorithms can
recognize unrestricted and ambiguous context-free grammars in O(n3 ) runtime, where
n is the input size.

Context-Free Grammars These grammars occupy a prominent position in the
research of parsing algorithms since the description of CFG rules translates well to a
parsed-tree representation, and these grammars can capture natural language syntax
well. Parsing algorithms are traditionally top-down or bottom-up. The Unger [274]
and Earley [83] algorithms are standard top-down parsing algorithms, and the CYK
algorithm presents a commonly used bottom-up algorithm for CFGs.
The LL parser is a deterministic top-down method that moves left to right on
the input. In particular, the LL(1) parser is extremely popular [108]. The LR parser
identifies the rightmost production instead of the leftmost production in the LL approach [164, 139]. The (1) in LL denotes how many character lookaheads are allowed.
An unbounded LL(k) variant also exists. ANTLR uses an LL(*) algorithm that
recognizes some context-sensitive languages [212]. LL(*) is a linear algorithm that
supports a language with predicates and lookahead.

PEGs Bryan Ford proposed Parsing Expression Grammars (PEGs) [98] to resolve
ambiguities in context-free grammars (CFGs) by (1) using ordered choice instead of
an ambiguous, unordered choice, and (2) making the Kleene star operation greedy,
instead of supporting backtracking. The Packrat algorithm generalizes the approach
to parsing PEGs and uses linear time and space [97].
Jim et al. proposed YAKKER, a parsing engine that supports modern data-
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processing applications [138]. They implemented a variation of Earley’s parsing
algorithm to parse their nondeterministic automata. Their algorithms support unrestricted context-free grammars and regular expressions on the right-hand side of
nonterminal definitions.
Valiant’s algorithm for unrestricted context-free grammar uses the efficient matrix multiplication algorithm to reduce the computational complexity from O(n3 ) to
O(n2.38 ). Jansson et al. formalized this algorithm in Agda [135].

Parsing with Derivatives Brzozowski derivatives were first defined for regular
languages [47]. A derivative of a language is a subset of the language that has been
filtered. For example, let us consider a language L containing the following strings
{prash, poo, bar}. The derivative of this language with respect to the character p can
be defined as:
Dp = {rash, oo}
Intuitively, the language set we get after performing the derivative, restricts the
set of input to only those that start with the letter p in the above case. We then
remove this initial character from the remaining set.
To determine if an input i or length n is in a language L, we successively compute
the derivatives n times. At each of the input stages, the derivative must be non-null,
and the derivative must be null for the last input. Computing the derivative of a
language with respect to an input token is straightforward.
However, derivatives become extremely complex when we expand this to CFGs
for two reasons. First, since CFGs are recursive, the derivatives would never lead to
null sets and hence would lead to non-termination. Second, derivatives only check
input membership and do not produce a parse tree. Might et al. [184] present an
extension to the derivatives approach to recognize CFGs. Henriksen et al. [114] also
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extended the derivatives approach to recognize input in O(n2 ) time and produce
parse trees in O(n3 ) time. They also showed connections between the derivatives
obtained and the Earley sets. Most recently, in 2020, Edelmann et al. [84] presented
a verified implementation of a linear-time algorithm to parse context-free expressions
using derivatives.
Given the recent revival in work looking at using derivatives to parse formal languages, there may soon be extensions to these algorithms to look beyond context-free
languages into data formats. Data format parsers usually require a parse tree generator and a recognizer. Given explorations in producing parse trees using derivatives,
a data format parser may be an achievable target.
A more significant reason I believe parsing with derivatives is a useful research
direction is the simplicity and explainability that comes with it. Parser debugging is
a challenging problem, especially since often we are confused if the bugs exist in the
parser, parser generator, or the language description. A derivative-based approach
can provide the derivatives for each input stage, significantly reducing the debugging
effort.

Hardware Parsing Algorithms Researchers have explored parsing context-free
grammars (CFGs) in FPGAs. Most of these approaches provide ways to parallelize
the traditional parsing algorithms. Ciresson et al. [61] presented an algorithm to parse
unrestricted CFGs in FPGAs and demonstrated a 240x speedup to use it in natural
language processing applications. Bordim et al. [39] implemented the Cocke-KasamiYounger algorithm to parse CFGs in an FPGA and showed a 750x speedup over a
software implementation. Taylor proposed generating FPGA code from parser code
in C using High-Level Synthesis (HLS) tools [269]. They mostly focus their efforts on
simplifying library functions in the Hammer parser toolkit to generate VHDL from
it. Lucas et al. [171] provide a parallel implementation of PEGs in VHDL.
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Section 2.8

Verified Parsers
Verified parsers have been explored for several years, ever since verification tools have
been commonly available due to the application to building secure compilers. Such
verification approaches prove several properties. For example, researchers often prove
that a particular algorithm is equivalent to another naive algorithm by showing that
these two algorithms produce the same output for all inputs. Researchers also use
verification tools to prove specific properties, such as completeness or correctness, by
providing a strict definition of these properties and a machine-assisted proof that the
verified implementation satisfies these properties.
Verifying PEG parsers and interpreters has been a rich avenue for research since
PEGs are unambiguous and can be parsed using a simple recursive-descent algorithm.
In 2020, Blaudeau et al. [37] built a verified PEG parser in PVS. They defined what
a well-formed PEG was and proved that their implementation terminates for all wellformed PEGs. TRX also formalized the notion of termination for PEGs [152]. The
CakeML compiler used a PEG parser verified using HOL4 [156].
Barthwal et al. demonstrated an SLR parser generator verified in HOL4 that
also produces a verifiable parse tree [29]. Ridge verified a recursive descent parser’s
termination and soundness properties by using parser combinators for context-free
languages [230]. A lot of work has focused on building verified encoder-decoder pairs
to be able to serialize and deserialize data [75, 277].

Verified Parsing of Binary Formats Unfortunately, not much work has happened in building verified parsers and parsing toolkits for binary formats. Van Geest
et al. [277] described binary languages using the data types in a general-purpose dependently typed language. They demonstrated their parser and pretty-printer on
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IPv4 protocol. Ramanandro et al. [226] also built a parser generator for tag-lengthvalue languages. They generated parsers using a simple message format description
and verified a parser-combinator toolkit using F* and Low*.
Additionally, in this thesis I implemented ParseSmith: a parser interpreter that
can handle complex structures in binary formats (Chapter 6). Similar to the above
approaches, we defined the security and safety properties vital to us and built invariants in code to prove those safety properties.

Section 2.9

Grammar Learning
There are thousands of known file formats—some open source and some proprietary.
To adhere to the LangSec principles, the parsers for these data formats must conform to the standards specified. However, in practice, implementations do deviate in
several ways [21]. Grammar learning approaches provide ways to learn the grammar
from either a corpus of input or the protocol implementation. Higuera et al. [74]
summarize and discuss decades of research in grammar inference—mostly focused on
natural languages. Lee [162] summarize decades of research on learning context-free
languages.
Protocol reverse engineering has its ties to the formal language problem of grammar induction or learning. We wish to learn a protocol syntax and state machine
using network traces and implementation source code. Protocol syntax captures individual message formats within a network protocol—describing the various fields.
A protocol state machine captures what messages are expected as a response to a
message X.
Learning grammars solely from input samples is, however, not possible. Instead,
algorithms such as Angluin’s L* rely on an oracle to at least respond with coun37
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terexamples given a learned regular grammar [19]. The algorithm will then use this
counterexample to produce a more accurate grammar. Unfortunately, building such
an oracle for protocols when we have no prior knowledge is difficult.

Protocol Reverse Engineering The goal of input reverse engineering is to understand the syntax of network protocol messages or a file format without specifications.
Often companies use proprietary protocols and file formats to transmit data—making
it challenging to build intrusion detection tools that can detect malformations in data
that use these formats.
Another security application is understanding how a particular parser implementation deviates from other implementations in subtle ways. For example, Argyros et
al. [21], and Poll et al. [134, 278] found that various operating systems implemented
the TCP protocol state machine slightly differently—especially in the finishing states.
Attackers can use these differences in parsers and state machines to fingerprint devices.
Hence, with these goals, reversing input formats is a significant problem and is of
great relevance to the LangSec community. By finding these parser differentials, we
can reduce mismatches between parsers and build a taxonomy of grammar drifts.
In 2007, Caballero et al. [49] proposed the idea of using dynamic analysis of
program binaries to reverse engineer network protocols. They learned the syntax of
five different network protocols and compared the learned syntax to the Wireshark
implementation. They demonstrate that their tools can generate accurate syntax and
be used for better grammar-aware fuzzing and fingerprint generation. Wondracek et
al. [286] presented another technique to extract protocol grammars. Instead of using
single packets to understand field boundaries, they use dynamic analysis on multiple
inputs of the same type to extract a grammar specification for that message format.
AutoFormat [169] monitors the call stack to gather information about fields and their
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dependencies.
Cui et al. [70] presented Discoverer, a tool to use network traces to learn a format.
They focus on learning the message formats and leave the protocol state machine to
future work. They tokenize input grouping raw bytes or text and then cluster these
tokens to discover patterns from several packets. The grammar learned by Discoverer
may not be complete since it can only learn syntax that is present in the corpus.
Cui et al. later presented Tupni [71], a tool to extract file formats from an input corpus and an implementation of the format. They demonstrated their tool on
complex formats such as WMV, BMP, PNG, and other network protocols such as
DNS, RPC, HTTP, and FTP. They learn the boundaries to each field in the format, sequence of fields (such as long sequences of image chunks or DNS records),
and constraints followed by fields. They rely on a taint tracking engine to trace
x86 instructions directly. They also use Tupni to generate signatures for zero-day
vulnerabilities for ShieldGen [72].
Most recently, Ye et al. [296] presented NetPlier, a technique that uses only network traces and no binary analysis to reverse a network protocol. They use a multiple
sequence alignment instead of the single sequence alignment used in the past (Protocol
Informatics [30], and Netzob [40]). Their key contribution is to probabilistically predict which locations are the keywords deciding what message type in the protocol it is.
Normally, the first byte in the application layer is magic characters showing that the
message conforms to a certain protocol (for example, the real-time publish-subscribe
protocol uses the magic word “RTPS” at the beginning of a packet). Following these
magic bytes, messages contain a field to specify what type of packet it is.
Protocol state machines are one level higher than message formats. Network
protocols traditionally comprise multiple messages. To reverse engineer a protocol
state machine using data, you need input sequences for each path in the protocol
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state machine to understand all the different dependencies possible.
Wang et al. proposed Veritas, a tool to produce a probabilistic protocol state
machine (P-PSM) [281]. They demonstrated their tool on several real-world protocols
by generating these state machines from network traces. Prospex, on the other hand,
uses program execution traces and dynamic analysis to extract the protocol state
machine [63].
Krueger et al. [154] used specialized embedding and clustering techniques to reverse message formats and state machines. First, they embed a message in a vector
space to understand statistically significant features. Next, each group or sequence
of events is labeled as an event. Finally, they compose these events to produce a
probabilistic state machine using Markov models.

Grammar Learning Algorithms Learning formal grammars has its applications.
First, by learning the grammar syntax followed by input in a corpus, we can identify
various common patterns seen in the input. Second, learning the natural language
followed by the input also aids in speech recognition.

Feasibility One of the crucial questions in learning grammars was answered in
1967 by Mark Gold. It is not feasible to learn grammars in any of the four classes of
languages in the Chomsky hierarchy using only a corpus of input samples [162, 103].
In addition, Angluin showed that even with the ability to ask equivalence queries,
there is no guarantee that the grammar would be found in polynomial time [20]. We
study how researchers have gotten around these two theorems by relying on dynamic
taint analysis, probabilistic approaches, and other learning techniques.
Hoschele et al. [121] use language induction along with taint tracking to understand the origins of various input fragments by generating context-free grammars
using dynamic analysis. First, these input fragments are inserted in an interval tree.
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The children of any node in this interval tree would correspond to the entire input
on the root node. For each node in the interval tree, they then compute all possible productions by creating a sequence of other terminals and non-terminals. They
demonstrate their grammar induction tools on formats such as CSV, JSON, INI,
and URLs. Of these formats, only JSON needs to be described using context-free
grammars. Other formats can be described using regular languages.
Argyros et al. [21] presented SFADiff, a tool to learn the grammars for web application firewalls and TCP protocol state machines. In addition, they demonstrated a
framework for learning symbolic-finite automata (SFA) and comparing them. Their
approach relies on the Angluin L* algorithm and only applies to regular languages.
However, this approach presents a way to compare protocol implementations to uncover parser differentials.
Cowger et al. built ICARUS, a grammar inference engine that uses reinforcement
learning [67]. They used “merge parsing” to combine neighboring terminals and
nonterminals repeatedly. The merge policy is random at first, and then the rewards
are adjusted based on the expected parse trees. They eventually reach an approximate
merge policy. They demonstrated their approach on context-free grammars in the
JSON format but not on other practical data formats.
In summary, being able to infer grammar, data format syntax, and the protocol
state machine is crucial to building better intrusion detection tools. For decades,
researchers have looked at what information would be needed to predict the grammar
followed by input accurately. More recently, researchers have turned to reinforcement
learning and dynamic analysis to leverage parser code other than just using an input
corpus. However, many traditional algorithms, such as L*, used to learn grammars
require oracles or teachers that provide counterexamples if a particular grammar
produced is incorrect. This is not a reasonable expectation in the case of black-box
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proprietary protocols and implementations.

Section 2.10

Conclusions
This section provided an overview and survey of prior LangSec research focused on
various topics. I believe that each of these topics provides an avenue for plenty
of future work. In addition, a lot of these LangSec sub-areas need to progress in
tandem for better outcomes. For example, as we design new language classes to
capture data formats in the existing Chomsky Hierarchy, we must also design newer
grammar learning approaches to learn these languages automatically and new parsing
algorithms to recognize input in these languages.
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Motivation
Understanding how vulnerabilities occur in code and how they are exploited is key to
building better software and security solutions that can tackle exploits. In previous
chapters, we understood what the core principles of LangSec are and various research
directions tied to LangSec. In this chapter, I will discuss some of my early work in
understanding vulnerabilities and categorizing them based on various features. This
chapter motivates my work in later chapters.
Although developers introduce bugs and vulnerabilities in code, exploits need to
be crafted to take advantage of such artifacts. Attackers craft input to programs to
create such exploits. These inputs are usually buffers read from sockets, files, or direct
user input. For these exploits to succeed, the parser—the first line of defense for any
program accepting input—must have a vulnerability or allow an exploit through.
Input-handling vulnerabilities can be triggered via crafted user input. Buffer overflows and buffer overreads are examples of such vulnerabilities. Exploits using inputhandling vulnerabilities could cause damage to a user in various ways. (1) Attackers
can gain remote access to a machine. (2) Attackers can cause a denial-of-service
attack by crashing a process using a crafted input. (3) Attackers can leak private
information from a host machine. I describe buffer overflows and buffer overreads
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and provide various real-world examples of these attacks.

Buffer overflows and overreads
Buffer overflows occur when we try to copy a buffer into a destination buffer of a
smaller size [208]. This results in the memory locations adjacent to the destination buffer being overwritten. An attacker can replace the subroutine return address
on the stack using a buffer overflow and return to a subroutine in libc which includes useful commands such as system [77]. Attackers can use a command such as
system("/bin/sh") to get access to a shell on the target machine.
The first known occurrence of a buffer overflow was in 1972 [17] when the Computer Security Technology Planning Study noted that some functions do not check
the source and destination addresses, which can lead to some of the kernel memory
being overwritten. However, the first known occurrence of a buffer overflow in the
wild was the Morris Worm [256].
Morris Worm used the Finger command on Unix systems to replicate [241, 31].
The Finger command accepts a request about a user and provides simple information
such as their name, location, and extension numbers as a response. The Finger
command, however, accepts the remote request using gets() with a 512-byte buffer
on the stack. Hence, Morris Worm uses a 536-byte message to overrun the stack and
overwrite the return address.
Buffer overreads are another type of memory safety violation. An attacker can
trick a program into reading data beyond its buffer boundaries. Let us consider
the example of the Heartbleed bug [82, 301]. Heartbeat messages are used to keep
OpenSSL encrypted connections alive. These messages follow the format shown in
Figure 3.1. The heartbeat message holds a size and a payload field.
The receiving party needs to send back a message with the identical size and
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Request/Response
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Payload Length

Payload

Figure 3.1: Syntax of a Heartbeat message in TLS. The client sends a request and
expects to receive an identical response with just the packet type changed.
payload. However, if the payload length and the size field do not match, the receiving
party must silently drop the packet. Instead, the library would read the number of
bytes prescribed by the size and send them back to the sender. If the attacker sends
over a large size value, such as 32000, they can expect to read the private contents
of memory, such as private keys. An attack such as Heartbleed does not leave logs in
the operating system and can be very difficult to detect.
Similarly, there was a parser bug in popular implementations of the point-to-point
protocol (PPP). PPP is widely used to establish internet connections and transfer
data [248]. PPP implementations also support the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to provide additional authentication. In 2020 it was found that an attacker
could send a crafted EAP packet to a vulnerable PPP server and use the unverified
data in the malformed packet to corrupt the stack using a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability [145]. Surprisingly, this bug existed in the code base for the last
17 years. Since PPP software often runs with high privileges such as root on Linux
machines, attackers could use this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code.

Parser Differentials
When a new deployment of a particular protocol needs to interact with other existing
deployments, most systems tend to be more permissive and accept data with various
malformations and deficiencies. However, by following such a paradigm, over time,
we would get several implementations of the same protocol that disagree with each
other in subtle and tiny ways. Such parser implementations that deviate from the
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specification and each other are called parser differentials.
A classic case of a parser differential was found by Dan Kaminsky, Len Sassaman,
and Meredith Patterson in 2010 [142]. They found that the URLs in certificates
get parsed very differently by various OpenSSL parsers. For example, when a null
character \0 is added in the middle of a URL in a certificate, not only does a certificate
authority issue a certificate with this null character, different parsers read the URLs
differently. Some parsers terminate the string at the null character. Some other
parsers either skip the null character or leave the null character in the middle of
the URL. An attacker can leverage these inconsistencies to craft certificates that get
rendered differently on different browsers—leading to phishing attacks where we may
think we are on a secure, HTTPS-enabled web page.
Spath et al. [258] discuss several parser differentials in various XML parsers. They
crafted several XML messages to cause denial of service attacks by resource consumption. They also craft messages to gain file system access on the host machine. They
found that most of these XML parsers were susceptible to some of these crafted files.
However, some of the countermeasures they propose to limit and counteract these
vulnerabilities included limiting the allocated resources by implementing thresholds
and filtering by validating input based on allowlists and blocklists. This thesis argues
that although limiting thresholds can be a good software engineering practice, we
need to take a more holistic approach to input validation instead of just using lists.
Apple uses property lists or plists to store serialized data such as configurations
and permissions [300]. The plists that store code signatures are called entitlements.
Siguza found that iOS used at least four different XML parsers, and they have differentials in how they handle comments in XML. As a result, an attacker can craft plists
containing material that some parsers ignore as comments, whereas others believe to
be authentic signatures.

46

Motivation

Motivation

In 2013, Jeff Forristal revealed the Android Master Key vulnerability at the Black
Hat Conference [136]. This was yet another case of a parser differential. Since Android
applications are essentially a collection of compressed (ZIP) files, this attack leverages
the fact that if there are multiple versions of a file within a ZIP archive, Android
verifies and extracts only the first version. Therefore, the implications of this attack
were huge—attackers could replace files within an application to launch arbitrary
code without users detection.
Most recently, in January 2022, Moshe et al. [196] and Stenberg [263] found that
there are two specifications commonly used to define URLs—RFC 3986 and the Web
Hypertext Application Technology Working Group (WHATWG). The WHATWG
URL specification was found to differ from RFC 3986 in some minor ways, such
as handling both slashes the same. Additionally, Moshe et al. tested four URLencoding confusions against 16 popular URL libraries across languages and browsers.
They found that implementations sometimes used multiple URL parsing libraries in
code that may be incompatible and led to denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
In summary, parser differentials and improper input validation are two broad categories of input-handling vulnerabilities that commonly appear in large systems. Using
memory-safe languages mitigates many vulnerabilities commonly seen in C/C++ applications. However, parser differentials can occur in any programming language and
data format. Therefore, we need better tools to aid developers in designing parsers
that are less susceptible to these attacks. Similarly, we also need robust description
languages to aid standardization bodies in developing machine-readable specifications.

Taxonomies of Input-Handling Vulnerabilities
In recent years, several popular vulnerabilities such as HeartBleed [82], Android Master Key [136], and Apple Mail’s 0-click attack [300] have been parser errors of some
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kind. Although all of these vulnerabilities are triggered via user input, we describe
how they differ in the subsections that follow. Each of these vulnerabilities stems
from an underlying anti-pattern followed by the developers.
In the rest of this section, we discuss various taxonomies describing LangSec antipatterns and input-handling vulnerabilities. Such a discussion would provide the
reader with an understanding of what kind of anti-patterns and vulnerabilities are
common and how the LangSec methodology tackles them. First, we describe a taxonomy where we understand the root causes of vulnerabilities in code by capturing them
as mismatches in interpretations or mismorphisms (Section 3.1). Then, we present
a categorization of vulnerabilities based on the nature of the bugs as perceived by
developers using software (Section 3.2).

Section 3.1

Mismorphism-based Approach1
Mismatches between the perceptions of the designer, the implementor, and the user
often result in protocol vulnerabilities [14, 8]. The designer has a high-level vision
for how they believe the protocol should function, and this vision guides the creation of the specification. In practice, the specification may diverge from the initial
vision due to real-world constraints, e.g., hardware or real-time requirements. The
implementor then produces code to meet the specification based on their perceptions
of how the protocol should function and, in some cases, how the user will interact
with it. However, incorrect assumptions may produce vulnerabilities in the form
of bugs or unintended operation. A user—informed by their own assumptions and
perceptions—may then interact with a system or service that relies upon the protocol.
A misunderstanding of the protocol and its operation can drive the user toward a de1
This section borrows from my previous work in [14, 8]. I primarily collaborated with Vijay
Kothari and Sean Smith on this work.
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cision that produces an unintended outcome. Ultimately, the security of the protocol
rests on the consistency between the various actors’ mental models of the protocol,
the protocol specification, and the protocol implementation.
A mismorphism refers to a mapping between different representations of reality
(e.g., the distinct mental model of the protocol designer, the protocol implementor,
and the end user) for which properties that ought to be preserved are not. In the
past, we have used this concept and an accompanying semiotic-triad-based model to
succinctly express the root causes of usable security failures [253]. We now apply this
model to protocol design, development, and use. As mentioned earlier, many vulnerabilities stem from a mismatch between different actors’ representations of protocols
and the protocol operation in practice, e.g., the HeartBleed [82] vulnerability embodies a mismatch between the protocol specification, which involved validating a length
field, and the implementation, which failed to do so. Therefore, it is natural to adopt
the mismorphism model to examine the root causes of protocol vulnerabilities. That
is precisely what we do in this work.
We examined protocol vulnerabilities and the mismorphisms upon which they are
rooted. We developed a logic to express these mismorphisms, which enables us to
capture the human mismatches that produce in vulnerabilities in code. Finally, we
used this logical formalism to catalog the underlying mismorphisms that produce
real-world vulnerabilities.
To represent mismorphisms we need a way to express the relationship between
interpretations of a predicate. Thus, we have the following:

[P redicate] [Interpretation Relation] [List of interpreters]
The interpretation relations over the set of all predicate-interpreter pairs are k-ary
relations where k >= 2 is the number of interpreters there are in the interpretation
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relation— and each k-ary relation is over the interpretations of the predicate by the k
interpreters. The three interpretation relations we are concerned with in this work are:
the interpretation-equivalence relation ( = ), the interpretation-uncertainty relation
interp.

?

( = ), and the interpretation-inequivalence relation ( 6= ).2 These relations are
interp.

interp.

defined as follows, where each P represents a predicate and each Ai represents an
interpreter:
– P

=

interp.

A1 , A2 , . . . Ak if and only if P , as interpreted by each Ai , has a truth

value that’s either T or F (never U )— and all interpretations yield the same
truth value.
– P

?

= A1 , A2 , . . . Ak if and only if P takes on the value U when interpreted by

interp.

at least one Ai .
– P

6= A1 , A2 , . . . Ak if and only if P interpreted by Ai is T and P interpreted
interp.

by Aj is F for some i 6= j.
There are a few important observations to note here. One is that the oracle O
always holds the correct truth value for the predicate by definition. Another is that if
?

we only know the = relation applies, we won’t know which interpreter is uncertain
interp.

about the predicate or even how many interpreters are uncertain unless k = 2 and one
interpreter is the oracle. Similarly, if we only know that the 6= relation applies, we
interp.

do not know where the mismatch exists unless k = 2. That said, knowledge that the
oracle O always holds the correct interpretation combined with other facts can help
specify where the uncertainty or inequivalence stems from. Last, the = relation will
interp.

?

not be applicable if either the = or the 6= interpretations are applicable; however,
interp.

P

?

= A1 , . . . Ak and P

interp.

interp.

6= A1 , . . . Ak can both be applicable simultaneously.
interp.

2

Note that for k = 2, if we confine ourselves to predicates that take on only T or F values, the
relation = is an equivalence relation in the mathematical sense, as one might expect, i.e., it obeys
interp.

reflexivity, commutativity, and transitivity.
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The purpose of creating this model was to allow us to capture mismorphisms.
Mismorphisms correspond to instances where either the interpretation-uncertainty
relation or interpretation-inequivalence relation apply.

Shotgun Parsers
Shotgun parsers perform input data checking and handling interspersed with processing logic.3 Shotgun parsers do not perform full recognition before the data is
processed. Hence, implementors may assume that a field x has the same value at
time t and time t + δ, but the processing logic may change the value of the field x in
an input buffer B.
This mismorphism relation is seen below:

B(t) = B(t + δ) 6= O, I

(3.1)

interp.

Implementors may expect the buffer to be intact across time, but that is not
observed to be the case. Shotgun parsing can cause mismorphisms in two distinct
ways. First, a partially validated input may be wrongly treated as though it is fully
validated. Suppose Implementor 1 performs the shotgun parsing and know the input
to be only partially validated. Then, Implementor 2 works on execution and assumes
the input is fully validated by the time the code segment is executed. This type of a
shotgun parser mismorphism can be represented as follows:

B is accepted 6= I1 , I2

(3.2)

interp.

Second, the same implementor may perform shotgun parsing and be responsible for
3

The term shotgun parser has to be rethought.
Phrases associated with military
actions or violence are not inclusive: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/style-guide/
bias-free-communication. I propose using the term sprinkled parsers instead of shotgun parsers.
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working on the execution code. But they may interpret the same protocol differently
during those different times. This type of a mismorphism can be represented as
follows:

B is accepted 6= I t1 , I t2

(3.3)

interp.

Parser Inequivalence for the Same Protocol
Designers of protocols intend for two endpoints to have the exact same functionality,
and build identical parse trees. The Android Master Key bug [136] is an apt example
for this type of a mismorphism. The parsers for the unzipping function in Java and
C++ were not equivalent, leading to a parsing differential.
We describe this relation as:

Parsers P1 , P2 are equivalent 6= O, D, I

(3.4)

interp.

Implementor is Unaware that Some Fields Must Be Validated
Designers of protocols introduce new features in the specification of the protocol
without describing them fully or accurately. The designer introduces a field x in
the protocol, but the interpreter does not entirely understand how to interpret it.
The HeartBleed vulnerability [82] was an example of this. The designers included
the heartbeat message, but the implementors did not completely understand it and
missed an additional check to make sure the length fields matched.

sanity check C is performed 6= O, D, I
interp.

52

(3.5)

3.1 Mismorphism-based Approach

Motivation

Types of Fields in Buffer are Not Fixed During Buffer Life
Cycle
The types of values that have already been parsed must remain constant. Sometimes,
implementors assume field x is treated as type t(x) throughout execution. In reality,
the field may be treated as a different type at certain points during execution.

type(x) is fixed 6= O, D, I

(3.6)

interp.

3.1.1. A Catalog of Vulnerabilities and Their Mismorphisms
Below, we provide a small catalog of some vulnerabilities and the mismorphisms that
we believe produced them.
Shellshock: Bash unintentionally executes commands that are concatenated to function definitions that are inside environment variables [180].
sanity check C is performed 6= O, D, I
interp.

The sanity check C here makes sure that once functions are terminated, the variable
shouldn’t be reading commands that follow it.
Rosetta Flash: SWF files that are requested using JSONP are incorrectly parsed
once they are compressed using zlib. Compressed SWF files can contain only alphanumeric characters [257].
sanity check C is performed 6= O, D, I
interp.

The specification of the SWF file format is not exhaustively validated using a grammar. The fix uses conditions such as checking for the first and last bytes for special,
non-alphanumeric characters.
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Heartbleed: The protocol involves two length fields, one that specifies the total
length of the heartbeat message; the other specifies the size of the payload of the
heartbeat message [82].
sanity check C is performed 6= O, D, I
interp.

Sanity check C involves verifying the length fields l1 and l2 match.
Android Master Key: The Java and C++ implementations of the cryptographic
library performing unzipping were not equivalent [99].
Parsers P1 , P2 are equivalent 6= O, D, I
interp.

Ruby on Rails - Omakase The Rails YAML loader doesn’t validate the input
string and check that it is valid JSON. And it doesn’t load the entire JSON; instead,
it just starts replacing characters to convert JSON to YAML [229].
sanity check C is performed 6= O, D, I
interp.

Sanity check C should first recognize and make sure the JSON is well-formed, before
replacing the characters in YAML.
Nginx HTTP Chunked Encoding: Large chunk size for the Transfer-Encoding
chunk size trigger integer signedness error and a stack-based buffer overflow [175].
B is accepted 6= I1 , I2
interp.

The shotgun parser works on execution without validating the value of the length
field, which could be much larger than allowed, thereby causing buffer overflows.
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All implementors must work with the same knowledge, and the input must first be
recognized fully.
Elasticsearch Crafted Script Bug: Elasticsearch runs Groovy scripts directly in
a sandbox. Attackers were able to craft a script that would bypass the sandbox check
and execute shell commands [195].
?

L is decidable = O, D
interp.

Developers of Elasticsearch had to explore the option of abandoning Groovy in favor
of a safe and less dynamic alternative.
Mozilla NSS Null Character Bug: When domain names included a null character,
there was a discrepancy between the way certificate authorities issued certificates and
the way SSL clients handled them. Certificate authorities issued certificates for the
domain after the null character, whereas the SSL clients used the domain name ahead
of the null character [141].
Parsers P1 , P2 are equivalent 6= O, D, I
interp.

Although having a null character in a certificate is not accepted behavior, certificate
authorities and clients do not want to ignore requests that contain them. So they
follow their own interpretations, resulting in a parser differential.
Adobe Reader CVE-2013-2729: In running length encoded bitmaps, Adobe
Reader wrote pixel values to arbitrary memory locations since there was a bounds
check that was skipped [93].
B is accepted 6= I1 , I2
interp.
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The code used a shotgun parser where the implementor of the processing logic assumed all fields were validated. The bounds check was never performed.
OpenBSD - Fragmented ICMPv6 Packet Remote Execution: Fragmented
ICMP6 packets cause an overflow in the mbuf data structure in the kernel may cause
a kernel panic or remote code execution depending on packet contents [209].
sanity check C is performed 6= O, D, I
interp.

Implementors of the ICMP6 packet structures in OpenBSD did not understand how
to map it to the existing mbuf structure, and then validate it.

Conclusions
In this section, we proposed a novel approach to categorizing the root causes of
protocol vulnerabilities. We created a new logical model to express mismorphisms,
grounded in the semiotic-triad based representation of mismorphisms explored in
our earlier work. We then used this logical model to develop a preliminary set of
mismorphism classes for capturing LangSec vulnerabilities. Finally, we created a
small catalog of vulnerabilities and demonstrated how our classification scheme could
be used to classify the mismorphisms those vulnerabilities embody.

Section 3.2

Categorizing Vulnerabilities4
Mamot et al. [194] noted that several CWEs already define do cover a wide range of
LangSec vulnerabilities. Such CWEs such as CWE-805 cover buffer overflows [191].
At the same time, there are CWEs to cover cross-site scripting attacks and SQL
4

This section borrows from my previous work in [3]. I collaborated with Sameed Ali, Zephyr
Lucas, and Sean Smith on this project.
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injection attacks. Most LangSec bugs fall under CWE-20: Improper Input Validation [190].
However, this category of “Improper Input Validation” is a wide one. It combines
many issues with input validation—first, situations when the validation is insufficient.
The parser may have missed validating a few fields. Second, different parsers may
interpret a specification differently. Such a situation may lead to a mismatch between
the two parsers. Finally, the parser does not reject invalid input but accepts some
versions of invalid input.
Although these are all different kinds of “improper input validation”, CWEs tend
to club them together with similar solutions. Each of these subcategories of poor
input handling stems from different underlying causes.
We took a different approach from Mamot et al. to categorize vulnerabilities.
We categorized vulnerabilities based on the LangSec anti-pattern that led to the
vulnerability. The categories we came up with were:
– Flawed and Insufficient Parsers: Basic LangSec Failures. Often, flawed
parser code implicitly assumes that the input is correctly formatted and acts
on the input. The Ripple20 vulnerability was found in the Treck TCP/IP stack
used in several embedded applications [60]. The DNS resolver in this Treck stack
failed to validate data from external entities. Similarly, the Thales module used
in billions of Internet of Things (IoT) devices was found to have a vulnerability
of a similar nature [158]. The parser had a flaw in ignoring certain characters
in the input, rendering the module vulnerable.
– Official Grammar is Wrong: When specifications are incorrect. Occasionally, the specifications can specify incorrect grammar concerning what
is commonly used. For example, in the “Wallpaper of death” vulnerability,
although the attacker uses a well-formatted image file since the Android op57
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erating system converts the image from one file to another, the specification
for this conversion was incorrect [35]. Similarly, ZecOps discovered zero-click
attacks in default email applications in Apple devices [300]. Attackers craft
valid but devious emails that can exploit various vulnerabilities in these email
applications.
– Parsing Differentials. We already discussed parser differentials extensively
in Section 3.
– Semantic Differentials. Although the underlying parsers may function correctly as per the specification, the results displayed to a user could be vastly
different. For example, several attacks have been crafted against PDF viewers [177]. In addition, some PDF viewers may allow attackers to overlay text
with their devious text in the PDF file. However, the PDF viewer uses the
previous signature to tell a user that the file has been signed, so there is no
reason for a user to worry. This semantic differential demonstrates a mismatch
between what a user may think a PDF signature means and how PDF viewers
interpret signatures—since signatures may not sign the entire PDF file.

L1: all possible inputs

☠

L2: correct inputs

code

Figure 3.2: In the basic anti-pattern, the flawed code implicitly assumes the input is
in L2 but does not check; attacks are possible when the adversary crafts an input in
L1 \ L2 .
Figure 3.2 shows the basic LangSec anti-pattern, in which flawed code implicitly
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assumes the input is correctly formatted and acts on invalid input as a result. The
three vulnerabilities described below fit resulted from this anti-pattern.

Ripple20 June 2020 brought news of Ripple20, a set of vulnerabilities in the Treck
TCP/IP stack. This TCP/IP stack is over 20 years old but used in “hundreds of millions” of embedded systems, including critical infrastructure such as power, aircraft,
and healthcare [60]. Besides the direct threat to the large number of compromised
systems themselves, Ripple20 has additional high impact downstream consequences
because it is a networking stack, that, by definition, exposes an interface to the outside world. Consequently, Ripple20 vulnerabilities may enable adversaries to read and
write data on the devices, as well as execute code, and thus compromise other systems. Remediation will be difficult as real-world embedded systems are notoriously
hard to track down and patch.
Two of Ripple’s vulnerabilities (i.e., “#1” and “#3” in [151]) are straightforward
failures by the DNS resolver to validate external input.
– In the first vulnerability, flawed code constructs a requested hostname and
copies it into a buffer. However, the adversary-supplied MX record provides
both the RDLENGTH value used to calculate the size of the buffer, as well as
the data from which the requested hostname is constructed. As a result, the
adversary can supply a record that tricks the code into corrupting its heap by
copying a large byte sequence into a too-small buffer. Correctly behaving code
should have rejected this malformed record.
– In the second vulnerability, the flawed code does not correctly confine reads to
data relevant to the adversary-supplied record—so a malformed record can trick
the code into copying internal data to an output buffer.
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Thales Module August brought news of a vulnerability in a Thales module potentially used in “billions of things” [158]. At its core, this vulnerability manifests as
a variation on the basic LangSec anti-pattern. The variation is shown in Figure 3.3.
In the case of the Thales module, flawed code determines access control by checking
if an input parameter specifies something forbidden—but this test implicitly assumes
the input parameter is correctly formatted (that is, a path with a single slash). If
the adversary goes outside the safe input space by supplying what would be a forbidden parameter, except using two slashes instead of one, the flawed code accepts the
parameter and then ignores the second slash.

L1: all possible inputs

L2: correct inputs

☠

L4:
forbidden
paths

code

Figure 3.3: In a variation of the basic anti-pattern, the flawed code checks for disallowed requests (L4 ) but implicitly assumes these requests are in L2 ; the adversary
can craft inputs in L1 \ L2 that bypass the checks but get interpreted as something
in L4

How LangSec can fix these problems In these examples based on exploiting
the basic LangSec anti-pattern, the software programs expected their input to follow
certain rules and the attacker capitalized on these expectations by providing data that
was not structured according to these rules but processed nonetheless. This in turn
caused unexpected and harmful computation to be performed. LangSec calls for these
input rules to be formally described as a grammar so that a verifier could parse any
potential input to see if it adheres to these rules before passing it on for processing.
In the Ripple20 vulnerabilities, a parser would have recognized malformed records
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and rejected them before any harmful computation would have been done. Similarly,
in the Thales Module, an input parser would have rejected input parameters with
excess slashes, therefore protecting the code from the forbidden paths.

3.2.1. The Official Grammar is Wrong: When Specifications
are Incorrect
The standard LangSec defense pattern to the problems of Figures 3.2 and 3.3 is to
formally specify an expected input language, L2 , to test whether an input is in L2 before acting on it. However, this approach raises the question (depicted in Figure 3.4):
just because an input is in the language the developer expects, does that it mean
the code will handle it safely? This section considers some recent vulnerabilities for
which the answer to the question (above) is “no.”
Summer 2020 saw many flaws arising because the set of correctly handled inputs
are only a proper subset of the inputs within the validation grammar. This can stem
from either an error in formally describing the intended input, or from improperly
handling all intended inputs.

L1: all possible inputs
L2: intended correct
inputs
L3: handled
correctly

☠
code

Figure 3.4: In many cases, the flawed code is intended to handle some target L2
of valid inputs—but instead properly handles only a proper subset L3 . Attacks are
possible when the adversary crafts an input in L2 \ L3 . Simply validating against L2
is not enough—we need tools to help ensure that L2 \ L3 is empty.
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Wallpaper of death June brought news of the Android “Wallpaper of Death.” [35]
A particular picture, when set as the background image for a Samsung or Google Pixel
(or other phones which use the default Android color engine), will softlock the phone
by causing it to endlessly reboot. The picture contains a pixel whose color values
cause an overflow error when the phone is calculating the luminescence value that
the OS handles by rebooting the phone. During the reboot process, the background
image is loaded, overflows and initiates another reboot. This renders the phone to be
unusable until the user boots the phone in safe mode and deletes the image resetting
the phone to the default background.
This raises some interesting LangSec questions as the image in question uses a
properly formatted RGB color space—but the phone first transforms the RGB to
sRGB, and the transform code can turn some valid RGB images (such as this one)
into illegally formatted sRGB ones.
Non-Click iOS Email 0day In April this year, ZecOps reported that they found
a zero-click attack on iPhone and iPad default email applications. [300] Users do not
need to take any action; when the email shows up in their mailbox, it gives access to
the attacker. The attacker can even delete the crafted email that gave them access.
Such zero-click attacks are hence extremely difficult to detect. ZecOps reported that
several top-level executives and journalists across the world might have been affected
by this vulnerability.
ZecOps reported that correctly formatted (but deviously crafted) email could
trigger vulnerabilities:
– Out of bounds write: the email application calls the ftruncate syscall to truncate or extend a file to a specific length, but does not check the error condition.
With the right input, the application will write beyond the end of mapped
space.
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– Heap-based overflow: the email application tries to copy 0x200000 bytes into
memory allocated using mmap. However, if this syscall fails, the application only
allocates 8 bytes and copies over the much larger 0x200000 bytes, overflowing
the heap.

Snapdragon August brought news of a large number of vulnerabilities within the
Snapdragon Digital Signal Processor (DSP) used in many Android smartphones, including but not limited to Google, Samsung, OnePlus, Xiaomi, LG, Android and are
accessible by third party applications. [222] Such devices have many separate processors; communication between them is handled by software generated by the Hexagon
SDK. However, as Slava Makkaveev discussed at DefCon,5 this code fails to handle
certain kinds of correctly (but oddly) formatted input: data and buffer lengths are
treated as unsigned integers, but tested as signed integers—so crafted input with a
large enough length to be regarded as negative when interpreted as signed can result
in heap overflow.

SigRed Bastille Day 2020 brought news of “SigRed,” a 17-year vulnerability in the
Windows DNS. The bug enables remote adversaries to execute code on the victim
machine, on “the DNS servers of practically every small and medium-sized organization around the world.” [107] Researchers at Check Point [272] found that when
the code handles certain kinds of records sent in response to a forwarded DNS query,
it calculates the length of the record using a 16-bit unsigned integer. However, the
adversary can use compression tricks to construct a valid record whose length exceeds 216 . Once more, the flawed code copies too many bytes into too small a buffer,
resulting in heap overflow.
5

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CrLJ29quZY8&feature=youtu.be
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Ripple Again Another one of the Ripple vulnerabilities demonstrates this pattern
(“#2” in [151]). The flawed code uses a 16-bit unsigned integer to track a “label
length” value, but correct inputs can be constructed whose label length overflows
that. As a result, the code will allocate a too-small buffer, and then copy a much
larger byte sequence into it. This can also be viewed as a parsing problem: the flawed
code uses two different ways to calculate a length, and there are correct inputs for
which these two approaches do not agree.

How LangSec can fix these problems In these examples, the problem was not
a failure to validate, but a failure to validate with the correct specifications. To fix
problems like this, the grammar must be rewritten to match what is handled correctly,
or the computation must be reworked to handle all of the expected input. Not only
must we need to check if the input is within the specified grammar, but also we need
to be careful the grammar we are checking against matches a program’s “safe input.”
Therefore we need to develop tools that can discover grammars for the application,
or at minimum be able to find potential errors with grammars that are considered
“correct.” Alternatively, if the legal inputs in L2 \ L3 have no legitimate use, the
developers may wish to restrict the official input space and tighten the input filter
accordingly.
internal data structures
L1: all possible inputs
L5: all possible configs
L2: correct inputs
L6: correct configs

☠

code

Figure 3.5: In some vulnerabilities, crafted but correct input can trick the flawed
code into constructing incorrectly formatted internal state; when the code later acts
on that state, it goes wrong.
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3.2.2. LangSec on the Inside
Other Ripple vulnerabilities [150] pertain not to code parsing input, but rather to
code parsing its own internal data structure (Figure 3.5).
When processing tunneled and fragmented IP packets, the code constructs an
internal data structure with two different ways of representing the same length: an
overall length in the initial part, and the sum of the lengths of each part. In “correct”
configurations of this data structure, these match; however, correct inputs exist which
can cause the flawed code to construct internal state in which these values don’t
match, leading to adversarial-directed memory corruption.

How LangSec can fix these problems Just as it’s important for software to
ensure that its external inputs are correctly formatted before acting on them, it’s
also important to check its internal inputs and internal outputs. Indeed, the basic
programming tenet of defining and preserving the invariant for a data structure can
be seen in a LangSec context: indicate precisely what one means as correct.

3.2.3. Differentials: Can Parsers Disagree?
Parsing Differential
In LangSec, the role of formal languages is not just confined to deciding whether an
input is safe to act on; it’s also key in parsing: how a program understands what an
input means.
In the software world, the multiple programs often consume the same input—and
there is an underlying assumption that different programmers read a specification and
understood it the same way. Disagreements lead to parser differentials (Figure 3.6),
perhaps documented initially in 2010 when Len Sassamen et al. [142] found that
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Public Key Certificate Authorities could grant servers to domains that were invalid
and some APIs accepted these invalid certificates.

L1: all possible inputs

space of parsed inputs
code1

L2: correct inputs

●≠
●

code2

Figure 3.6: In parser differentials, two different programs can construct different parse
trees—and take different actions—for the same input.

Psychic Paper May brought news of a parser differential vulnerability in iOS. [247]
In the Apple Ecosystem, property lists or plists are used to store serialized data in
various contexts such as code signatures and configuration files. The list of properties
the plist defines in code signatures are the entitlements. There are over 1800 entitlements available for the latest versions of the iOS (the mobile operating system),
whereas the Mac OSX versions support just less than 1000 entitlements each. These
entitlements also specify how the application interacts with the kernel. It can hold a
list of drivers and system calls that the application can access.
The Psychic Paper vulnerability uses the fact that iOS uses “at least four” different XML parsers, and they have differentials. One example is how parsers handle
comments in plists. Comments are usually enclosed in <!-- and --> tags, and everything enclosed within these tags is considered to be a comment. However, three of
the iOS XML parsers (IOKit, CF, and XPC) handle the not-quite-correct comment
delimiters (a) <!---> and (b) <!--> differently
– IOKit sees the <!-- in (a) and thinks it’s the start of a comment. It ends the
comment when it sees the end of (b) <!-->.
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– The CF parser has a bug that only scans two places after seeing the ! in (a).
This means that a - is parsed twice and the first tag (a) opens a comment. The
second tag (b) is treated as the opening of a new comment.
– XPC ignores both (a) and (b), but differs from IOKit and CF in other constructs
such as the usage of double-quotes ’’ and square brackets [].
By being able to construct plists containing material that some parsers ignore as
comments and others believe as real, the adversary can thus forge his or her own
entitlements, and can get access to any memory location the user can access and
execute system calls and drivers. The adversary can also alter thread register states
and read and write process memory.
As mentioned earlier, the problem stems from the fact that the three parsers
handle comments differently. One way to deal with this could be to specify the
context-free grammar needed to recognize plists, and then build a parser to recognize
this grammar. Instead of a specification, if developers start with the formal grammar
needed to recognize plists, parser differentials can be minimized.

How LangSec can fix these problems With parser differentials, the correct specifications are not the same across various implementations. Using parser generators
that use a data-description language or grammar could ensure that the parsers implement the same grammar across different implementations. Another approach would
be to use parser combinators. They implement code that look like the grammar and
can be easily verified. When different implementations use parser combinators, they
can be visually verified to be equivalent, and equivalent to the grammar specification.
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L1: all possible inputs

"virtual piece of paper"
signer's
code

L2: correct inputs

☠

●≠
●

verifier's
code

Figure 3.7: In the Shadow attack, the signer sees a “virtual piece of paper” and signs
it; the verifier later sees a valid signature but a different virtual piece of paper. In
between, the adversary modifies the PDF.

Semantic Differential
Shadow July also brought news of the Shadow attack [177], which might also be
seen as a form of differential, albeit a semantic one.
A PDF viewer:
(a) can render a PDF file as a “virtual piece of paper” to the user;
(b) can allow a user to digitally sign the document they see.
(c) can allow a user to append incremental update to the document.
(d) can tell the user that a digital signature is valid.
The problem is that behavior 3 could permit certain harmful types of incrementally
saved changes after behavior 2, and allow the attacker to configure the PDF so that
the visible content of the document that the signer saw in behavior 2 differs from the
content the verifier sees in behavior 4 (Figure 3.7). Attackers can construct a form,
contract, bill, etc., and get it approved via a digital signature. However then it is
possible for the attacker to modify the document to display different content from
the one approved.
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pdf P3

incremental
changes C

pdf P2

pdf P1

pdf P4

pdf P3

sig of P1

pdf P2

(a)

sig of P3

incremental
changes C

(b)

Figure 3.8: In this simplified sketch, the verifier may perceive that the signer signed
P3 : the PDF P1 modified by changes C. However, that only happened in (b); in (a),
the signer only signed P1 .
The problem is that there’s a gap between the core meaning of the PDF file—the
virtual piece of paper the user sees—and the parsed PDF structure. As Figure 3.8
shows, the verifier cannot (easily) distinguish between two different ASTs with significantly different signature semantics the same way. (This was also demonstrated
with earlier versions of PDF long ago [140]).

How LangSec can fix these problems A common solution that many PDF
viewers currently use, is to remove any unused objects prior to signing, however, this
only stops some flavors of the Shadow attack and not all of them. A stronger one
(suggested in [177]), would be to reject any document which contains an non-signing
incremental save after a signature. While this is effective, it is possibly too harsh,
as there are use cases where changes made post signature are actually desired (for
instance, filling out an approved form).
Work must be done to isolate exactly what is considered a “safe change”—and
more deeply bind the action of producing/verifying a signature to the semantics of how
the document is being presented to the user. Ideally, if two parse trees are semantically
different, then the code consuming them should enable the user to distinguish the
difference.
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Section 3.3

Conclusions
This chapter detailed common input-handling vulnerability classes—namely, improper
input validation and parser differentials. Then, I described related work on various
LangSec fields such as parser combinators, data description languages, and parsing
algorithms for data formats. Finally, I discussed two categorization approaches we
organized to build taxonomies of various input-handling vulnerabilities seen in the
wild. This chapter forms the basis for the rest of the thesis proposal—laying out all
the fundamentals and the cutting-edge approaches in LangSec.
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Chapter 4

Building Safer Parsers with
Parser-Combinator Toolkits
Parser combinators are functions that allow developers to compose parsers using
smaller building blocks. They were originally constructed for functional programmers
to construct better and more composable recursive descent parsers. Subsequently,
they have been adopted in other programming language communities, such as Scala,
Rust, and C.
This chapter details our experiences building various tools using parser combinators. First, we built session-language-based parsers for Internet of Things (IoT)
protocols. We define the state machines for various IoT protocols and define parsers
specific to each state in the state machine (Section 4.1). We demonstrated that these
parsers perform faster than the packet parsing in existing applications.
Second, we discuss CVD, a communication validity detector we built for various
Power Grid or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) protocols (Section 4.3). We deployed CVD as an intrusion detection tool and demonstrated how we
could leverage parsers for various network protocols to detect intrusions. In addition
to CVD, we also describe PhasorSec, where we built a parsing toolkit for the Phasor
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Measurement Unit or PMU protocol and designed algorithms to place these parsers
to get better performance from the network (Section 4.2).
Finally, we describe our experiences building a parser and a static analyzer for the
iccMAX file format (Section 4.4). We built our parser using parser combinators and
then analyzed the parser’s syntax tree. The iccMAX file format supports a calculator
element that implements various stack operations. Therefore, we check the stack for
various underflows and overflows as a part of the static analyzer.
These early experiences of working with various parser combinator toolkits
stressed the need for tools that perform better in several ways. We conclude this
chapter by describing lessons learned and ideas we have subsequently incorporated in
the later chapters of this thesis.

Section 4.1

Parsers for IoT protocols1
Current estimates show that the Internet of Things (IoT) will soon have billions of deployed devices. Approximately 50 million smart meters are in households in the USA
at the moment. Several taxi companies, natural gas pipelines and industrial control
systems make use of some of the popular IoT protocols. Some of these applications
use personally identifiable information and any attack could lead to privacy concerns.
Moreover, the widespread deployment of these protocols increases the probability of
an attack as several recent attacks like the Mirai botnet [116] indicated. In the rush
to deploy these IoT services, IoT vendors have limited or no focus on the required
security mechanisms for their architectures.
Parser bugs have been haunting the Internet for the past several years, and the
same trend is expected to continue in the IoT. Our current Internet works on a
1

This section borrows from my previous work in [15].
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“penetrate and patch” paradigm and, if the same paradigm is applied to the IoT, it
would continue to lead to more parser-based vulnerabilities in the future [211]. Hence,
we propose using Language-theoretic security to build hardened IoT end-devices.
Hammer [214] is a parser combinator toolkit that has been designed to aid developers in building code that can enforce input validation rules. This section discusses
how hammer could be used along with protocol state machines to build hardened
implementations of IoT clients.

Summary of Contributions:
– Our implementation demonstrates the efficacy of LangSec for Internet-of-Things
protocols. Our technique could be deployed on IoT devices in the future.
– We show that the effort required to implement our technique is very reasonable
given the security benefits offered to the IoT setting.

4.1.1. Background and Related work
The LangSec approach to security focuses on recognizing and handling all input safely.
This functionality can be enforced by using a parser combinator toolkit like Hammer,
which has bindings for several languages like C, C++, Python, Ruby and Java. To
perform the task of building these hardened clients, we need to have a deep understanding of the target protocols.

Understanding application layer IoT protocols
XMPP. XMPP is a popular chat protocol that runs on the TCP/IP stack, and
supports and enforces the use of TLS [235]. All clients connect to central servers.
XMPP messages are XML streams that need XML parsers. A stream is negotiated
between a client and a server. The server supports some optional features, namely,
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binding, TLS, and SASL authentication.
A trimmed version of XMPP could be a perfect fit for the IoT world [148]. Service
infrastructures for the IoT based on XMPP have been proposed in the past [32].
XMPP maintainers have agreed to make use of TLS v2, disable the support for SSL
v2, and make use of STARTTLS [236]. Despite the support for TLS, crafted messages
could lead to exploits due to the lack of a clear parser and recognition boundary
(shotgun parsers). Several secure architectures for XMPP have been proposed in the
past [96, 64, 55], but none of them addresses the problem of shotgun parsers and
untrusted input handling in XMPP implementations, which could have devastating
repercussions in the IoT.
Some examples of XMPP messages are presented below.

<message type="chat" id="purpleb4dbd712"
to="arthur@sri.lit/host-134"
from="alice@sri.lit/XYZ567">
<active xmlns=
"http://jabber.org/protocol/chatstates"/>
<body>This is a sample XMPP message.
</body>
</message>
<success
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-sasl"/>

The <message> is used to send a message from one client to another after the
stream negotiation is complete. The <success> message is received by a client from
a server if the SASL authentication was successful. The other relevant messages are
<stream>, <stream-features>,
<proceed>, <auth> and <bind>.
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Figure 4.1: XMPP protocol state machine.
MQTT. MQTT is an asynchronous publish-subscribe architecture that works
via a broker and was designed to consume less battery and bandwidth [124]. MQTT
supports a limited number of messages - Connect, Connect Ack, Subscribe Request,
Subscribe Ack, Ping Request, Ping Response and Publish Message. The message type
is specified in the first 4 bits of the MQTT packet. The format of the MQTT packet
is described in Figure 4.2. To initiate a connection with a broker, an MQTT client
only needs to send one Connect message, in contrast to the large number of messages
in XMPP. The client subscribes to channels using the subscribe message. The server
sends messages Connack, Suback, Pingresponse. Figure 4.3 shows the state machine
of the MQTT protocol.

Figure 4.2: MQTT packet structure.
Hunkeler et al. proposed modifications to MQTT to be used in wireless sensor net75
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works. MQTT has come under a lot of scrutiny for not being implemented correctly,
with plenty of production systems not enforcing TLS or password-based authentication [174].

Figure 4.3: MQTT protocol state machine. The ovals represent states and the arrows
represent MQTT messages.
We have seen past work on designing authorization mechanisms and making use
of TLS to secure MQTT [203] [275]. Attribute-based encryption has been used in
MQTT to encrypt MQTT packets for different channels [249]. Again, none of this
work addresses the issue of handling untrusted input.

4.1.2. LangSec and Protocol State Machines
Shotgun parsers. Shotgun parsers perform data checking, handling, and processing,
interspersed with each other. The shotgun parser pattern has led to several recent
vulnerabilities as context-sensitive data formats can be dangerous and not easy to
handle and recognize [45]. Instances of untrusted data propagation due to shotgun
parsers were also found in Android applications in the past [273]. Shotgun parsers
are only one of the possible Langsec-related weaknesses [194] [188].
Parsing errors encountered in XMPP and MQTT. Parsing errors could lead
to memory corruption and logic errors, which could in turn lead to severe security
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Client
Prosody IM
Cisco Jabber
Pidgin
Smack IM
IBM Message Sight
WebSphere MQ

Protocol
XMPP
XMPP
XMPP
XMPP
MQTT
MQTT
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Vulnerabilities from Parsing Errors
4
4
3
1
2
1

Cryptographic Vulnerabilities
0
1
0
1
0
0

Table 4.1: Classification of vulnerabilities found in popular application-layer IoT
protocols from 2013 – 2016 on Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE).
vulnerabilities. We studied the CVE database [188] for the “MQTT” and “XMPP”
search strings and analyzed the type of vulnerabilities detected between 2013 – 2016.
We found at least 14 vulnerabilities in XMPP implementations, out of which only two
were cryptography-related (i.e., improper implementation of STARTTLS). Almost all
other vulnerabilities included crafted XMPP input. The search string ”MQTT” also
yielded similar, but fewer results. MQTT had a higher percentage of crafted input
vulnerabilities as well.
Table 4.1 summarizes a comparison of parser-related errors and cryptographic vulnerabilities in popular MQTT and XMPP implementations from the CVE database.
Protocol State Machines. In this work, we also make use of protocol state
machines to define contextual parsers. In the past, there has been work in using protocol state machines for hardening protocols. Poll et al. [220] describe the difference
in the state machines in various implementations of openssl. Graham et al. [106]
state that finite state machines are sufficiently expressive for Internet protocols and
are sufficiently performing for high-throughput applications.
Our work combines the concept of protocol state machines and the use of parser
combinators to harden the implementations of IoT clients by making them less susceptible to input-processing vulnerabilities.
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4.1.3. Methodology
In this section, we provide a comprehensive tutorial of how the state machine and the
parsers hook together, and take a look at the limitations of this approach.

Figure 4.4: Overall architecture of a client: Depending on the current state, a different
parser is called to recognize the message.
Our implementation is in ruby, and makes use of the hammer ruby bindings [214]
and the state machines gem [41], and hence assumes the correctness of both these
implementations.2
2

Gems are Ruby libraries that are packaged are shared using the RubyGems package manager:
https://rubygems.org/.
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Figure 4.4 gives an overview of the architecture of our IoT client. We implement
the state machine defined in Figure 4.1. There are separate input recognizers for each
of the states, which get called when the client receives a message at a particular state.
Only once fully recognized, this input is further processed.
Our process of building a client involves four steps:
– Construct a simplified state machine from protocol specifications.
– Build the state machine using the state machine gem.
– Identify the input language for each state.
– Define parsers for each of the receiving states of the state machine.
Constructing the protocol state machine. A protocol state machine is constructed from the specifications. To simplify the finite state machine, we need to
enforce a few cases. For example, in our implementation of XMPP and MQTT, we
enforce TLS and password based authentication because we think it is the right approach to follow as per the guidelines. The states and transitions that need to be
handled in the case of not enforcing TLS and passwords can now be ignored. We
make use of the state-machine ruby gem [41] to this effect. The gem includes a set
of test helpers that could be used to aid in development as well. We implement the
state machines in Figures 4.1 and 4.3.
The state machine gem could be used in this fashion with before transition and
after transition methods used to trigger methods.
The above code snippet shows a part of the implementation of the state machine.
The event methods show transitions between states. At each state that is receiving
a message, we need to fully recognize the message received with the help of a parser.
Defining the receiving state parsers. We need to define a separate grammar
for the messages we are expecting for each receiving state. For example, in the
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state_machine :state, initial: :start do
before_transition on: :stream_1_sending,
do: :stream_1_sent_call
before_transition on: :start_tls_sending,
do: :start_tls_sent_call
before_transition on: :ssl_negotiation,
do: :ssl_negotiation_call
before_transition on: :auth_sending,
do: :auth_sent_call
before_transition on: :bind_sending,
do: :bind_sent_call
after_transition on: :quitting,
do: :quit_call
event :stream_1_sending do
transition [:start] =>
:stream_1_sent
end
event :stream_1_received do
transition [:stream_1_sent] =>
:stream_1_received
end
end

Code Snippet 4: State machine descriptions in Ruby
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implementation of the XMPP protocol, if we sent the stream stanza to initiate an
XMPP connection, we should be receiving a stream stanza back from the server along
with some options. We need to use a parser to make sure this message is completely
recognized. We need to define the language that is to be accepted at every state. Let
us first look at the grammar for simple < stream > messages.
whitespace → \x20
doublequote → \x22
newline → \x5c \x6e
tab → \x5c \x74
gaps → whitespace | tab | newline
many_gaps → gaps | gaps gaps
zero_gaps → E | gaps | gaps gaps
starttag → zero_gaps \x3c zero_gaps
start_closetag → zero_gaps \x3c zero_gaps \x2f zero_gaps
endtag → zero_gaps \x3e zero_gaps
closetag → zero_gaps \x2f \x3e zero_gaps
stream_word → \x73 \x74 \x72 \x65 \x61 \x6d
stream_open_tag → starttag stream_word endtag
stream_close_tag → start_closetag stream_word endtag
Code Snippet 5: XMPP grammar in BNF syntax
The grammar defines whitespaces, double-quotes and all the other special characters as separate productions to help reusage of the combinators. The stream word
parser defines the word stream in the hexadecimal notation. The starttag production
has the character < and the endtag has the character >. These productions can
be reused while defining productions for the XML tags. All the tags allow zero or
more spaces or special characters surrounding the tag symbols. This grammar was
converted to hammer parser-combinator code in ruby, and is shown in the code above.
It is important to understand the combinators provided by hammer to represent
grammar. The many combinator is used to apply the combinator given as an argument zero or more times. We use the many1 combinator if it has to be used one or
more times. The sequence combinator is used to group these combinators together in
81

4.1 Parsers for IoT protocols

Using Parser Combinators

@hammer = Hammer::Parser
whitespace = @hammer.ch('\x20')
doublequote = @hammer.ch('\x22')
newline = @hammer.token("\x5c\x6e")
tab = @hammer.token("\x5c\x74")
gaps = @hammer.choice(whitespace, tab, newline)
many_gaps = @hammer.many1(gaps)
zero_gaps = @hammer.many(gaps)
starttag = @hammer.sequence(zero_gaps,
@hammer.ch('\x3c'), zero_gaps) # "<"
start_closetag = @hammer.sequence(zero_gaps,
@hammer.ch('\x3c'), zero_gaps,
@hammer.ch('\x3e'), zero_gaps # "</"
endtag = @hammer.sequence(zero_gaps,
@hammer.ch('\x3e'),
zero_gaps) # ">"
closetag = @hammer.sequence(zero_gaps,
@hammer.ch('\x2f'), @hammer.ch('\x3e'),
zero_gaps) # "/>"
stream_word = @hammer.token("\x73\x74\x72
\x65\x61\x6d") # "stream"
stream_open_tag = @hammer.sequence(starttag,
stream_word,
endtag) # <stream>
stream_close_tag = @hammer.sequence(start_closetag,
stream_word,
endtag) # </stream>

Code Snippet 6: Hammer Ruby code matching stream objects in XMPP
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a sequence. The ch combinator is used to represent a single character and the token
combinator is used to represent a string. We make use of these basic building blocks
to convert the grammar to the hammer parser combinator code.
Validating input. We will now look at how we use the hammer parsers we have
already defined to recognize a message given as an argument. The hammer parser
provides an object of class HParseResult if the parsing was successful, and a nil if
the parsing was not successful. Upon successful recognition, we need to fire events
to perform certain actions. In the example below, we are recognizing a message with
the < stream > message, and fire an event if the parsing was successful.

def validate_stream(args)
if !stream_open_tag.parse(args).nil?
true
else
false
end
end
def stream_1_received(message)
if validate_stream(message) and
state == "stream_1_sent"
fire_events(:starttls_sending)
end
end

The above method would fire the starttls sending transition, if the message was
recognized fully and correctly.

File organization. As per the LangSec philosophy, all the input validators are
placed in a separate class. These validators return a boolean if given a string to
parse. These validators are called from all other files as and when input recognition
is needed. Placing the validators in a separate class serves two purposes. Firstly, it
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helps in re-usability of parser-combinator code. Secondly, it could aid developers and
people performing code audits to easily identify mistakes in input recognition.

Limitations
– We can only define context-free grammars and regular expressions using parsercombinator toolkits. Hence, if the language to be recognized by our parser is
either a context-sensitive grammar, or a Turing-complete language, we would
have to simplify it down to a context-free grammar or a regular expression
resulting in loss of functionality. However, we argue that this is essential since
Turing-completeness or context-sensitivity of a language only results in more
input processing errors.
– Since our implementations were lightweight, we see that our implementations
were faster than a few other widely used open-source clients. In general, a layer
to recognize input completely adds some overhead time. However, this cost is
reasonable considering the benefits of this approach.

4.1.4. Evaluation and Discussion
To evaluate our implementation of the MQTT and XMPP protocols, we run timing
experiments to determine how our implementation performed in comparison to other
implementations. We also perform unit and preliminary fuzz testing, and describe
our methodology.

Experiments
We compare the performance of our implementation and other open source implementations of XMPP and MQTT available. We analyze SleekXMPP [100] for python,
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Smack [90] for Java, and Xrc [200] for ruby. We compare the total time to reach a connected state. These experiments were performed on a Raspberry Pi 2. For the server
side of the XMPP protocol, we make use of Vines - An XMPP chat server [105]. In a
similar setup, for the MQTT protocol, we use ruby-mqtt, pyMQTT and the Mosquitto
broker.
Client

CPU Time

Our implementation

0.42 s

Xrc

0.59 s

Smack

0.30 s

QXMPP

0.41 s

SleekXMPP

0.90 s

Table 4.2: Comparison of average time to connect to the XMPP server.

Client

CPU Time

Our implementation

218 µs

ruby-mqtt

2.3 ms

pyMQTT

1.2 ms

Table 4.3: Comparison of average time to connect to the MQTT broker.
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we observe that our clients run in comparable time to most
other XMPP and MQTT clients. Our clients are comparatively light weight and need
fewer features than the traditional clients; hence, the similar CPU time values.

85

4.1 Parsers for IoT protocols

Using Parser Combinators

Message

CPU Time

Number of lines in hammer

Stream 1

17 ms

39

Proceed

18 ms

20

Stream 2

27 ms

39

Success

3 ms

20

Stream 3

24 ms

39

Bind

11 ms

25

Table 4.4: Comparison of average time to recognize various XMPP message inputs
and the human effort in terms of lines of code.

Message

CPU Time

Number of lines in hammer

Connect Ack

39 µs

6

Subscribe Ack

126 µs

7

Ping received

97 µs

6

Table 4.5: Comparison of average time to recognize various MQTT message inputs
and the human effort in terms of lines of code. MQTT messages for receiving acknowledgements from the server generally contain just 2 bytes and are easy to parse.
In Tables 4.4 and 4.5, we show that the amount of time used to recognize various
inputs is minimal (i.e., in the order of tens of milliseconds).
We also observe that, with just under 250 lines of code, we can implement the
input recognizers for a simplified version of XMPP, which indicates that the human
effort required for such an implementation is not significant. Writing a separate
layer of a parser and defining the protocol state machine explicitly are steps that are
necessary to be taken and improve the process of code auditing.
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4.1.5. Unit testing
We evaluate the correctness of the validation and state machine components using
unit testing. We provide results of our unit testing in Table 4.6. We wrote unit tests
for most of the parsers required for the two implementations, achieving a 100% code
coverage for the state machine implementations and over 80% code coverage for the
other parser implementations.
Protocol

Component

Coverage

XMPP

State machine

100%

XMPP

Parser validation

86.55%

MQTT

State machine

100%

MQTT

Parser validation

81%

Table 4.6: Unit test coverage of our XMPP and MQTT implementations via coverage
gem.

4.1.6. Lessons Learned
We set out with the goal of demonstrating the efficacy of using LangSec in IoT protocols. We make use of the hammer parser-combinator toolkit to this end. It proved
very easy for us to convert a context-free grammar to a parser-combinator implementation. The hammer library includes bindings for several programming languages and
we made use of the ruby bindings for our implementations.
The specifications of protocols are in plain-text and are lengthy.

Given the

LangSec methodology, we have to read through these specifications and design a
language compliant with the protocol specifications. Specifications could be more
exact if they specified the protocol state machine and the input language for each
receiving state. This would prevent parser differentials.
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The hammer parser-combinator toolkit fared reasonably well in a constrained environment, showing that the overhead due to the recognizer was very negligible. The
programmer does not have to write a lot of additional lines of code. The generation
of the state machine could be automated with a tool to further reduce programmer
effort. We simplified the language of the protocols to make it more strict, by enforcing
rules that were otherwise optional in the protocol. This would reduce functionality
of the protocol, but, at the same time, improve the security of the protocol.

4.1.7. Conclusion
In this work, we addressed the widespread problem of unprincipled input handling
in IoT clients. We explore some of the popular application-layer IoT protocols and
then discuss some of the recently known vulnerabilities in IoT protocols. We then
describe the methodology used to build LangSec-compliant IoT clients. We analyze
our implementation and show that the performance cost and the human effort in
terms of lines of code added due to the hammer-based parser are a very reasonable
price to pay for security. We generated large datasets of valid sequential XMPP and
MQTT messages to see for what input our clients broke, and found no input that our
implementation could not handle.
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Section 4.2

PhasorSec: Protocol Security Filters for Wide
Area Measurement Systems3
4.2.1. Introduction
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are being widely deployed by power grid transmission owners and generator owners with the primary goal of improving situational
awareness about the grid. These measurement devices are part of a larger critical infrastructure: wide-area measurement systems (WAMS). WAMS include PMUs, phasor data concentrators (PDCs), central data concentrators (CDCs), GPS receivers
and communication and the networking infrastructure to facilitate better planning
and operation of power systems. The measurements collected by the PMUs are sent
upstream to PDCs over a wide area network where they are processed and used by
applications. Every application has a desired timing bound on the freshness of data it
requires. While some applications, like transient stability, require access to near realtime data, others like, postmortem analysis work with data that has been archived
by the PDCs. Due to the real-time abilities of PMUs, there are plans to integrate the
infrastructure with the current control system of the grid, thus making the security
of the WAMS a high priority.
One of the primary tricks used by attackers to compromise devices is to find
vulnerabilities in code that handles input. Regardless of how the code receives input,
some processing on the input has to be done to make sure that the input is exactly
as intended by the programmer. The lack of proper input recognition has commonly
led to critical vulnerabilities like Heartbleed [82], where there was a particular length
3

This section borrows from my previous work in [16]. I collaborated with Kartik Palani, Galen
Brown, Rafael Brantley, Sergey Bratus, and Sean Smith on this work.
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field that was not validated, enabling an attacker to read an arbitrary number of
bytes from the buffer.
In the past, our investigation of current supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) protocols like DNP3 [42] revealed vulnerabilities in several implementations
of the protocol by various vendors. Recently, vulnerabilities were found in implementations of the IEEE C37.118 [128], the most commonly used WAMS communication
protocol. Operating on a malformed input can cause the device (PMU for example)
to enter an unforeseen state which affects either the availability (device crash) or
worse: increased privileges on the device for the attacker.
This section presents the initial design and implementation of PhasorSec, an input
validation filter for WAMS. PhasorSec is an ingress-based network appliance that
inspects packets in the WAMS network for potentially malformed inputs. PhasorSec
is designed to filter out inputs that might compromise any WAMS devices by making
use of Language-theoretic Security (LangSec) principles. Language-theoretic Security
is a field of security that focuses on validating and handling input safely, using the
principles of formal language theory [250]. Essentially, the set of acceptable inputs
is treated as a language with a known grammar. Only inputs that conform to the
grammar are operated upon, and everything else is either dropped or logged for
analysis. Note that in this work the terms parser and filter are used interchangeably
since the PhasorSec filter is essentially a hardened parser with added functionality to
drop or log packets.
Several challenges exist in developing such a filter. We describe them and note
the contributions of this work below.
– The IEEE specification of the C37.118 protocol [125] consists of verbose text,
thus making it extremely hard and error-prone to implement a parser for the
protocol. In this work, we provide an open source implementation of the parser
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in C,4 which is tested extensively against the state of the art AFL fuzzer.
– The protocol is also designed in a way that the PDC first receives a synchronization frame, and then receives a number of data frames that depend on the
values in the synchronization frame. This dependency forces a validator to look
at the state of the protocol stream, rather than look at the packets individually.
Thus, such a filter would need to maintain state over multiple flows. There is a
possibility of state space explosion and hence a concern over how much memory
is available for the filtering process to maintain context. We mitigate this by
building a finite state machine that only maintains state over what it expects
to see given a certain input, thus conserving memory.
– Most ICS devices are comprised of proprietary software that cannot be modified
without vendor involvement. This means long development cycles are needed
to integrate hardened parsers into the device. PhasorSec is a bump in the wire
solution that works independent of the vendor, thereby allowing flexible and
timely deployment.
– Most power grid protocols prescribe a maximum permitted latency in the communication. Meeting these latency requirements and at the same time validating
the input when the synchrophasor data that is collected at 60 to 240 measurements per second at the PDC becomes a challenging task. We build PhasorSec
with stringent constraints and show that the overhead is a few microseconds.
We also provide a mechanism to decide which network links are best suited to
deploy PhasorSec such that the delay constraints are met.
It is important to note that PhasorSec filters don’t match against an attack signature nor compare against a pattern of acceptable behavior, like in traditional intrusion
4
The source code of our system is available at https://github.com/Dartmouth-Trustlab/C37.
118PMU.
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detection systems, but match each packet and its contents on a grammar, and on the
context of the packet based on the protocol state. PhasorSec filters keep track of the
actual values in the configuration frames, and use them to make sure that the subsequent values are well-formed as well. Also, PhasorSec does not prevent against false
data injections in protocols by default. While it protects cyber components against
compromise, it does not consider how attackers can affect the power system given
that PMUs have been compromised. However, it is possible to extend PhasorSec
functionality to do so by integrating it with [276] for example. This would come at a
higher overhead, which we do not discuss in this work.

4.2.2. Background and Related Work
Language-Theoretic Security
LangSec posits that the design of any software must begin with gathering the protocol
state machine and the grammar of the protocol. In the past, we have looked at a
similar approach for protocols in the Internet of Things for the MQTT and XMPP [15]
(Section 4.1) and the SCADA/ICS DNP3 protocol [42].
The DNP3 implementation was built as a proxy, that would consume DNP3 packets asynchronously, and would run the parser on it offline. This design decision was
made since the DNP3 parser induced latency. To avail the security benefits of having
a parser protect a system from input handling vulnerabilities, the parsing has to be
performed in real-time. Also, the DNP3 implementation looked at parsing separate
packets, without regard for the protocol state. SCADA protocols are traditionally designed such that they rely on a previous packet for context. The MQTT and XMPP
implementations perform the parsing synchronously, but add significant overheads
due to parsing.
PhasorSec overcomes these shortcomings in the DNP3 and IoT implementations
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of LangSec. We build a placement tool and outsource the parsing to a separate device
on the substation network to serve as a filter for the entire network, while at the same
time maintaining the state for each of the connections on the network.

IEEE C37.118 protocol
The C37.118 protocol is used to gather synchronized phasor measurements to make
better-informed decisions about the operation of the smart grid. Figure 4.5 shows
the various types of C37.118 protocol messages. The PDC sends commands to the
PMU, and the PMU in turn sends a configuration frame specifying the format of
the data frames that would follow after that. Header frames can contain any sort of
human-readable information (i.e., plain-text).

Figure 4.5: Flow of messages for the C37.118 protocol.
In the initial state of the PMU, only Command frames are valid. Receiving a
Command frame requesting a Header or Configuration packet causes the machine to
temporarily accept a single packet of the appropriate type. Due to the complexities of
simultaneous communication, this packet need not be the next one received. Instead,
the machine will continue accepting valid packets of any type until it receives the one
requested, then stop accepting those packets until a second Command packet requests
them.
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At any point, receiving a Command frame requesting data causes Data frames to
be accepted as valid, until a Command frame ending data is received, at which point
all Data frames are rejected.

Security of Wide Area Measurement Systems
Intrusion detection in wide area measurement systems has been widely studied. Yang
et al. propose an intrusion detection mechanism specific to the C37.118 protocol [293].
Their technique involved making use of a heterogeneous whitelist of known attacks,
and a behavior-based approach to detect unknown ones. Stewart et al. provide a very
comprehensive set of guidelines to describe what approach is to be taken by operators
to ensure confidentiality, data integrity and availability of the grid [264]. Stewart et
al. also note that the specifications of the C37.118 protocol do not include any
security features, and that it is left to the network layers to enforce the security. The
paper also provides several results demonstrating the effectiveness of the safeguards.
Although the paper goes in depth about substation security and information security,
Stewart et al. do not discuss the issue of input handling in the PMUs.
Coppolino et al. conducted a study of synchrophasor devices (PMU) and phasor
data concentrators (PDC) [65]. Coppolino et al. note that telnet was being used
to perform a lot of management tasks, and this is susceptible to man-in-the-middle
attacks. Also, there was no input validation or sanitization in the PDC application
that they examined, which was the open source OpenPDC application. The content
of the messages were usually not verified, and the authors note that a host of input
validation attacks and bugs are possible including SQL injection and buffer overflows.
The authors recognize that the issue of input validation exists in the PDCs and PMUs,
but do not talk about ways this could be addressed.
Another important source of motivation for our work is looking at past list of
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Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) and understanding why these errors
occurred. In the database we find three CVEs that are specific to the C37.118-2 communication system and PMUs [192, 126, 127]. CVE-2013-2800 and CVE-2013-2801
signify exactly the same problem we are trying to address in this work. These bugs
would expose the devices to a host of memory corruption and denial-of-service attacks.
The most valid action would be to reject these messages since they are malformed,
and don’t satisfy the grammar of the protocol. Prior to the security investigation
of DNP3 implementations by Chris Sistrunk and Adam Crain [42], the DNP3 CVE
list had just one reported vulnerability. The researchers found over 30 vulnerabilities
through their investigations in 2013-2014. We anticipate that a similar investigation
of the C37.118 protocol would reveal several more of these vulnerabilities.

4.2.3. Approach
We are using a principled approach to build a high-assurance input validator, and
provide it in a way that operators of constrained edge devices do not have to bother
about the performance and CPU time. We want to do this by placing these parsers
optimally on a level higher on the hierarchical structure followed by wide area measurement systems, and sometimes in the edge device itself when the PMU is known
to be sending and receiving critical data.
Our development effort of PhasorSec was divided into three broad parts. First, we
build the LangSec parsers for the IEEE C37.118 protocol for the revision of 2011. Second, we introduce PhasorSec as a bump-in-the-wire on a substation network. Finally,
we find the most optimal location to place PhasorSec based on the importance of the
PMUs and the network topology. Figure 4.6 demonstrates the purpose of PhasorSec
in a substation network.
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Figure 4.6: Overall architecture of PhasorSec. A single substation contains multiple
PMUs, which are synchronized using a GPS clock. These PMUs communicate with
a single PDC at the substation, which then aggregates data to a PDC in the control
center. This diagram shows the placement of PhasorSec in a substation network in
the control center.

Designing PhasorSec
The LangSec methodology involves a critical reading of the protocol specification to be
able to extract information that is needed to build parsers. We start by understanding
what states follow in the protocol, and the messages that are to be accepted by each of
these states. The architecture of our parsing methodology can be seen in Figure 4.7.
A clear and direct correlation between the packet format diagram, the grammar and
the code validating this grammar is necessary, and is the goal of LangSec, since it
helps programmers and auditors alike.
We make use of the Hammer parser combinator toolkit to both describe our extracted grammar for each state of the C37.118 protocol, and at the same time implement a parser for the protocol. Our coding style makes the C/C++ code more
clean and concise, and more readable that the pointer arithmetic-based parsing code
usually written.
Extracting the session language: To understand how the parser must be built,
we need to understand the exact order in which the messages are sent and received.
In some cases, messages that aren’t supposed to appear one after the other or in a
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Figure 4.7: Parsing methodology in PhasorSec. For protocols involving complex
session languages and states, we would first perform a well-formedness check to make
sure the message overall conforms to the specification of the protocol, and only then
parse the message with respect to the current state of the system.
certain order may appear so, and the session language must be able to reject such
messages. Figure 4.5 shows the communication between the PMU and the PDC
from which we can extract the individual state machines for both the PMU and the
PDC. Figure 4.6 also shows the session language or the protocol state machine for an
individual PDC.
Extracting grammar from specification: Usually all protocol specifications
have clear descriptions of what are the various packet formats. The specifications also
include some critical information such as what the boundaries of the various parts of
the payload are, and which fields depend on other fields. Context-sensitivity must
usually be avoided, and we advocate that we must stick to the easily recognizable
regular and context-free languages. A LangSec analysis of the specification would
reveal such issues as pitfalls in the specification of protocols [194]. Below is the
grammar we were able to extract for the C37.118 protocol. A well-formed PMU
frame can comprise any of the four frame types. One thing to note in the config frame
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description is that the Station config field repeats NUM PMU times. This leads to a
complexity in parsing, since this value NUM PMU has to first be extracted, following
which the rest of the packet has to be extracted. The same occurs for the fields
PHUNIT, ANUNIT and DGUNIT which all depend on the previous values PHNMR,
ANNMR and DGNMR for their lengths.

config frame → Header NUM PMU Station config∗
Header → sync framesize idcode soc
fracsec time base
Station config → name id code FORMAT
PHNMR ANNMR DGNMR
PHUNIT ANUNIT DGUNIT options
options →  | options DATA RATE |
options CHKSUM

Well-formedness check: We build recognizers for the chosen protocol, and
recognize the overall syntax of the message, without actually taking into consideration
the session state the receiver is in. This check is really important, since there are some
semantic actions involved in checking whether a receiver is in a certain state, and
making sure the correct parser is being run on it. When a device is on the receiving
end of a stream of completely malformed and invalid messages, these messages get
rejected directly at this step without being subject to any semantic actions hence
saving CPU time and memory. The placement of the well-formedness check in the
code can be seen in Figure 4.7.
Parsing based on the session state: Once the message is checked for overall
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header = h_sequence(h_uint16(),
h_uint16(),
h_uint16(),
h_uint32(),
h_uint32(),
h_uint32(),
NULL);
station_config = h_sequence(name,
id,
format,
phnmr,
annmr,
dgnmr,
phunit,
anunit,
dgunit,
options,
NULL);
options = h_sequence(h_optional(h_uint16()),
h_optional(h_uint16()),
NULL);
initial_parse = h_sequence(header,
h_uint16(),
NULL);
next_parse = h_repeat_n(station_config,
num_pmu);

Code Snippet 7: The Hammer-based code for handling the C37.118 configuration
frame as described in the grammar above.
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syntactic validity in the well-formedness check, we check which state our system is in,
and deploy that particular parser to be run on the given input to make sure that the
message we received is not just structurally correct, but also valid with respect to the
current state our system is in. In the C37.118 protocol, the data frame parsers need
to be built based on the configuration frame that was received previously. Figure 4.7
describes how each state of the system has a parser of its own, that gets called if a
message was received in that particular state. Code Snippet 7 shows a snippet of
how the grammar in the previous section translates directly to a parser in our code
snippet written in C.
PhasorSec as a bump-in-the-wire. One of the bigger goals of PhasorSec is to
make sure that all the C37.118 packets in our scope goes through our parsers, and no
device receives a packet that has not been parsed by one of our parsers. To introduce
PhasorSec as a bump in the wire, we perform the following:
– The PhasorSec device performs an arpspoof on the PMUs telling them that it
is the PDC, and the vice versa to the PDC.
– We use scapy to recover the packets the PDC is sending or receiving.5
– The state of each of the connection is maintained in the form of a finite state
machine, and the correct parser is called.
In case of failure to parse a message, PhasorSec logs the message after dropping
the packet. If the parsing is successful, PhasorSec forwards it on to the recipient.

4.2.4. Deployment
Applications that depend on synchrophasor data often have real time requirements in
the order of seconds. Meeting these demands can be hard and hence security consid5

Scapy helps us manipulate packets on the wire: https://scapy.net/
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erations are often ignored in the pursuit of performance requirements. In deploying
PhasorSec, we hope to guarantee end to end delay requirements while providing input
validation. Another constraint is the strict security budget that utilities have which
makes it expensive to deploy and manage a filter per network link. In Section 4.2.5
we show that PhasorSec adds a network overhead in the order of a few microseconds
and hence even if we were to deploy a filter on every network link, the end to end delay requirements for even the most time critical of applications will not be exceeded.
Hence, we define the problem of deploying PhasorSec as maximizing the number of
links that are monitored by a filter while guaranteeing that the budget is met [143].
We represent the WAMS network as an undirected graph G = (W ∪ N, L), where
W is the set of WAMS devices and N is the set of network infrastructure nodes. L is
the set of links at which PhasorSec can be deployed.
Objective function: Not all network links are created equal i.e. some links carry
data from PMUs that provide more valuable measurements than other PMUs. Thus,
we can assign an importance to each network link. Let w(li ) be the importance of
link i. The objective of PhasorSec deployment is then to maximize coverage of the
most important links.
Deployment Cost: The cost of deploying the network appliance is affected not
just by the cost of the appliance itself but also the cost of installation which can vary
significantly due to geographical location or accessibility of the substation. Let c(Sj )
be the cost of placing a filter on a set of links Sj ⊆ L.
Hence, the formal definition of deployment is given by the following equation
where xi = 1 if link li is selected and yj = 1 if a set Sj of links is chosen.
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maximize

X

w(li )xi

subject to

X

C(Sj )yj ≤ B;

xi ∈ {0, 1};
yj ∈ {0, 1};
Note that this is reformulation of the budgeted maximum coverage problem which
is NP-hard [147]. There exists a 1 − 1e approximation algorithm to solve the problem
[147]. It turns out that the greedy algorithm achieves the best approximation ratio.

4.2.5. Evaluation
We evaluate our parsers using three broad validation techniques. We performed
a static analysis on our system, we fuzz-tested our system, wrote unit tests, and
performed CPU-time analysis.

Unit Testing, Static Analysis and Coverage
We make use of the Infer tool to perform a static analysis of our system [52]. Our
implementation was found to not have any of the categories of errors found by infer,
namely, null de-references, memory leaks, premature nil termination arguments and
resource leaks.
We used a set of unit tests to test our implementation of the C37.118 protocol.
To validate our unit testing technique, we used gcov to assess the code coverage of
our implementation. The results of our coverage are in Table 4.7.

Fuzzing
We make use of coverage-guided fuzz-testing using the American Fuzzy Lop
fuzzer (AFL). Figure 4.8 shows that we ran AFL on the configuration frame parser.
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Type
Line Coverage
Function Coverage

Lines
364/485
31/34

Percentage
75.1%
91.2%

Table 4.7: Code coverage of the C37.118 parser using gcov and lcov. This shows the
number of lines and functions that could be reached by our unit testing suite.
Our results show that after 25 hours of fuzzing, there were no crashes. Although there
were several hangs, these were mostly due to the fact that our parser was stateful.
Parser
Configuration Frame
Data Frame

Total Run-time
25 hours
25 hours

Crashes
0
0

Hangs
37
42

Cycles
9452
10300

Table 4.8: A summary of our AFL fuzz-testing results

Figure 4.8: AFL Fuzzer screenshot showing results of fuzz-testing of our configuration
parser written in hammer

Timing Analysis
The experiments were run on an Firefly Development Board with a Quad-core ARM
Cortex-A17 processor and 2GB of RAM.
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Figure 4.9: AFL did not detect any crashes and had only two unique hangs after over
24 hours of testing for both the configuration frame and command frame parsers.
Frame
Command Frame
Configuration Frame
Data Frame
Header Frame

CPU Time
20 µs
13 µs
27 µs
80 µs

Lines of code
29
71
56
30

Table 4.9: We compare the time taken to parse each of the frames and the number
of lines of code in each of these parsers.
We perform CPU-time analysis on the individual parsers, to understand the overhead which would be introduced. The command frame and the header frame would
have to be parsed at the PMU, and the configuration and data frames would be parsed
at the PDC which aggregates the data from multiple PMUs. In Table 4.9, we see
that the overhead due to the addition of these parsers is very minimal (in the order of
micro-seconds) considering that it prevents input-handling vulnerabilities and bugs.
We also note that the complex parser we have written was for the configuration frame,
which contains the context needed for the data frames to parse the data correctly.
Despite performing stateful parsing, we note that we can construct these parsers in
under 75 lines of code each.

4.2.6. Conclusions
We showed that a context-aware parser can be built for the C37.118 parser, that is
not only resilient to state-of-the-art fuzzing techniques such as AFL, but also does
not add much overhead to the devices.
We started with a critical reading of the specification of the IEEE C37.118 proto-
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col, understanding what devices are included in the protocol, and at the same time
understanding the syntax and semantics of the messages. We implemented individual
parsers for the different messages, that first look at the overall syntax of the message,
and then look at the context of the device based on the previous messages.
Although our current design is inspired from our discussions with domain experts,
we anticipate that the substation networks are moving slowly towards software-defined
networking. In our future work, instead of using an ingress-based network appliance,
we would instead like to move to software switches based on P4 [170]. To improve
usability of hammer, we will also explore using domain specific languages to improve
the usability of the parser building methodology.

Section 4.3

Communications Validity Detector for SCADA
Systems6
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) protocols are being used to
make the Power Grid smart and automated. In such a modernized grid, substations
are increasingly unstaffed and controlled from control centers via SCADA protocols
such as DNP3 and IEC 61850 MMS.
Such critical-infrastructure systems usually boast of an IT-OT air-gap—physical
separation of the critical infrastructure (OT) and IT systems using non-routable interfaces and legacy hardware. However, this air-gap is disappearing, given the need
for remote access to control these devices [46].
In recent times, this air-gap has not helped either. Attackers were able to make
centrifuges malfunction in the case of Stuxnet by taking control of PLCs [92]. These
PLCs were attacked using multiple zero-day attacks using compromised USB sticks.
6

This section borrows from my previous work in [186, 12].
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We had no prior knowledge of these vulnerabilities and held no signatures of them.
We also witnessed the use of such zero days in the Ukraine power grid attack [54].
However, these zero-day attacks have one thing in common: they are mostly inputhandling vulnerabilities such as stack- or heap-based buffer-overflows [302].
Securing our SCADA Systems has been a challenge for various reasons. First,
since any communication received by a SCADA device can have a physical effect,
availability and timeliness are of paramount importance. The devices are usually too
constrained, and security schemes often fail to meet some of the real-time guarantees
required by Smart Grid networks [303].
Second, Anomaly and Intrusion detection schemes proposed for SCADA systems
are either targeted at detecting anomalies using the physics of these systems or using
the communication patterns. Such schemes cannot detect crafted-input attacks such
as those used in the Ukraine attack in 2016 or the Stuxnet attack in 2010.
Hence, any forensic tool used to investigate cyberattacks must detect attacks that
use invalid communications. In SCADA systems, invalid communications can stem
from various causes. First, communications can exploit weaknesses in programs due
to insufficient syntax checking. Programs often fail to implement communication
protocols correctly, leading to vulnerabilities. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to crash the program or gain complete access to the device running the program.
Second, forensic tools must detect syntactically valid but semantically invalid
communications. For each device in a SCADA network, the SCADA operator
holds a specification document listing all the IP addresses and the endpoints of that
device. For protocols such as DNP3 and MMS, the device only supports a specific set
of requests known as setpoints. A SCADA operator holds specification documents
showing what setpoints each device supports. Communication violating any of these
network or setpoint configurations is semantically invalid.
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Finally, forensic tools must also help detect communications triggered by a
malicious program or device, not a human. Differentiating between human actions
and a malicious program is a difficult problem. SCADA forensic tools must provide
visual feedback or confirmation on any human-triggered actions or evil actions.
To address these challenges, we present CVD, a communications validity detector.
Our contributions are as follows:
– Our CVD implementation detects malformed packets in a wide range of protocols. CVD detects any packet that does not conform to the protocol specification, detecting potential zero-day attacks.
– CVD detects various Web-based, Telnet-based, and DNP3 actions that attackers take. Although these protocols are known to be insecure, they are used
extensively in SCADA networks.
– CVD can detect various configuration and communication mismatches within
a Smart Grid substation.
– With CVD, we propose a new forensics paradigm to permanently place our
CVD devices in substations and control centers to monitor traffic and detect
attacks early.

4.3.1. System Design
To build a useful forensic gathering tool for SCADA networks, we set the following
technical goals for CVD:
– Live Forensics: CVD devices must be connected to SCADA traffic to continuously monitor and collect forensic information. In case there are any suspicious
actions in a network, operators can view CVD’s insights.
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– Detecting syntactically invalid messages: CVD must detect messages that
violate protocol specifications.
– Detecting semantically incorrect packets: Based on SCADA operator configuration files, CVD must detect communication flows violations.
– Help in detecting non-human-triggered actions: Most critical SCADA
actions with physical effects such as opening or closing breakers and relays
are human-triggered. If a compromised device communicates these SCADA
commands over the network, CVD must detect and visualize all SCADA actions
with physical effects.
To ensure that CVD is a tool that is extensible and usable, we set the following
design goals for CVD:
– Adaptive. We must not depend on existing attack scenarios and heuristics,
but be able to detect crafted packet attacks. Since zero-day attacks exploit
patterns and vulnerabilities that we have never seen earlier, we do not want
to rely on previously seen patterns but instead, use the LangSec paradigm to
detect new attacks.
– Scalable. We need to support a wide range of Smart Grid protocols with an
easy API to support future protocols. CVD detects syntactically malformed
packets for protocols we implement. CVD must hold a flexible architecture so
that in case a SCADA network supports protocols we do not support, developers
can add parsers for this protocol with minimal effort.
– Distributed. Given that there is a large amount of data generated in every
substation, we want to perform as much analysis as possible within the same
substation. In the control center, we only want to perform certain aggregated
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operations. This goal is vital to not add too much network overhead to the
SCADA network due to our CVD devices.
– Usable. It must be able to provide alerts in a usable and visual way while not
overwhelming users with information.

Figure 4.10: CVD Minions are connected to the routers within the substation, and
collect traffic from two interfaces. Whereas, the CVD Master is present in the Control
Center. The shaded boxes show our CVD devices.

Design
To realize our design goals, CVD uses various techniques. First, CVD uses a comprehensive set of Language-Theoretic Security-compliant parsers for different protocols
commonly used in Smart Grid substations. Some of the protocols that CVD includes
parsers for are DNP3, IEC 61850, and IEEE C37.118. Our parsers are adaptive, not
relying on previous attack samples to detect crafted input attacks. We will discuss
these parsers in more detail in Section 4.3.1.
Second, CVD uses a producer-consumer model within each implementation. This
design using Apache Kafka makes CVD scalable. Any future protocol additions only
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require adding consumers. The producers extract the payload portions of the packets
and broadcast them to all the consumers simultaneously.
Third, CVD uses a distributed master–minion system, where the CVD minions
are placed in every substation, whereas the CVD master is present in a control center.
This design is shown in Figure 4.10. The CVD master performs only data aggregation
and correlation, whereas the data collection and our parser checks happen in the
minions.
Finally, CVD includes strong visual components in terms of various Web UIs and
a command-line interface. The Web UIs present Smart Grid operators with multiple
alerts and a visual representation of specific traffic, which gives operators an ability to
monitor the network for traffic that may be well-formed but not sent by the operators.
For example, attackers could then use a particular relay device compromised via a
side-channel attack to send DNP3 commands to other breakers. Operators can easily
detect such attacks via our visual component that displays various DNP3 protocol
actions.

Continuous Data Collection and Monitoring Paradigm
CVD proposes a novel paradigm of continuous data collection and monitoring. Most
forensic investigation tools are only deployed after a bulk of the attackers’ actions
are complete. We deploy CVD in SCADA networks to continuously monitor network
traffic. In case of a suspicion of a cyberattack, operators can retrace the attackers’
steps using the CVD database.
We require a live network tap interface that can be created by duplicating all the
traffic going through a router. This duplication ensures that CVD does not add significant overheads to the network. CVD processes all the packets the router forwards
asynchronously, generating alerts on all suspicious packets. We continuously push
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Figure 4.11: Overall Architecture of the CVD Minion. The producers process network packets and forward them to various consumers via the Apache Kafka Broker.
The various consumers perform their analysis and store the results in a PostgreSQL
database. Operators can consume information from the PostgreSQL database via
interactive Web UIs or a command-line interface.
these alerts to our databases along with all network traffic metadata observed. This
paradigm of leaving CVD connected to a SCADA network tap before any cyberattack
to aid in forensics allows operators to reproduce the steps taken by attackers rapidly.

Distributed Data Collection
As seen in Figure 4.10, data is collected by CVD Minions present in every substation.
These minions collect and store data within the substation, as well as across them.
This data can include mostly various SCADA commands, but could also include other
routing behavior such as ARP, NTP, and DNS.
Since the CVD Minion and Master are also a part of the substation networks,
network traffic originates from these devices as well. However, this data does not
contribute to any forensics gathered by our parsers since we whitelist all traffic orig111
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inating from CVD.

CVD Minion Publish-Subscribe Model
One of the goals of CVD is to run the same packet received from the network through
our various LangSec parsers in parallel to check if the packet conforms to any of those
protocols. To do this, we adopt the publish-subscribe model.
We show this model in Figure 4.11. In this model, we have producers that capture
network traffic on various interfaces and send them to the Apache Kafka Broker. The
Kafka Broker then broadcasts it to all the consumers, that then decide what to do with
these packets. We chose the publish-subscribe model since it gives us the flexibility
to add future protocols and other analyzers easily without much effort.
Producers. We designed our Kafka producers to accept input in two formats.
They can take packet capture files or attach to live network interfaces. In either case,
our producers read each packet, and convert them to a string and then send them
over to all the consumers. They do not do any pre-processing since each consumer
analyzes the packet at a different layer of the protocol stack.
Consumers. Our Kafka consumers receive all the packets from the producers
and process them in various ways. In this section, we describe the various consumers
present in CVD. As seen in Figure 4.11, all our consumers store the results of their
analysis in the PostgreSQL Database.

Detecting Syntactically Invalid Packets
We implemented LangSec-compliant parsers for the protocols shown in Table 4.10.
To build these parsers, we purchased or procured the specifications of all SCADA
protocols of interest. After carefully reading these specifications, we extracted the
protocol state machine and the message formats in these protocols.
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The protocol state machines specify what the correct sequences of packets must
be and what sequences are prohibited. In contrast, message formats determine how a
packet conforming to a specific protocol must look like. We converted these message
formats to formal grammars.
IECGoosePdu = h.sequence(gocbRef,
timeAllowedToLive,
datSet,
goID,
T,
stNum,
sqNum,
simulation,
confRev,
ndsCom,
numDatSetEntries,
allData)

Code Snippet 8: Code showing a portion of our IEC 61850 GOOSE parser.
h.sequence() is a function provided by the Hammer parser-combinator toolkit.
We use parser-combinators to convert these formal grammars to code. Parsercombinators such as Hammer allow us to write parsers in code. As seen in the code
snippet 8, the parser-combinators help us write parsers that visually resemble the
formal grammar.
Our LangSec-compliant parsers detect packets that violate the formal specifications of a protocol. Although we cannot find or see specific semantic bugs, where
well-formed packets crash the application, state-of-the-art fuzzers should find such
semantic bugs. Our parsers or syntax validators cannot detect other types of attacks.
However, based on our prior research, most new zero-days discovered are crafted input
attacks such as buffer overflows that we prevent [14] (Section 3.1).
Our parsers are Kafka consumers that accept a raw byte string. We run our parsers
on this byte string and decide whether the packet is safe or not. Often, packets may
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conform to protocols we are yet to support. Based on the packet metadata (first two
bytes of the payload and the Ethernet frame), we first shortlist packets to check if it
may conform to a protocol we support.
These consumers run on Docker containers to ensure functional separation. Our
parsers would return a parsed object if the parse were successful or NULL if the parse
failed. The parsed object is essentially an abstract syntax tree (AST). Our parser
interacts with the AST to store various information. Based on data extracted by our
parsers, we keep all instances of failed parses due to malformed packets in our CVD
database. After ascertaining if a particular packet is making any setpoint changes,
we store these new setpoint values in our local CVD database.
Table 4.10: Various parsers included in CVD. The other LangSec parsers will also be
made available soon.
Protocol
Language Code Availability
DNP3
C/C++
Yes [42]
C37.118
C/C++
Yes [16] (Section 4.2)
SES92
C/C++
Not yet
GOOSE
Python
Not yet
MMS
Python
Not yet
SEL Fast Message
Python
Not yet

4.3.2. Evaluation
To evaluate CVD, we try to answer the following questions:
– Are the LangSec parsers CVD implements correct?
– Are the LangSec parsers in CVD resilient to fuzzers?
– Are CVD’s network interfaces resilient to fuzzers?
– Can CVD detect crafted packet attacks for various protocols?
– Can CVD handle the high rate of traffic in SCADA networks?
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– Can CVD visualize various human actions?
We ran our experiments on an Intel Xeon E31245 3.30 GHz processor with four
cores and 16GB RAM. We used Apache Kafka version 0.10 and Hammer toolkit
version 1.0-rc3.

Running our LangSec parsers through a large dataset
To ensure that our LangSec parsers cover a wide range of features in various SCADA
protocols, we ran data collected from a SCADA tested through our parsers. Apart
from running live network captures, CVD can also replay and process previously
captured packet captures (PCAP files).
Dataset. We used a dataset provided by Yardley et al. [294]. They collected
data from 20 substations and three control centers. These substations and control
centers were not provided by an actual industry utility, but they were otherwise realistic, simplified physical substations with both SCADA communications and power
equipment in a field-deployed testbed. These were experimental substations spread
over two square miles representing three independent crank paths and fed by three
generators connected by real overhead and underground wires. There were also highvoltage substations handling electricity at 13 kV.
Protocol
DNP3
MMS
C37.118
GOOSE
SEL Fast Message
SES-92

Number of
Substations
25
1
2
1
1
2

Packets parsed
Successfully
1888861
35635
1619479
4501
45802
488147

Total number of
packets
2007277
36262
1619582
4511
46737
503244

Percentage of packets
correctly parsed
94.5%
98.2%
99.9%
99.7%
98.1%
97%

Table 4.11: Our parser correctness experiments. We ran our parsers through a large
dataset of SCADA traffic provided by Yardley et al. [294].
Each substation included at least four relays and an RTU. The three control centers had RTACs and HMIs. These devices were from at least four different manufac115
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turers. Our dataset includes five hours of traffic. Although most of these substations
and control centers ran DNP3, each of the following protocols—SES-92, SEL Fast
Message, IEEE C37.118, IEC 61850 GOOSE, and IEC 61850 MMS—was running in
one substation each.
The results of our experiment are in Table 4.11. Our parsers ran with a minimum
accuracy of 94%, and most parsers had an accuracy of at least 98%. Our experiments
demonstrate that our parsers cover an extensive feature set of these SCADA protocols
successfully. Many practical DNP3 implementations support experimental and errorprone features that we are yet to support.

Fuzzing our parsers
Fuzzing SCADA devices can lead to crashes and denial-of-service attacks if the parsers
are vulnerable [268]. As explained in Section III-D, CVD includes a set of LangSec
parsers to ensure the syntactic validity of the SCADA network packets. Since CVD
is designed to detect crafted-packet attacks for SCADA protocols, we want to ensure that fuzzing approaches do not crash CVD itself. Fuzzing CVD serves two
primary purposes: (i) Parser resilience: ensuring that our parsers do not crash on
any input—well-formed, malformed, or random, (ii) Network resilience: testing the
network interfaces of our consumers to check if they can handle the high volume of
traffic in SCADA networks.
Parser Resilience. We had to use separate fuzzers for our C/C++ parsers and
our Python parsers. We fuzzed our C/C++ parsers using AFL++ [94] and our python
parsers using Python Fuzz [213]; both coverage-guided fuzzers. To create a fuzzing
target for AFL++, we created additional C files that called our parsers. AFL++
requires us to compile the program with instrumentation using an afl-cc compiler.
We then run afl-fuzz on the binaries generated with a seed folder. We created a

116

4.3 Securing SCADA Systems

Protocol
DNP3
SES92
C37.118
GOOSE
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SEL Fast
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Parser Resilience
Number of Unique Crashes
packets
paths
3.62 Million
623
0
637 Million
6
0
112 Million
5
0
1.2 Million
254
0
2.2 Million
13
0
1 Million
6
0

Hangs
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 4.12: Results of our fuzzing experiment with our LangSec parsers.
corpus of valid packets for our seed.

Figure 4.12: Fuzzing our SES-92 parser using AFL++.
Our fuzzing results are in Table 4.3.2 and Figure 4.12. We ran each of our fuzzers
for 48 hours. None of our fuzzing executions led to any crashes or unresponsive
parsers. Each of our python-fuzz targets ran at least one million permutations through
our parser targets. In comparison, our AFL++ targets ran a minimum of three million
executions through our parsers.
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CVD versus Crafted Packets
To test CVD against crafted packets, we collected malformed DNP3 packets from the
Aegis fuzzer [68]. Our sample consisted of 198 malformed DNP3 packets that were
generated by mutating well-formed DNP3 packets. These malformed packets used
some of the DNP3 vulnerabilities identified by Crain and Sistrunk [251]. Most of
these vulnerabilities were structural or syntactic vulnerabilities.
Since Aegis only supports Modbus and DNP3, we mutated well-formed packets
for SEL Fast Message, GOOSE, MMS, IEEE C37.118, and SES92 protocols. We
generated 198 packets for each of these protocols. We mutated packets so that they
mostly conform to the protocol but violate the specification in specific locations.
We fed these generated packets to our CVD producers, which passed on these
packets to the respective CVD consumers. We found that CVD was able to detect
all the mutated packets as malformed. Also, none of these malformed packets led to
any crashes on any of CVD’s parsers.

CVD’s Visualization Capabilities

Figure 4.13: CVD’s Web UI displaying the DNP3 Write operations captured within
a ten minute window.
One of CVD’s core features is an added visual component so operators can confirm
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Figure 4.14: CVD’s network UI. Devices not identified are shown in red. The highlighted numbers on edges shows the number of packets observed.
user actions. To validate our various UIs, we constructed several scenarios. We
created network configurations for our test network with three relays, two RTUs,
and one RTAC from three different manufacturers. This network was a SCADA-only
network. Our relays were not controlling any live power settings.
We removed various devices from our network configuration and ran CVD on the
network. We found that CVD was successfully able to detect network devices not
present in the configuration. Our network configuration mismatch analyzer triggered
alerts to alert the user with the network diagram in Figure 4.14.
Next, to evaluate our DNP3 timeline UI, we crafted a scenario where a malicious
program injected various DNP3 WRITE commands in the network. Operators must
monitor our DNP3 timeline to ensure no malicious WRITE or OPERATE commands
enter the network. Only users can trigger these commands.
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When we injected DNP3 WRITE commands and ran CVD, we found that CVD
generated various alerts and generated the timeline UI in Figure timeline. If an
operator notices the timeline UI in such a state, it could imply that one of the network
devices could be sending malicious commands.

4.3.3. Conclusions
This section presented CVD, a novel, distributed tool to monitor SCADA communications networks for crafted input attacks and malicious operations. We presented
our novel paradigm of continuous monitoring and data collection to gather forensics
from the SCADA network. We showed how we use LangSec-compliant parsers to
detect crafted input attacks and malformed packets.
We demonstrated CVD Minion’s parsers on a wide range of SCADA protocols
and a large dataset of valid SCADA traffic. We also built a GUI that would enable
SCADA operators to make security decisions. We fuzzed CVD to show that it is
resilient and can detect various SCADA misconfigurations.

Section 4.4

Parsing ICC Max
The International Color Consortium (ICC) provides a file format to create and interpret color data [202, 265]. The consortium was established in 1993 with nine founding
industry members to standardize how different vendors handle color profiles and rendering. In 2019, ICC approved the iccMAX specification, which is also ICC.2:2019.
ICC also provided a reference implementation to go along with the iccMAX specification. The reference implementation and specification are publicly available [76, 130].
Implementing a parser for the iccMAX file format presented several challenges.
First, since the specification is recent (2019), we could not find many ICC profiles
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to test our parser. This is especially a problem because several vendors have yet to
adopt iccMAX and provide support for these profiles.
Second, the iccMAX specification defines a calculator element that uses a stack
and defines several operations on the stack not entirely different from assembly code.
Therefore, to correctly parse a calculator element and ascertain that the entire iccMAX file is safe, we need to perform two checks: (1) syntactically validate the
iccMAX file using parsers, and (2) statically analyze the calculator element to ensure
safe stack operations.
Finally, the iccMAX specification and the reference implementation contain numerous errors that researchers find and fix every day [131, 291]. The iccMAX specification is a moving target. Other than implementing the specification, we also had
to be on the lookout for inconsistencies and bugs in the specification itself.
In this section, we demonstrate how you can parse an iccMAX file using parser
combinators, and build a static analyzer to model the stack effects of various operations inside the iccMAX calculator element.

4.4.1. iccMAX parser
We built the Parsley Rust parsing library to be able to capture features in the
PDF specification. Subsequently, we have successfully captured the syntax of DNS,
Mavlink, and RTPS protocols. The library provides several parsing primitives to
capture magic strings, characters, and integer ranges. In addition, we also provide
several combinators to perform various complex parsing operations such as prioritized
choice, sequences, alternate sequences, and star and plus operations.

Cursor control. Complex file formats often require users to search for a magic
character to begin parsing. For example, the actual file contents start only after the
magic string %PDF in the PDF format. Similarly, the contents of a PDF file following
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the %EOF tag are ignored.
Hence, control over the cursor’s location is crucial in a parsing library. For example, we may need to set the cursor’s location to a specific location in some formats.
Similarly, we may have to skip over a particular set of bytes until we find a magic
string, and depending on the offsets we find, we may need to parse the bytes we have
already skipped.

Creating views. Like the PDF format, the iccMAX format contains a tag table
with a list of tag entries. Each entry comprises a tag, the offset, and the size. The
iccMAX format uses this pattern often. Each calculator element also contains a list
of offsets and sizes relative to the calculator element. These offsets and sizes show
where the main function and all the subelements of a calculator element are located.
The main function and the subelements need not be contiguous with the calculator
element header—there could be arbitrary data between these blocks of an iccMAX
element. These offset-size structures allow us to define a view—a fragment of the
complete parsing buffer, such that the cursor can only move within this fragment.
Creating a view using the Parsley combinators is a two-step process. First, we
define the transformation using the TransformView structure. It follows the syntax
TransformView::new(position, size). We then call the transform function with
an existing view as an argument. Views are recursive structures; we can create
additional views from an existing view.
Internally, views do not create new copies of the entire buffer. Instead, our Parsley
library implements an API to set the bounds for a view and ensure that the cursor
cannot go beyond these bounds. At every parsing operation, these checks are enforced
on the parsing buffer and the view.
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4.4.2. iccMAX Static Analyzer
In addition to a parser for the iccMAX format using our Parsley Rust combinators, we
added a static analyzer to further analyze these iccMAX profiles, and in particular,
the calculator elements. The static analyzer uses the syntax tree produced by the
parser to analyze the calculator element. The static analyzer checks the syntax of
various operations and the stack effects of each operation.
The iccMAX specification defines a minimum stack size of 65 535. To ensure
interoperability, every iccMAX implementation must adhere to this minimum stack
size requirement. Therefore, given an iccMAX profile, we must detect stack overflows
and underflows along multiple paths of calculator functions.
Each calculator element contains the main function with a set of operations and
subelements. Each operation is a 4-byte operation signature followed by a 4-byte
argument. Depending on the operation, the argument may be split into 2-byte arguments or may be completely ignored.
Subelements invocations fall under six predefined operation signatures. The calculator element (and the main function) holds a four-byte index value to help identify
the subelement. Subelement operations take this four-byte index value as an argument. The type defined in the subelement definition and the operation signature
must match in four of the six subelement types.
The calculator element and each subelement define how many input and output
channels they use. When a subelement is invoked from the main function, we check
the number of input channels used by the subelement and pop those many elements
from the stack. Similarly, we add the output channels back to the stack when the
subelement completes execution.
The iccMAX specification defines several other operations that manipulate the
stack. These operations vary from stack operations to matrix operations and various
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mathematical operations to conditionals. However, most of these operations are deterministic in the effect they leave on the stack, and we can compute the size of the
stack after each operation.
Conditionals complicate this process by producing branches. if conditions can
take two paths, whereas switch statements can take any number of paths. We cannot
know which branch the program must take without inspecting the inputs given to
the calculator element. Tracking every possible branch, however, is resource-intensive
and inefficient.
We treat if, if-else, and switch operations differently. Instead of tracking all
the possible stack sizes after each branch, we only store the minimum and maximum
stack sizes to check for underflows and overflows. If an if operation does not have a
corresponding else operation, we store the previous stack size along with the stack
size after the execution of the operations under if.
Similarly, suppose a switch statement does not hold a default condition. In that
case, we compare the stack size before the switch statement to all the possible stack
sizes after various cases. Eventually, we only track this list’s minimum and maximum
stack sizes.
We used our static analyzer to find several stack overflow and underflows in iccMAX files produced using the DemoICCMax toolkit. These files were produced with
these malformations to help future iccMAX implementors test their parsers with
these malformed files. We were able to detect these malformations in the given files
successfully.

4.4.3. Showcase
We uncovered several issues with the iccMAX reference implementation and the specification while implementing our parser and static analyzer. We detail the issues we
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found in this section. In addition, we reported all these issues to the ICC and PDF
Association.
In implementing our iccMAX parser and static analyzer, we have uncovered several
errors in the specification and the demo implementation. In addition, we have already
reported several minor typos to the ICC working group. This section discusses more
complex errors and implementation challenges pertaining to the iccMAX specification
and the demo implementation.

Conditional operations are insufficiently defined
Conditional operations such as if and switch conditions were not sufficiently described
in the specification. These operations could have nested structures, where a switch
operation could have an if condition or a switch operation embedded in it. For
example, let us consider the following sequence of operations.
if

5

if

4

pi 0
pi 0
NaN 0
+INF 0
The above operations are syntactically valid. The operations pi, NaN, and +INF
do not take arguments, and these values are set to 0. The if operation specifies how
many operations are a part of the if block. It was not evident in the specification that
the outer if accounts for every condition inside, even if it includes nested conditional
operations.
We considered an entire if-else block to be just one instruction in an earlier implementation. However, upon further discussions with iccMAX experts, we were in125
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formed that the correct interpretation was to consider each operation within a block
to be an instruction. If the inner condition fails, we eventually only execute one operation, not five. We proposed better language to the ICC working group to alleviate
this confusion.

Subelement type mappings missing
The iccMAX specification uses the following language: “The curv, mtx, and clut operators require that the indexed subelement has the appropriate type.” The subelement
types for each of these operators are not specified in this text. We proposed adding
a mapping for these operators to subelement types. The specification must contain
the following mappings: mtx/matf, curv/cvst, clut/clut, and calc/calc. The calc operation and subelement type were missing from the original list. The ICC working
group has acknowledged these changes.

Operators missing in specification
Since the iccMAX specification and demo implementations are relatively new (since
2019), we do not have many open-source implementations and sample data available.
The iccMAX profiles we used to test our implementations were available as part of
the demo implementation.
However, when we ran our parser on these iccMAX profiles, we found that several
of these files used operations that were not defined in the specification. So we reached
out to the working group to gather descriptions for all these operations and alert them
about missing specifications.
These operations were the following: fJab, tJab, fLab, and not. Our static
analyzer now models the stack effects for all of these operations.
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Incorrect subelement index implementation
In the previous section, we described that subelement indices are a four-byte value.
We can invoke any subelement by referencing the index number and the correct
operator type.
When we inspected various iccMAX profiles as part of the demo iccMAX implementation, we found that several of these files were malformed. Instead of using a
four-byte index as an argument to the subelement operations, the demo iccMAX implementation converted this argument to two two-byte arguments where the second
argument is always zero.
Any reasonably crafted calculator profile must not need more than 65536 (216 )
subelements. However, this implementation of iccMAX clearly violates the specification. Given that extant data has already been produced and several vendors are
building on top of the demo iccMAX implementation, the ICC working group has
two options.
First, alter the specification in multiple places. For example, make sure that the
subelement indices are always two-byte. The extant files use a four-byte value in one
location and a two-byte value in another, causing confusion. This change would mean
the data files already produced would violate this specification version.
Alternatively, second, support both interpretations. We could try both interpretations of the specification as disjunctions. If we cannot find the right subelement using
the correct interpretation, we can try the incorrect but already shipped interpretation
to validate the file. To the best of our knowledge, the ICC working group is yet to
finalize an approach to address this issue.
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Section 4.5

Armor Within: Defending against
Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Libraries7

adversary
external interface
main code

vulnerable
library
application

Figure 4.15: In the general model we consider, an internal library has a crafted input
vulnerability; we must defend against the adversary tricking the main program into
calling that library with suitably crafted input.
The standard way to defend against crafted input attacks is validate the input
that comes in at the adversary’s attack surface. However, when an internal library
is vulnerable (Figure 4.15), it’s not clear what to filter for at the adversary’s attack
surface. We therefore propose enforcing strong protections at the software module
boundaries—e.g., between the main program and each library it uses. These protections will provide a strong guarantee that even if a third-party library is vulnerable
to a crafted input attack, the overall application will not be exploited; the adversary
7
This section borrows text and images from [4]. Also, Sameed Ali led this work, and I collaborated
with Sameed and Sean.
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may try to trick the main program into passing the right crafted input to the vulnerable library, but our defense will ensure that no unvalidated input crosses that
channel. This allows us to reason strongly about software security. We can be sure
that any crafted input attack which requires the input to be syntactically invalid will
not be able to exploit the software module—thus reducing the severity of another
libpng-like 0-day [189], if it were to happen again. Furthermore, these drop-in filters
could easily be added to applications after a vulnerability is discovered to protect
them from being exploited by a malicious attacker.
Malicious PNG
image
networking module

GUI module

Browser core
sensitive
data

vulnerable
libpng

XML module
libxml
browser

Figure 4.16: In CVE-2004-0597, the adversary tricks the browser into sending a
malicious PNG file into the libpng library. The exploited software module can then
access sensitive information in other parts of the address space.

Attacks Third-party libraries are used by multiple widely used software programs
and are often targeted by malicious actors who try to find exploits in these widely
used modules so they can reach a larger target audience for their malware.
Programs accept arbitrary input from users, sockets or files. These programs are
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expected to fail safely and reject malicious inputs. However, in the case of the remote
code execution bug found in libpng (CVE-2004-0597), if the adversary can trick the
main program into passing a specially crafted PNG to the library, the library overwrites the stack of the main program. Figure 4.16 visualizes the data-flow of this
attack. Traditional security considers hardening the outer boundary of the main program, and treats libraries as black boxes; preventing these attacks requires hardening
the boundaries between the main program and the libraries.

Existing Defenses Most solutions that have been proposed—such as WriteXOR-Execute [193], stack cookies [89], DEP [240], SafeSEH [183], CFI [1], and
ASLR [215]—do not prevent malformed input from being consumed. Indeed, they
attempt to prevent exploits after the exploit starts execution by detecting a memory
corruption or a control flow integrity violation.
Although these techniques do manage to stop some exploits midway in execution,
they offer no protections that crafted or malformed input will not be consumed by
the application in the first place. In contrast, our drop-in LangSec filters will detect
and prevent a crafted input attack before the exploit executes itself. Moreover, sophisticated exploits are often able to bypass these defense techniques, so there is a
need for a more effective exploit mitigation mechanism.
The existing software hardening approaches also do not take advantage of software
modularity. A defensive mechanism which attempts to use this aspect of software
architecture to its advantage will prove highly useful as we shall demonstrate with
our approach.
We tackle these issues using a suite of techniques to provide Armor Within an application. First, we propose enforcing strong protections at software module boundaries. We do this by injecting LangSec filter before data enters the untrusted modules.
A LangSec filter is the software component which validates the input by parsing it as
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a formal language.
Second, we use ELFbac to compartmentalize software and enforce fine-grained
access control on code and data sections and across software module boundaries. By
ensuring that programs do not jump to code sections that are not allowed via policy,
ELFbac enforces that entries to a vulnerable library must first go through the filter.
Finally, we convert legacy binaries to include ELFbac metadata and LangSec
filters to reduce the human effort required to deploy our tools. Our LangSec filters
consume CPU time in the order of micro-seconds.
I refer the reader to the paper [4] for a full treatment of this work.

Section 4.6

Conclusions
This chapter described some of my earlier work where I used parser combinators
to build recognizers for various network and file formats. We evaluated our parsers
against corpora of data to ensure that the implementations were correct. However,
our approaches did have some pitfalls.
The need for verified tools. We found that the Hammer parser combinator,
just like any other C library, is not immune to various memory safety bugs. Although
efforts are underway to fuzz the various Hammer backends to build assurance, the lack
of termination proof and the huge variation in functionality across different parsing
backends confuse developers. A verified parser combinator toolkit would guarantee
various correctness properties and termination properties.
Hammer does not implement garbage collection. As we were fuzzing the
Hammer-based parsers we wrote using libfuzzer, we found that Hammer does not
provide any functionality to free memory after it has been allocated to a parser
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object. Although we can avoid this from being a major issue in software with clever
engineering, it presents a challenge to support fuzzing efforts efficiently.
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Chapter 5

SPARTA: A Strict PDF
Type Checker
Section 5.1

Introduction
In Chapter 4, we studied how we can use parser combinators to build parsers to
ensure that we fully recognize input before operating on them. In this chapter, we
switch gears to study parser differentials and present an approach to finding sources
of parser differentials.
Parser differentials occur when two parsers implement a specification in slightly
different ways that may be interoperable. In addition, the tools creating input may
also contain these differentials. For example, two producers of JPEG files may both
misinterpret portions of the specification—producing slightly malformed files. This
chapter studies Portable Data Format (PDF) creation tools, how they may produce
malformed PDFs, and how we find these malformations.
PDF is one of the most commonly used data formats in today’s age. We use
this format to share documents such as this thesis proposal, presentations, and home
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leases. The format has iterated and evolved over the years since Adobe introduced
it in June 1993. Adobe maintained the specification until 2008, when it released its
patent to the International Organization of Standardization (ISO). There were six
versions of the PDF standard until 2008. As part of ISO, a committee of volunteer
industry experts votes on changes to the PDF specification.
Since 2008, ISO has released two versions of the specification: ISO 32000-2:2017
and ISO 32000-2:2020—both of which are versions of the PDF 2.0 specification. Both
of these versions of the specification hold no normative references to any proprietary
files or formats.
The PDF format is extremely complex—it contains various objects spread out
across the file with a cross-reference table (xref table) at the bottom of the file
containing pointers to each of these objects. A parser first looks at the cross-reference
table and jumps to each location in the table to parse an object. Hence, we need a
mechanism to read a value and jump to a location based on that value to parse PDF
files. This construct can lead to cyclic references—which in turn makes it difficult to
build a verified parser for the format [38].
These objects in a PDF file can be of several types: (1) Text stored in content
streams, (2) Font stored as Embedded Font objects, (3) Vector graphics, (4) Embedded images, and (5) other special objects such as forms and encrypted objects. The
format uses several base types that are extensively used.
Specifically, the dictionary and array objects in PDF require a specific syntactic
structure. For example, the Catalog dictionary is the root of all the objects connected
in the form of a tree. In addition, the Catalog dictionary holds other information such
as the version, language, and page layout.
Keys in a dictionary are optional, mandatory, or forbidden. The PDF specification
includes tables specifying the keys and their corresponding types for each dictionary
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and array type in the PDF specification. Each key in a dictionary or location in
an array can correspond to a fundamental type (number, integer, string, etc.) or a
complex type (dictionary, array, stream, number tree, name tree).
Different PDF readers implement various features differently.

For example,

Rohlmann et al. [233] found that 15 of the 26 PDF viewers they tested, would display visible content over previously certified content. They also found that different
implementations test permissions in PDF structures very differently.
Similarly, Muller et al. [197] define various attacks against PDF readers by crafting
attack paths. They demonstrate that different PDF viewers implement various PDF
constructs differently—leading to infinite loops in some tools. Similarly, they also
found that some PDF creation tools may reveal information about users via metadata.
Different PDF creation tools and viewers implement features of the PDF specification
differently. Due to these inherent differences, viewers often display different outputs
for the same PDF files.
Hence, detecting parser differentials between different PDF creation tools is essential. Muller et al. [197] and Rohmann et al. [233] use pixel comparison and Optical
Character Recognition (OCR)-based text comparison to check if PDFs are rendered
differently. Even when implementations deviate from specifications in subtle ways,
the PDFs display and render differently.
Parsley Type Checker API

PDF 2.0
Specification

Generate
Rust code
SPARTA Code
Generator

Invocations
to the type
checker

Rust type checker
code

Figure 5.1: Overall overview of SPARTA and the Parsley PDF Type Checker API.
I present two tools: (1) A PDF type checker API in Rust, and (2) SPARTA—a tool
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to generate Rust PDF type checker code from the Arlington PDF Document Object
Model (DOM). This DOM provides the tables in the PDF specification in a machinereadable (XML and TSV) form. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of our project.
SPARTA generates Rust code that includes invocations to the Parsley type checker
API. Our Rust type checker API supports most annotations required in the PDF
specification, such as indirect references, required fields, and heterogeneous arrays.
My contributions in this chapter are as follows:
– I built SPARTA—a first-of-its-kind tool that generates a type checker from the
Arlington PDF DOM: a machine-readable PDF specification (Section 5.3).
– SPARTA has already contributed to several corrections to the Arlington PDF
DOM: some logical errors and other typos (Section 5.5). In addition, SPARTA
has also led to corrections to other commercial PDF creation tools and the PDF
2.0 ISO specification.
– I also contributed to the Parsley type checker and built the transformer, and
serializer. Our Parsley Rust type checker provides an API that closely aligns
with the fields in the Arlington PDF DOM (Section 5.4).
– I present the PDFFixer, a tool to dynamically modify PDFs to fix commonly
seen type errors. The PDFFixer produces PDF files that produce fewer errors
and more text when run through text extraction tools (Section 5.7).

Section 5.2

PDF Format
PDF files, in their simplified form, comprise five basic structures [216].
– Header: this specifies the PDF version this file follows.
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– Objects: a list of objects each conforming to a predefined PDF type.
– Cross-reference table: also known as xref table, this table contains a list of
absolute locations of the objects in the PDF file.
– Trailer: this dictionary stores references to the Root object and info dictionary.
The trailer also contains other metadata fields such as the size of the xref table.
– End of file marker: this marker shows where the xref table is stored.
Each object in a PDF file are identified by an object number and a generation
number. For example, let us consider the following object.
13 0 obj
Object contents
..
endobj
In the above example, the object takes the object number 13 and generation
number 0. This object can be referenced from other objects or the trailer via the
reference 13 0 R.
Dictionaries PDF dictionaries are surrounded by << and >> characters. The keys
in these dictionaries must be of the name type, whereas the value portion can hold any
predefined PDF type. For example, <</Foo1 (bar) /Foo2 13 0 R>> is a dictionary
with two keys, Foo1 and Foo2, where the corresponding values are of types string and
reference respectively. The ISO 32000-2:2020 PDF specification specifies several rules
on various dictionaries. The Arlington DOM captures these rules in machine-readable
specifications.
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Arrays These are predefined objects that are surrounded by brackets ([ and ])
and contain multiple elements separated by spaces. Arrays can be homogeneous or
heterogeneous and can be fixed or variable length. For example, [(foo) /bar 13 0
R] is a heterogeneous array of size three where the first object is a string, the second
object is a name object, and the third object is a reference.

Streams These predefined objects contain a dictionary and a compressed stream.
The adjoined dictionary holds keys that specify the compression algorithm used and
the length of the stream. In most cases, stream objects are indirectly referenced, i.e.,
they are entirely stored in a different object and not embedded in another object.
The code snippet below shows an example of a stream object.
13 0 obj
<<
stream dictionary objects
>>
stream

endstream
endobbj
The Parsley PDF parser follows several steps to validate a PDF file thoroughly.
Figure 5.2 shows these steps. First, we syntactically validate all objects in a PDF file
by following the objects from the xref table. This step ensures that the dictionaries,
streams, arrays, and other predefined-typed objects are well-formed.
In the second step, we type check the various objects starting with the catalog dictionary and info dictionary. Then, iteratively, we type-check all the objects referenced
in these dictionaries based on type specifications.
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PDF
File

Syntax Check,
extract structures
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Figure 5.2: We show the steps followed by the Parsley PDF parser to validate PDF
files.

5.2.1. Related Work
PDF readers are also susceptible to crafted packet attacks like any other system. In
2021, several CVEs were issued since PDF readers were vulnerable to various crafted
packet attacks. For example, Polaris Office had a vulnerability where an attacker
could cause remote code execution by making the victim open a crafted PDF file [161].
Similarly, in Corel PDF Fusion, an attacker could use a heap corruption vulnerability
to execute arbitrary code if the victim opens a crafted PDF file [245]. Finally, various
Adobe Acrobat versions also had a stack overflow vulnerability that could be exploited
by opening a crafted file [157].
Validating PDF files is an ongoing problem. Given how complex the PDF format
is, it must not be a surprise that we see so many vulnerabilities in various PDF readers
from time to time. In addition, different PDF readers implement different validation
and rendering algorithms.
These subtle differences lead to differentials—the same file produces different results on different readers. These differentials could be in terms of validation, render139
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ing, or security.

Caradoc Caradoc [87] is a PDF parser freely available on GitHub. The Parsley
project started with the goal of making parsing file formats easier. Caradoc, on the
other hand, targeted the PDF format. Caradoc implements three passes to check
PDF files. For lexical analysis and parser generation, Caradoc uses MENHIR and
OCAMLLEX. They implement a strict type checker and a content stream checker for
the other two passes.
Although the Parsley PDF parser does the same three passes, it uses a parser
combinator library in Rust to check the syntax. In this chapter, we focus on the
Parsley type checker. In addition, we provide an extensible interface to support code
generation. Any changes to the PDF specification will need significant changes to
the Caradoc code base. The Parsley type checker uses SPARTA-generated code to
alleviate this issue of code changes.
Table 5.1 compares various features in Caradoc and Parsley. The Parsley type
checker is only one component of the Parsley PDF parser. For the sake of this table,
we decouple the type checker from the rest of the parser. The Parsley PDF parser
goes above and beyond many of Caradoc’s capabilities.
Caradoc includes a normalizer to patch broken PDF files. In Section 5.7, we
test the efficiency of this normalizer by running files through the normalizer in an
additional pass before running the PDF file through the Parsley parser. Caradoc also
checks a PDF file for cycles. They implement indirect references in files as a graph
and look for cycles in these structures. A PDF file with cycles can lead to infinite
recursion or nontermination if not handled carefully.
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Overall PDF Syntax
Cycles in PDF objects
Duplicate keys
Normalizer
Type checker API
Dictionary Specifications
Array Specifications
Stream Specifications
Number Tree Specifications
Name Tree Specifications
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Caradoc
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial
Partial

Parsley Type Checker
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Partial
Partial
Partial

Parsley PDF Syntax Checker
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

Table 5.1: A comparison of Caradoc features and Parsley features. We extracted the
list of features from [87].

5.2.2. Extant Data and the de facto standard
The SAFEDOCS program is a DARPA program designed to build better parsing
and parser monitoring tools. The SAFEDOCS program broad agency announcement states the following “dominant implementations of these formats extend the
[published] standards by deliberately accepting non-compliant inputs without any indication to the users that the document contains malformations silently presumed
benign” [217].
A de facto standard is the standard implemented by dominant implementations
that vary from the official standard in tiny, non-malicious, and subtle ways [67].
Similarly, files that implement these de facto standards are called extant data.
These files mostly conform to the specification, and most commercial PDF readers
cannot detect these malformations. However, some PDF readers print warnings when
encountering some of these constructs.
In Section 5.5, we outline various extant PDF files and their constructs. We
reported these issues to the PDF association. These issues led to the official specification and the de facto standard converging, leading to multiple proposed edits to
the ISO 32000-2:2020 PDF specification.
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5.2.3. Arlington PDF Model
The PDF 2.0 ISO 32000-2 specification spans over 1000 pages with several normative references. PDF files have been in use for over 25 years, and via a differing
understanding of the specifications, contradictions in the specification, and errors
of omission, various PDF implementations have deviated from the specification in
various ways.
Wyatt et al. at the PDF Association proposed creating a machine-readable specification, the Arlington PDF Model (also known as the Arlington DOM or Document
Object Model),1 for various objects commonly used in PDFs. This specification can
help reduce deviations and inconsistencies in implementations. The Arlington PDF
Model captures the keys present in Arrays (indices), Dictionaries, and Stream objects.
The DOM defines 515 TSV files with a total of 3544 rows of data. Each row includes 12 columns. We describe the columns that are vital to SPARTA and supported
by the Parsley type checker.
– Key: For each row in the DOM, this column defines the key portion of the
dictionary.
– Type: This column defines the type of the value portion of this dictionary field.
There are 18 pre-defined types. This field cannot contain any other type.
– PossibleValues: For basic predefined types such as integers and names, this
column lists all the possible values the field can take.
– Required: Takes a true or false value to denote whether the field is required.
– Indirect: Specifies whether a field must be indirect. There could be cases when
the field must be indirect for only specific choices (such as streams) and be
1
Peter Wyatt, one of the lead creators of the DOM said, “it is named after the DARPA HQ
location as a nod to their funding support.”
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direct for other choices.
– Link: Links help define a type further into a a TSV class. For example, the
“Type” column may define a particular field to be a dictionary. What fields
this dictionary must contain and their properties are defined by files listed in
the “Link” column. The types arrays, dictionaries, name trees, number trees,
and streams always require links.
In the rest of this chapter, we differentiate between three types in the Arlington
model.
(a) Basic predefined Arlington types: These are types that do not need additional
descriptions. These types are bitmask, boolean, date, integer, matrix, name,
null, number, rectangle, string, string-ascii, string-byte, and string-text. Our
type checker implements these types out of the box.
(b) Complex predefined Arlington types: These are types that hold links in the
DOM. Although they hold an overall structure, additional descriptions are
needed to completely capture these definitions. Occasionally, these types may
hold links to a UniversalDictionary or a UniversalArray type. These
types describe generic dictionaries and arrays with no constraints on the keys
or values present.
(c) TSV class: Links in the TSV files correspond to other TSV files. The type
derived from the entire TSV file corresponds to the link in the original TSV
file. For example, the Catalog TSV file holds a link to a PageObject TSV
type which corresponds to the PageObject TSV file. The row in the Catalog
TSV file specifies it is a dictionary, and hence the PageObject TSV type must
be interpreted as a dictionary. In summary, TSV classes specify additional
constraints on the complex predefined Arlington types.
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Section 5.3

SPARTA Code Generator

PDF
2.0

TSV
Spec

Compute stack
and dependencies

DOM Validator

Arlington DOM to
Rust Transpiler

70,000 Lines of our
PDF Type Checker
Code in Rust

Figure 5.3: Overall architecture of SPARTA. We generate Rust code using the PDF
2.0 machine-readable specification in TSV format.
Figure 5.3 shows that SPARTA follows three steps to generate Rust type checker
code. We use the passes to compute metadata and stack configurations needed to
generate code that terminates. We implemented SPARTA in Python 3, and the
source code uses about 1000 lines of code. As we will discuss later, we found several
specification errors using the DOM validator pass.
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5.3.1. Computing a list of classes
We start with a stack comprising one element—the catalog. Then, we process each
key in the catalog dictionary and add the classes a key references to the stack. For
example, the catalog contains an entry to an “Extensions” field and a corresponding
class called “Extensions.” Once we see a reference to this class in the “Link” column,
we add it to our stack and explore this new class.
Once we add it to our stack, we also take a snapshot of the current stack to keep
track of all the various classes higher up the tree. For example, if the extensions
dictionary holds a reference to a catalog dictionary, we can create an infinite loop
of class definitions. We use a naming convention for class definitions to avoid such
cyclic class definitions. Similarly, we also keep track of all the sibling classes. Again,
the extensions and pages fields in the catalog dictionary could hold cyclic references
to each other, leading to an infinite loop.
In summary, we use a full-stack to keep track of all the class definitions (tsv files)
we must explore. Simultaneously, we use a live stack to keep track of all the classes
higher up the tree. Finally, we also keep track of siblings of a particular class to
ensure there are no cyclic definitions.

5.3.2. DOM Validator
Once we extract type definitions from the Arlington PDF model, we perform a static
check on the model to ensure certain integrity properties.
(a) The same type must not be defined as an array and a dictionary.
(b) Each predefined complex type must hold a corresponding tsv file.
(c) Dictionaries must not contain duplicate keys.
(d) Arrays must only consist of numbers from 0 to n-1 or a * entry.
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(e) “*” must always be the last entry in an array or dictionary definition.
These validation steps are covered in the Arlington PDF model’s internal specification and language document. Since we treat these properties as invariants in
the Arlington specifications, we must make sure that these properties hold before
generating code from this data.
Since the code generation process varies, if an Arlington class is a stream, dictionary, or array, we must handle these cases differently and run the above integrity
checks to ensure that the same type is not used as multiple of the above-predefined
types. Likewise, interpreting them becomes complicated if arrays contain non-numeric
and non-star values.
The DOM validation step is vital in generating Rust code from the Arlington
model. Unfortunately, we found three significant errors in the Arlington model—
typos and contradictions—using the DOM validator. These issues are reported in
more detail in Section 5.5.2.

5.3.3. SPARTA Transpiler
Since the Parsley type checker provides an API that can model heterogeneous and
homogeneous arrays, dictionaries, and all predefined PDF types, we generate Rust
code using templates. These templates store the overall syntax of these types and
can be called when we encounter a particular type.
First, we use information gathered in the first pass. We ascertained what predefined types are called with each Arlington class (tsv file). The same class cannot
be defined as an array and a dictionary. We check if the array is homogeneous or
heterogeneous for arrays to call the correct code generator.
Homogeneous Arrays The Parsley API provides support for an Array structure
that accepts an optional size parameter and a type parameter to specify what checks
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to apply on each array element.

Heterogeneous Arrays These arrays use the HetArray structure in the API. It
takes a list of types as an argument. The type checker goes through this list and
applies each check in this array sequentially, ensuring the array’s length and the type
at each location are accurate.

Hybrid Dictionaries Dictionaries by nature in Parsley implement both the star
and the individual keys. We use the DictEntry and DictStarEntry structures to
specify the individual keys that go in a dictionary. As shown in the code snippet
below, we specify the type for each key in a dictionary and whether it is required,
optional, or forbidden.

Indirect References Each class in the Arlington DOM is implemented as a separate function. These functions follow a similar pattern—taking two arguments, a
context variable, and a boolean to denote if a class needs to be indirect. We needed
to use an additional argument since several classes get called indirectly and directly
depending on the callee.
The snippet below shows a portion of the Arlington specification for the catalog
dictionary (Figure 5.4) and the code generated using SPARTA (Code Snippet 5.3.3).
For classes such as extensions type and pagetreenoderoot type, the functions use
the two arguments we described earlier. For keys that define an allowlist of possible
values, the function signatures use the possible keyword. We also use the opt
parameter in these structures to denote if the field is required, optional or forbidden.
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Figure 5.4: A snippet of the Arlington PDF model

5.3.4. Version-specific type checkers
The Arlington model currently provides separate specifications for each version of
the PDF standard. However, since the goal of the PDF standard is to make sure
that the specifications are backward compatible and implementations are forwards
compatible, we used the PDF 2.0 standard to generate code using SPARTA.
We generate a separate type checker for each version in the PDF standard and use
the version number in the catalog or the header to choose the correct version of the
type checker to use. In our experiments so far, only the pdfcpu [120] tool implements
version checks for keys. However, pdfcpu only supports PDF versions up to 1.7. The
current active version of the PDF specification is 2.0. Table 5.2 shows the number of
files for each PDF version in the Arlington DOM and the lines of code generated by
SPARTA for each version.
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let entry_type = DictEntry {
key: Vec::from("Type"),
chk: mk_type_possible_typchk(
tctx),
opt: DictKeySpec::Required,
};
let entry_version = DictEntry {
key: Vec::from("Version"),
chk: mk_version_possible_typchk(tctx),
opt: DictKeySpec::Optional,
};
let entry_extensions = DictEntry {
key: Vec::from("Extensions"),
chk: extensions_type(tctx, false),
opt: DictKeySpec::Optional,
};
let entry_pages = DictEntry {
key: Vec::from("Pages"),
chk: pagetreenoderoot_type(tctx, true),
opt: DictKeySpec::Required,
};
let entry_pagelabels = DictEntry {
key: Vec::from("PageLabels"),
chk: number_tree(tctx),
opt: DictKeySpec::Optional,
};

Code Snippet 9: SPARTA-generated Rust code

Section 5.4

Parsley Type Checker
Our Parsley type checker closely follows the PDF specification, defining the fundamental and complex structures. In addition, we provide an API to define homogeneous
and heterogeneous arrays. Finally, we support dictionaries with a fixed set of keys
and values or dictionaries where the types of values are defined, but keys can be any
name.
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Version
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
2.0
Total

Lines of code in Rust
6389
10617
23591
41415
47677
64626
71370
76114
96263
438062

Number of type files
46
78
147
237
264
349
385
414
511
2431

Table 5.2: Number of type files and Rust code generated for each PDF version in the
Arlington PDF Model
Since some fields in the specification hold a set of possible values, we support
choice predicates where the list of names is provided as an array. The type checker
checks each of these possibilities sequentially till a match is found. Similarly, we
support disjunctions for more complex types. Fields in arrays or dictionaries can
often take multiple types. Just like an ordered choice in PEGs, we iteratively go
through these disjunctions till we find a match.
The PDF 2.0 specification defines fields in arrays with annotations such as ”Required” or ”Optional” and ”must be indirect” or ”indirect preferred.” These annotations are vital in defining what fields are necessary for PDF dictionaries for syntactically valid PDF files. We support annotating each dictionary key with Required,
Optional, or Forbidden keys. Additionally, we support an annotation to define that
an indirect specification is required for a particular field in each type definition.
Our type checker runs a breadth-first search to match types. We start with the
Catalog dictionary and Info dictionary in a PDF file. Then, since the catalog holds
indirect references, we add these type definitions and the indirect object to our queue.
Finally, we keep removing these items from the queue to check types.
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Section 5.5

Showcase: Specification Violations
When we ran SPARTA on the Arlington PDF model and SPARTA-generated Rust
code on a corpus of PDF files, we found several errors in the Arlington PDF model and
errors in PDF files. We reported the errors in the Arlington PDF model to the PDF
Association. Subsequently, they acknowledged these errors and fixed them. Since
creating the machine-readable PDF 2.0 specification was a manual process, most of
these errors were a result of data-entry errors. In the rest of this section, I detail the
PDF model errors, and the errors in the PDF files. Table 5.3 summarizes the various
errors and their outcomes.
Error
Name-/Number-tree can hold links
Incorrect types in DOM
Array/Dictionary mismatch in DOM
Name/String mismatch in Lang
Indirect specifications not followed
Type key missing in Fonts
Page Tree Node keys missing
Incorrect Date Format in htmltopdf

Date Reported
9/20/21
12/05/21
12/05/21
7/20/21
7/21/21
12/15/21
7/20/21
11/15/21

Outcome
Specification fixed
Specification fixed
Specification fixed
Specification fixed
Changes proposed
More investigation needed
More investigation needed
Fixed in immediate release

Table 5.3: A summary of errors uncovered using SPARTA and Parsley and their
current status with PDF association (as of May 3rd, 2022).

5.5.1. Test Dataset
To test our type checker, we use a corpus of PDF files provided by the SAFEDOCS
program [6, 217]. This corpus includes files from Common Crawl [48], GovDocs [101],
and files artificially generated by the SAFEDOCS Kudu team. We used 10,000 files
from this dataset to evaluate our type checker. These files vary in length, language,
and, most importantly, the PDF creation software.

151

5.5 Violations

SPARTA: A Strict PDF Type Checker

5.5.2. Errors in the PDF model
The DOM sanitizer in SPARTA (Figure 5.3) performs several wellformedness checks
that we have detailed in Section 5.3. These checks allow us to be certain that the
model is correct and does not contain contradictory information. The machinereadable specification must also conform to the text-based specification of ISO 32000.
Discrepancies between the machine-readable specification and the ISO document
could further lead to extant data.

Number trees and Name trees can hold links The Arlington PDF model holds
a documentation file detailing all the fields in the model and what values each field
must hold.2 The documentation specified the following: “The following predefined
Arlington types ALWAYS REQUIRE a link: array, dictionary, stream.” and “The
following predefined Arlington types NEVER have a link (they are the basic Arlington
types): bitmask, boolean, date, integer, matrix, name, null, number, rectangle, string,
string-ascii, string-byte, string-text, name-tree, number-tree.” However, when we
implemented this validation check, we found that name-trees and number-trees always
contained links. We provided a pull request to the Arlington DOM Github repository
to fix this issue.3

Same type defined as an array and a dictionary When we checked the Arlington model for cases where the same type is defined as multiple predefined types, we
found that there were 25 instances where a type specification (tsv file) corresponded
to multiple predefined types.
2

Arlington PDF Model Grammar Validation Rules: https://github.com/pdf-association/
arlington-pdf-model/blob/master/INTERNAL_GRAMMAR.md
3
Pull request: https://github.com/pdf-association/arlington-pdf-model/pull/4
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Figure 5.5: The Widths key was incorrectly described in multiple places in the Arlington PDF DOM.
Incorrect “Widths” key Various font dictionaries in the PDF format include
a Widths key, which is an array of numbers. The number type signifies that these
numbers can be a real number (decimal) or integer. An earlier version of the Arlington
PDF DOM specified the Widths field in various dictionaries to be an array of integers.
We ran SPARTA and ran the generated Rust code on our 10,000 file dataset.
When we investigated the various specification violations, we found that the key was
incorrectly specified in the DOM and subsequently in our generated code. We raised
an issue, which has been fixed in a later version of the Arlington DOM. Figure 5.5
shows our interaction with the PDF association.
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5.5.3. Common Specification Violations in Extant Data
We found these errors by running our Parsley type checker on the dataset of 10,000
PDF files. Most of these errors demonstrate a poor understanding of the PDF standard on the part of the developers of PDF creation tools.

Type Errors This category of errors does not seem extremely common. However,
occasionally, we find that specific keys in dictionaries do not contain a value of the
correct type. For example, we found that several PDF files contained a catalog
dictionary with the Lang containing a corresponding value of the name type instead
of the string type [290]. An incorrect Lang key can confuse a text extraction tool
and could lead to poor text extraction results. Figure 5.6 shows the issue created to
illustrate this issue and how an incorrect value for this key can lead to confusion.

Figure 5.6: We found several files with invalid languages. The Lang key needs a value
of type string. However, we found several files using the Name type in PDF.

Missing Keys PDF dictionaries contain several mandatory keys to ensure that a
PDF file created on one tool can still be read and rendered on another tool. Unfortunately, missing required keys are the most common error format in our experiments.
Two examples of this error occur frequently. First, out of the 10,000 files, we found
more than 200 failing due to missing the count or kids keys in page tree nodes. Both
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of these keys are mandatory as per the standard.
Similarly, we find that often font descriptor dictionaries are missing the Type key.
Each PDF dictionary includes a type key to differentiate between the various classes.
However, around 40 files missed this key. Most PDF readers do not provide errors or
warnings when such mandatory keys are missing. Since error handling is not covered
in detail in the specification, different implementations differently handle the lack of
required fields.

Indirect References Our type checker enforces an indirect reference check if the
specification requires an object to be indirect. We do this by ensuring a reference for
that key, not a dictionary, array, or stream, in place. We found that the Outlines
and Dests keys in the catalog dictionary appear to be in place quite commonly [289].
Figure 5.7 shows the GitHub issue we created for this issue. 96 files out of the 10,000
files failed our type checker with this error.
This issue on GitHub is still currently open. The PDF community is still discussing how this needs to be addressed in the next iteration of the PDF specification.
Currently, the proposal is to weaken the specification to allow both direct and indirect
references for these keys.

Figure 5.7: Issue opened by PDF Association to address the problem of indirect
references raised.

Proprietary page layout and modes The page layout and page mode fields are
a part of the catalog dictionary. They are both of the name predefined type, and the
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specification provides a list of options for these values. We enforce a strict check to
ensure that this allowlist is followed. However, we found several instances where the
dictionary used keys that violated these lists. Some of these are proprietary values
that are used in some PDF readers, whereas others were simple typos such as using
none instead of UseNone. In addition, other keys with allowlists such as the TR key
in procedure sets also include an allowlist that we observed was violated time and
again.

Incorrect Date Syntax In the PDF syntax, date strings must start with a D:
at the beginning, followed by the rest of the date, ending with the timezone information. We found that several files violated this date specification. Upon further
investigation, we found that the htmldoc tool still implemented an incorrect date
format. Therefore, we created an issue on their GitHub page to ensure this issue is
addressed [9]. Subsequently, the maintainers have promptly fixed this issue to ensure
future versions do not produce extant data.

Errors in Font definitions We found that this error was prevalent mainly in files
generated via latex tools. These files sometimes did not contain Type, BaseFont, or
SubType tags in the font definitions—these tags are mandatory in font dictionaries.

Missing Keys in Data Dictionary The Data dictionary is referenced from the
PieceInfo key in the Catalog dictionary. This dictionary stores two keys: LastModified
and Private. The LastModified key stores the timestamp of when the file was last
edited. Whereas, the private key stores other private data in a dictionary. The
LastModified key is required in this dictionary type. However, we found instances of
files where this key was absent, leading to differentials.
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5.5.4. Skia Errors
The Skia open-source graphics library serves as a graphics engine for multiple browsers
and operating systems. In addition, it provides ways to describe graphics in C++
and generate PDFs and SKP files. In our dataset, we found a cluster of 53 files that
were produced using the Skia graphics engine milestone 90, which Google released in
August 2021. In this section, we examine these errors.
Error
Type spelled as Typ
Content Stream reference absent
Parent key missing from Page
Page Tree Node has key Page (should be Pages)
Kids and Type key missing from Page Tree Node
Typo in the keyword Page
Typo in the keyword Catalog
Root points at Info instead of Catalog
Root points at XObject instead of Catalog
Page Tree Root contains Parent key
Typo in string “Normal”

Frequency
16
12
10
1
1
4
3
1
1
4
1

Table 5.4: Skia/PDF errors summarized

Type misspelled We found that 16 files contained a typo in the word “Type.”
This key in the dictionary is mandatory to understand the type of the dictionary. For
example, a catalog dictionary has the string Catalog corresponding to the key Type.
A typo in this key makes parsing a PDF unambiguously a colossal challenge.
Typos We found several keywords such as the string “Normal” or “Type” were
misspelled or were spelt with incorrect cases. For example, we found instances of the
typo “Typ” instead of “Type” and “norMaL” instead of “Normal.”
Content stream objects missing Several files contain content stream references
that we were not able to resolve to an actual stream object.
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Root does not point to Catalog The trailer in a PDF file specifies the Root
object ID, which must reference a Catalog dictionary. However, files created by Skia/PDF contained references to the Info dictionary instead of the Catalog. Similarly,
we also found references to XObject types.

Malformed Page tree nodes A page tree node must contain three keys: the
Type, Kids, and Count keys. An additional Parent key must be present in page tree
nodes that are not the root. In addition, the Type key must correspond to the value
Pages. This key occasionally contained the value Page instead of Pages. Also, there
were instances where the required Parent key was absent in non-root nodes, and the
Kids and Type key were missing.
In summary, we found several files that contained the producer Skia/PDF. These
files contained numerous minor defects and typos, as we outlined in Table 5.4. However, not all of these errors are easy to fix dynamically. For example, errors in the
Type field or the absence of the Type field make it difficult to identify the object
type.

Section 5.6

Evaluation on arXiv dataset
The Kaggle team has made a dataset of arXiv documents available [270]. This dataset
is composed of over 1.7 million PDF files available on arXiv. Although this data was
made available so researchers can perform machine learning research on such a vast
corpus, we leverage this dataset to understand differentials in PDF creation tools.
We used all papers uploaded to arXiv from 2022 January to March, which amounted
to over 40000 unaltered files.
When we analyzed the type errors we found in these datasets, we found some
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Number of files
4379
16336
19105

Type Errors
11
35
46

Table 5.5: Summary of our evaluation on the arXiv dataset
trends. The arXiv dataset predominantly consisted of files generated using various
latex tools. We found these errors in files submitted to arXiv in 2022—making it
highly likely that such error-introducing behavior is present in the latest releases of
some of the latex to PDF conversion tools. Table 5.5 summarizes our datasets and
the number of type errors we found in each of our dataset when we applied our
version-specific type checker.
In the rest of this section, we study the type errors we found in detail.
– Incorrect PageMode: We found several instances of this issue in our analysis
of other datasets as well. The PageMode key includes an allowlist and values
corresponding to this key must follow this rule. In our arXiv evaluation, we
found that there are files containing incorrect values, such as None instead of
UseNone. This issue was found in files generated by TeX Live 2020 and Dvips
used with GPL Ghostscript 9.22 (2017). Following is a list of all the incorrect
values we found corresponding to the PageMode key in these datasets: None,
noneh, Fit, Fullscreen, none, UserNone, empty, and TwoColumnsRight.
– Incorrect Data Syntax: PDF files store dates using a specific syntax. This
syntax handles the data, time, and timezone. We found that PDFs generated
by the WPS office, the word processing software, had incorrect syntax for date
strings that store the time the file was last modified.
– Missing objects and streams: The PDF specification uses several indirect
references to improve readability and spread objects across a PDF file. Using a
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lazy reading technique, we only read objects currently in use instead of loading
the entire PDF file in memory. However, in our evaluation of the arXiv dataset,
we found several instances where there were references to missing objects.
– Type key missing in FontDescriptor dictionary Like most dictionary
types in the PDF specification, the Font Descriptors must include a Type key.
Most font types require font descriptors to describe the font in further detail,
such as the font weights, family, and the name if it is a base font (The PDF
specification defined 14 standard base fonts). We found that many files generated by PDFium did not include the Type key for Font Descriptor dictionaries.
This makes identifying the dictionary type difficult since most other keys in the
dictionary are not mandatory.

Section 5.7

PDFFixer: Transforming PDF files using a
Format-Aware Reducer
In previous sections, we understood how the PDF syntax is defined (Section 5.2), how
we can generate code from the machine-readable specification (Section 5.4), and how
PDFs today contain numerous errors (Section 5.5). This section explores ways to fix
common type errors in PDF files.
There is a need to have an organized way of applying fine-grained rewriting rules
to parsed input, particularly for data formats. For example, software engineers that
deal with a complex file format like PDF need a toolchain to enable them to rewrite
an arbitrary, complex PDF file to a notional “PDF/Safe” dialect by removing or
rewriting slight malformations or by substituting risky instances of particular format
features with an equivalent representation that carries less risk. Engineers who deal
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in data languages often lack a principled framework for applying transformations to
instances of that data in a safe and systematic way [115, 43].
Current data rewriting systems in file and network security are usually based
on regular expression search-and-replace, such as URL rewriting schemes when they
occur in email. This technique “works” because typical URLs do not have deep,
nested structure.4 This grep-like approach will not work for complex structured
input. Moreover, the post-parsed input is likely contained in a tree-like or similar
data structure, thereby losing the ease of applying file and line-oriented Unix-style
string search-and-replace tools. Such tools and tracers lack format awareness: they
do not “see” the meta-language structure on top of the symbols built to scan.
One way of visualizing this problem is to apply a regular expression-aware triggeraction programming pattern. Xpath [62], M4 [146], and Gremlin [232] are standard
tools used to achieve this task. However, we would need to build tools to operate on
complex graph or tree structures instead of text or XML data in the more generic
case.
This section argues for the need for format-aware tools to transform, sanitize, and
serialize data. There are several reasons to design such tools. First, not all data
formats are similar. For example, the transformations we must apply to a PDF file
differ significantly from DNS network protocol message transformations. File formats
often contain offsets—data spread throughout the file, and the locations and size
of this data are maintained in a table. Designing an intermediate representation
common across various data formats is also challenging.
Second, we need tools that can generate files from an intermediate representation.
This operation is called unparsing or serializing [231]. However, with the complex
4

Although they can be surprisingly complex, as evidenced in M. Zawelski’s Browser Security
Handbook [299], due to the various legal representations of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses along with the
permitted encoding schemes for GET and POST parameters.
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structures in data formats, programmers need to design their serialization tools for a
particular format to convert the internal representation to bytes.
Finally, the PDF specification has evolved a lot over the last three decades, resulting in several ad hoc implementations that create PDF files that violate the specifications in subtle ways. We investigated commonly occurring errors in PDF files
and found that a substantial number of errors require sophisticated methods to fix
these errors. For example, in a dataset of 1 million PDF files, we found that over
3000 of them contained page tree node malformations of some sort—meaning keys
mandatory in the page tree nodes were missing. As a result, these otherwise benign
files do not open on several PDF readers.
Additionally, Muller et al. [197] demonstrated that PDF files contain metadata,
personally identifiable information, and redacted data. For example, they found that
over 58% of PDF files in their sample included author information. Furthermore,
PDF tools also include the creation time and the name and version of the tool used
to create the file. An adversary can use this information about the victim’s PDF
tools to craft exploits.
Although the most common application for data transformation tools is fixing
minor malformations in data, there could be other use cases. For example, we can
transform valid files to violate format specifications. We can then use these files to
test parsers for these formats. We can also use a parser and serializer to redact data
transiting network filters. We can achieve this by applying transformations to the
parsed data structures and then serializing the parsed structure back to a network
packet.
To this end, we present the Parsley normalization tools that address the above
challenges using several approaches. First, we introduce the Parsley Intermediate
Representation (Parsley IR), a representation to capture the syntax of PDF objects in
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use. Developers can use this IR to debug PDF files or use it with other normalization
tools that are a part of the Parsley toolchain.
Second, we develop the PDFFixer, which comprises the Parsley Reducer API to
allow developers to specify various transforms on the PDF structure. A reducer is a
tool that can dynamically execute transformation functions over data. These transformation functions are defined as a set of reducer rules. Then, a reducer applies these
rules to transform data. This section proposes a reducer API targeted at the PDF
format. The API allows a developer to specify selection, filtering, and replacement
rules.
Our Reducer API provides a customizable, scriptable rewriting system for the
PDF format. This design pattern is similar to the pattern used by Pin [173] and
Valgrind [201] and dyninst and DynamoRio [34] for x86 code. These tools use this
pattern for other purposes, such as performance profiling, static and dynamic memory
and cache analysis, and bug finding. They dynamically inject x86 code to monitor
the program’s performance. In contrast, we invoke our Reducer API to apply transformations to the PDF structure.
Third, we build a serializer to convert Parsley IR to a transformed PDF file.
Serialization is the process where an internal representation of data is converted to a
set of bytes that can be stored on disk or sent over the network [231, 285]. In the case
of a file format, it converts an internal representation to a file format. For example,
we can convert a JSON representation of a PDF file to a PDF file. Similarly, in the
case of network protocols, a machine beginning to transmit a message will create a
structure with all the fields locally. Subsequently, these fields are converted to bytes
in a sequence predefined by the serializer. Our serializer for the PDF format does
not preserve the object order but retains all the in-use objects while computing the
correct offsets and generating syntactically valid PDFs. We automatically remove
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objects not used.
This section makes the following contributions:
– We created a radically new capability we call the Parsley Reducer API, a novel
tool to allow developers to programmatically redact or modify portions of PDF
files. This concept uses a design pattern similar to Pin and DynamoRio, allowing scriptable dynamic data operations on PDF files. For example, this new
capability provides something akin to a graceful dynamic exception handling
mechanism that is external to the codebase it is protecting, similar to seminal
work in matching exploit signatures in network stacks [280].
– Our research over a large corpus (1 million files) of real-world documents, led
to the discovery and characterization of a number of malforms present in PDF
files that are amenable to safe rewriting. We use these files to create a set of
case studies that successfully demonstrates that this tooling repairs malforms
and other conditions of concern in real PDF documents.
– We conducted experiments that explore several dimensions of comparison between existing PDF transformation tools and our Reducer. We discover that
these existing PDF (normalization) transformation tools lack any ability to dynamically script or react to malforms present in their input and are unsound
(i.e., they introduce errors during their rewriting).
– We provide conceptual contribution: there are many divergent unlabeled dialects of PDF. Our work shows and provides tooling so that one can begin to
merge unlabeled dialects into labeled, normalized representations, where the
overall organization is provided by the set of transformations defined and executed by the Reducer. In other words, we can begin to formulate dialects that
are labeled by the set of transformations applied and/or malforms rectified.
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The benefit of this is to reduce poor outcomes like parser differentials and other
format confusion.

Definitions
The Parsley normalization tools are a part of the larger Parsley system. The Parsley
system first validates PDF files to ensure they are syntactically valid. As a result,
we can successfully serialize well-formed files or those that we can transform into
well-formed files using our reducer.
Definition 5.1 (Well-formed PDF file). A PDF file is well-formed if the Parsley
syntax checker decides that the overall syntax of the file is valid as per the PDF 2.0
specification.
Since we transform a PDF file, we want to ensure that the text in the original
PDF is fully preserved. In addition, since we have fixed particular objects by applying
transformations, pages the text extraction tools could not previously access will now
be accessible. Hence, we hypothesize that a safe normalization tool must produce the
same amount of text or more text than the original file. Additionally, the transformed
file must also be syntactically valid.
Definition 5.2 (Safe Normalization). The original PDF file P 1 is transformed to
produce a new PDF file P 2. This transformation is safe if:
– P 1 and P 2 are well-formed PDF files, and
– The text extraction output of P 2 is identical or a superset of the text extraction
output of P 1 across multiple tools.
We describe six case studies we constructed to demonstrate the utility of a formataware normalization tool for the PDF format. The normalization tool uses a reducer
and serializer in conjunction to produce transformed PDF files.
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Claim. The Parsley reducer and serializer produce safe normalizations.
We back this claim up by evaluating our normalization approach against two
datasets, each over 6000 PDF files. Furthermore, the reducer rules we evaluated were
designed to fix specific malformations commonly seen in PDF files but not commonly
fixed by PDF rewriting tools.

5.7.1. Background
Running Example
In the rest of the section, especially Section 5.7.3, we will use the following running
example to discuss transformations to PDF files. This example includes two PDF
objects that are surrounded by the obj and endobj tags. The first object in the
snippet takes ID 1, whereas the second one takes ID 0. Both the objects have the
generation number 0.
1 0 obj
<</Names <</Dests 4 0 R>>
/Outlines 5 0 R /Pages 2 0 R
/Lang (en-US)
/Type /Catalog
/PageLayout /OneColumn
/PageMode /UseOutlines>>
endobj
2 0 obj
<</Count 13
/Kids [6 0 R 25 0 R 33 0 R
35 0 R 38 0 R 45 0 R 49 0 R
57 0 R 60 0 R 63 0 R 66 0 R
68 0 R 70 0 R]
/Type /Pages>>
endobj
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Catalog In the above example, object 1 is a Catalog dictionary. Dictionaries, in
PDFs, are surrounded by << and >> symbols. They hold key-value pairs that are
separated by whitespaces. In this example, the keys are Names, Outlines, Lang, Type,
PageLayout, and PageMode. There are several constraints on a Catalog dictionary to
ensure cross-compatibility: a file rendered on various PDF readers or text extraction
tools must produce nearly identical results.
The Type and Pages keys are the only mandatory keys in a Catalog. Additionally,
each key has a type associated with it. For example, the Lang key must have a corresponding string, and the PageLayout and PageMode keys must have a corresponding
Name object chosen from a list of options. The Names key has a corresponding dictionary object in this example. The Outlines and Pages keys must always include
indirect references to a dictionary that is stored in another object. The Outlines key
refers to object number 5, while the Pages key refers to object number 2.

Page Tree Node Similarly, Page Tree Nodes also include required and optional
keys. The tree’s root node must not include a Parent key but include Kids, Type,
and Count keys. If any of these keys are absent, the Page Tree Node is invalid, and
it can get challenging to traverse the tree. Other non-root nodes in the tree must
include a Parent key.
Like in the case of the Catalog dictionary, the specification assigns types for these
keys. For example, the Count key must have an associated positive integer, and the
Kids key has an array of references to other Page Tree nodes or pages.

Meriadoc Recognizer
In this work, we rely on the Meriadoc Recognizer to test a PDF file against a set
of PDF parsers [259]. The recognizer instruments PDF parsers such as Mupdf, Mu-
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tool [23], Qpdf [33], PDFMiner [246], and Poppler [205], to generate meaningful errors
that help debug malformations.
It applies techniques such as parser watchpoints—monitoring parsers in runtime
to find out which piece of code leads to errors. These parser watchpoints are formataware tracers—explicitly designed to handle PDF files. These format-aware tools use
a higher-level representation of the parsing events. With this representation, we can
provide meaningful, explainable errors as output.
There is a strong coupling between the Meriadoc Recognizer and the Parsley
Reducer, as we discuss in Section 5.7.2. The Recognizer provides feedback to pinpoint
where other PDF parsers reject a file Parsley generates. With this insight on the error
types, we revise future versions of our serializer to avoid buggy files. We also used
this Recognizer to compare a file transformed by other PDF repairing or cleaning
tools (such as Caradoc and Mutool clean) in Section 5.7.5.

5.7.2. Parsley Normalization Tools
There are two possible architectures we envision for the normalization tool. First, we
can use the reducer as an additional pass to the PDF checker. This way, before files
are type-checked, we fix the objects based on the set of reducer rules. Second, the
reducer can be used in conjunction with the serializer. In this approach, we focus on
making fixes in the intermediate representation and provide a transformed file.

Background
The Parsley PDF parser applies several checks to ensure that a PDF file is wellformed. We built the individual components of the parser to follow the PDF 2.0
specification. Figure 5.2 shows the steps followed by our PDF parser.
First, we syntactically validate all objects in a PDF file by following the objects
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from the xref table. This step ensures that the dictionaries, streams, arrays, and
other predefined-typed objects are well-formed. Next, the syntax checker extracts an
intermediate representation that provides the following structures.
– The object numbers and the corresponding objects in use
– The root (Catalog) and info dictionaries
– PDF file version (extracted from the PDF header and the Catalog dictionary)
In the second step, we type-check the various objects starting with the Catalog
dictionary and Info dictionary. We define specifications for each dictionary, array,
and stream object to apply the correct types. For example, in arrays, we define the
array size and the object type at each location in the array. Similarly, for dictionaries
and stream objects, we define the keys that must be present and their corresponding
types. Then, iteratively, we type-check all the objects referenced in these dictionaries
based on type specifications. Finally, we discuss several reducer rules in the case
study based on the errors we identified using our type checker.
In the third step in the Parsley PDF checker, explore content streams—
descriptions of the page’s contents. These content streams include text, shapes and
drawings, and images. We validate content streams to ensure that the text and the
metadata are well-formed. We also provide the functionality to extract this text.
In summary, the Parsley PDF checker performs three levels of validation to ensure
that files are well-formed. Our second and third passes generate a binary output by
checking the internal representation. Therefore, our normalization tools operate on
the internal representation generated after the first pass. In definition 5.1, we consider
a file well-formed if it passes the first step of validation in Figure 5.2.
This work focuses primarily on the Parsley normalization tools that we use in
conjunction with the rest of the Parsley PDF checker. Figure 5.8 demonstrates the
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overall architecture of the Parsley normalization tools. We designed the Parsley
normalization tools (the reducer and serializer used in conjunction) with several goals
in mind:
– Usability: Provide an API to support scriptable editing
There are several reasons to edit PDF files. We want to design an API that
provides flexibility to identify objects of interest and edit them.
– Composable Design: No shotgun serializers
We must not place the burden of serializing the internal representation on the
developer. We envision developers would use our serializer as a black box. Additionally, we also want to avoid the anti-pattern of a shotgun serializer—when
a code performs validation or transformations while also serializing portions of
the internal representation.
– Soundness: Produce syntactically valid PDF files
Our serializer must produce syntactically valid PDFs that pass the first syntax
check the Parsley system makes. However, these files may not pass the other two
validation checks we place since PDF files may already contain type or content
stream malformations in them. Additionally, developers can also introduce
malformations using the reducer API—such as removing mandatory keys from
dictionaries or deleting objects.

Parsley Reducer
The Parsley PDF parser and our normalization tools are implemented in Rust and
require the compiler version 1.55.0 or higher.
We require that the developer specify a selector hash map, use one of the filtering
functions we have built-in as a part of the reducer API, and then describe the type
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Figure 5.8: Changing the architecture of Parsley to support PDF rule-based transformations.
we must replace the filtered keys with.

Parsley IR
The Parsley Intermediate Representation (IR) is made available as an output of the
Parsley syntax checker. This IR comprises of four items: (1) a hash map containing
a mapping of PDF object IDs and their corresponding type-annotated objects, (2)
object ID of the root object, (3) object ID of the Info dictionary, and (4) version
number of the PDF file extracted from the header and the version string in the
Catalog dictionary.
This IR does not store information about the exact locations of the various objects
in the original file. Since PDF objects can be updated, traditionally these older,
unused objects are still stored in a PDF file. However, our IR does not represent
these unused objects—only storing the used objects.
Code snippet 10 demonstrates the Parsley IR syntax for our running example.
Essentially, it is a hash map of PDF object IDs and generation numbers and the
object contents.
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(1,0): {
Names: PDFType:Dict(map: {
Dests: PDFType:Ref((4,0))
}),
Outlines: PDFType:Ref((5,0)),
Pages: PDFType:Ref((2,0)),
Lang: PDFType:String(val: "en-US"),
Type: PDFType:Name(Catalog),
PageLayout: PDFType:Name(OneColumn),
PageMode: PDFType:Name(UseOutlines),
}
(2,0): {
Count: PDFType:Integer(13),
Kids: [PDFType:Ref((6,0)),
PDFType:Ref((25,0)),...],
Type: PDFType:Name(Pages)
}

Code Snippet 10: Parsley IR example of our running example

Selector
The selectors we use as input to the reducer take in a hash map with the list of keys
and the corresponding values for selecting an object. For example, if we need to apply
transformations to the Page Tree Node objects where the objects have the type key
“Pages,” we create a hash map with the key “Type” and value “Pages.”
The Selector traverses the Parsley IR hash map to find the appropriate objects.
Occasionally, this could also result in traversing the dictionary structure of a certain
object. For example, a selector rule to find all the Page Tree Nodes would need to
find the Type key of every object to find if it is a Page Tree Node. The selected
objects are then passed on to the filtering rules.
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Filtering rules
Once the intermediate representations of selected objects are available, we can find
specific structures of interest. Our filtering mechanism can extract specific objects
based on dictionary keys or array indices. For example, we may want to filter out
objects missing a particular key or inspect the type of the value corresponding to a
key. Our reducer API supports several built-in functions to find objects within an
outer object.
We list a few of the filtering rules we provide as a part of the reducer API.
– Delete a key from a dictionary: This rule is useful when some data needs
to be redacted: such as personally identifiable data in the file metadata.
– Select particular keys from dictionary or array: This rule is useful when
we need to replace specific keys or array locations. The transformed type is
defined separately in the transformer.
– Select version string: The version string is specified in the file header and
the Catalog dictionary. Hence, a modification to the version string needs to
reflect in both locations. Hence, we provide a separate filtering rule and a
corresponding transformer function to aid in this transformation.
– Select keys in the Catalog/Info dictionary: These dictionaries are special
and are the root nodes. Hence, we provide a separate way to get access to keys
in these nodes instead of traversing through the intermediate representation.

Transformer
We provide new values to the filtered keys or array locations using the transformer
functions. The function follows the syntax where we provide a filtered object O and
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the object to replace O, O0 . Then, the transformer applies these rules to each filtered
object individually. Finally, we return the modified IR with the correct transformations applied.

Finding well-formed PDFs
Parsley IR is produced by the first step of the Parsley PDF parser—the syntax checker.
Hence, to ensure that our Reducer rules can be applied, we must ensure that the file is
syntactically well-formed. To find well-formed PDF files in our dataset, we separated
the first pass of the PDF parser and ran it over all files in the dataset. Therefore, we
only operate on this subset of well-formed files from our datasets in the rest of this
section.

Parsley Serializer
We built a serializer for the PDF format, starting with the Parsley IR. The files we
generate must be syntactically valid PDFs to comply with the soundness property
we set for our normalization tools.

5

We implemented our serializer in less than 200

lines of code in Rust.
We follow a recursive structure to serialize each PDF object. First, we traverse
the Parsley IR, which contains a hash map of all object IDs to their corresponding
objects. Then, we identify the type of each of these objects and then call a recursive
function to serialize the internal objects within the object. For example, dictionaries
can be nested. Dictionaries may also contain other arrays and stream objects.
Name objects in PDF can contain special characters. To handle these special
characters, we included an additional check to ensure that we escaped these special
characters. Similarly, String objects may also contain special characters that are
5
PDF parsers may still reject our modified PDF files for type malformations originally present
or introduced as a part of our reducer rules. We only ensure that the syntax is correct.
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escaped using a certain syntax. We escaped all characters in PDF strings to avoid
further confusion. However, this approach makes debugging hard, and the modified
files significantly diverge from the original files.
For Stream objects, we kept the dictionary and the compressed portions intact—
not redacting or decompressing any objects to continue to preserve space. Finally, we
remove all comments from the file by not serializing any comment objects. We do this
because comments, metadata in the info dictionary, and unused objects collectively
contain much unredacted information.
In summary, our serializer produces files compliant with the PDF 2.0 syntax. Furthermore, we recursively implemented the Parsley serializer since PDF objects contain
complex types such as streams, dictionaries, and arrays containing other complex or
basic types such as boolean, strings, numbers, and name types. We evaluate our
serializer in Section 5.7.5 to ensure that the files we generate are syntactically valid
by running our generated files against a host of PDF parsers.

Using Meriadoc Recognizer as a feedback loop
We found several bugs in our serialization approach after running our generated files
against the set of parsers in the Meriadoc recognizer toolset. We list some of the
findings and then discuss how we fixed these issues.

Incorrect understanding of the Size field in the cross-reference table The
specification says this when describing the Size field in the PDF file trailer dictionary,
“this value shall be 1 greater than the highest object number defined in the file.”
Unfortunately, in the first version of our serializer, we wrongly computed these values
as the total number of entries in the Xref table.
Qpdf and Mutool parsers that are a part of the Meriadoc recognizer spotted this
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malformation and provided warnings specifying that the file may be malformed. We
subsequently fixed our serializer to generate these values correctly.

Special characters in the Name and String objects need to be escaped The
Name type in PDF contains strings that start with a slash (/). These name types are
extensively used in dictionary keys. To use characters that are not alphanumeric, we
can represent these values using hexadecimal. For example, the ASCII “+” character
would be denoted as the hexadecimal string “#2B.” Similarly, names can also include
whitespace characters escaped using this syntax. The specification uses the following
example: Lime#20Green must be interpreted as Lime Green. Our serializer did not
implement this hexadecimal encoding for these special characters producing the string
/Lime Green in PDF files. This led to several parser errors since the string Green
here does not conform to any PDF type.
Likewise, PDF string objects use octal or hexadecimal encoding to store special
characters. Any parenthesis used in a string must be balanced and require no special
treatment. However, any special character must be escaped using an octal syntax
\ddd—where ddd is the octal character code.
In an earlier implementation of the serializer, we wrote the internal string representation to bytes in the PDF objects. Unfortunately, similar to the case with name
objects, special characters in strings were serialized as is. This led to several errors
due to the incorrect handling of numerous special characters in these PDF objects.
We have subsequently patched this issue by representing all string characters in octal
encoding.

5.7.3. Case Study
Given the age of the PDF formats, several PDF creation tools have deviated from
the specification in various ways. These deviations expose parser differentials in
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PDF readers. In this section, we study several PDF specification violations and data
redaction cases and how we added reducer rules to handle these patterns and antipatterns.

Finding type check errors in PDF datasets

Table 5.6: PDF Type check errors in PDFs
PDF Errors
Occurrences in 1 million files
Incorrect Lang key
1k
Page Tree Node error
20k
500
Incorrect PageMode keys
Null references
5k
We ran the Parsley PDF type checker—closely designed for the PDF version 2.0
on 1 million PDF files collected via CommonCrawl and GovDocs digital corpora. We
logged errors we encountered on files in this dataset and clustered them based on
the type of error. Table 5.6 provides a summary of all the errors we found and their
frequency in our dataset.
As a result of our study, we’ve designed case studies C1-4 to serve as a way to
correct these commonly seen errors in PDFs. Subsequently, C5, C6, and A1 are other
use cases such as redacting data or generating files that contain errors for better
testing.

C1: Incorrect Lang key syntax
The language key in the Catalog dictionary aids text extraction. Some PDF creation
tools use incorrect syntax to describe the language. For example, several files use the
following Catalog dictionary syntax.
This dictionary differs from the running example in only the /Lang key. The value
/en uses the name type in PDF. However, the specification notes that this field must
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<</Names <</Dests 4 0 R>>
/Outlines 5 0 R /Pages 2 0 R
/Lang /en
/Type /Catalog
/PageLayout /OneColumn
/PageMode /UseOutlines>>

be a string—not specifying what readers must do if this field is incorrect.
The specification does not offer a default value for this key. Instead, it specifies
that if this key is absent, the language is considered to be unknown. Therefore, we
remove this key from the Catalog dictionary in an attempt to remove this common
anti-pattern from PDF files.
Selector

Filtering rule

Transformer

Catalog

Delete: Lang

-

The above table shows our reducer rules to remove the Lang key since the specification does not provide any default values for this key. Therefore, we specify that the
filtering rule we apply is a delete operation and specify the key that must be deleted.

C2: Missing keys in Page tree nodes
Page tree nodes in PDF files must contain the Kids, Type, and Count keys. However,
we found several PDF files in the wild with some of these keys missing. When PDF
viewers attempt to walk the page trees in documents with these malformations, they
encounter the page tree nodes with either the Count or Kids key missing—and often
fail to render the PDF file. The count key holds an integer value. The kids key stores
an array of references to other page tree nodes or pages. For example, following is an
example of a malformed Page Tree node—differing in some ways from our running
example.
In the above example, the Count key is missing. Other variations of this error

178

5.7 PDFFixer

SPARTA: A Strict PDF Type Checker

<<
/Kids [6 0 R 25 0 R 33 0 R
35 0 R 38 0 R 45 0 R 49 0 R
57 0 R 60 0 R 63 0 R 66 0 R
68 0 R 70 0 R]
/Type /Pages>>
>>

could be a missing Kids key or both Kids and Count keys missing.
We transform these malformed page tree node dictionaries using our reducer syntax. We select dictionary objects where the Type key is set to Pages. Then, we check
if the mandatory keys are present. We consider three cases:
– Both the keys are missing: we create an empty array for the kids key and set
the count key to 0.
– Only the count key is missing: we count the number of pages in the kids array.
We then set the correct count value. The count value may also be incorrect in
the previous version of the file.
– Only the kids key is missing: we create an entry for the kids key in the dictionary.
We then reset the count key to 0.
Selector

Filtering rule

Transformer

Type=

Select if Kids

Set Kids to []

Pages

missing

and Count to 0

Type=

Select if Count

Pages

missing

Set Count to
Kids.length()

The above reducer rules account for all three cases we listed. The first rule we list
accounts for both cases—irrespective of whether the Count value is present or not.
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C3: Incorrect PageMode keys
The Catalog dictionary also contains the PageMode key. The PDF 2.0 specification
provides a list of allowed values for this key. This field can only take the following values: UseNone, UseOutlines, UseThumbs, FullScreen, UseOC, and UseAttachments.
Additionally, the specification also specifies the default value as UseNone.
<</Names <</Dests 4 0 R>>
/Outlines 5 0 R /Pages 2 0 R
/Lang (en-US)
/Type /Catalog
/PageLayout /OneColumn
/PageMode /None>>

We found hundreds of PDF files with incorrect page mode values not in this list.
The code snippet above demonstrates such a value. So we wrote a reducer rule to
rewrite the Catalog dictionary with the page mode value reverted to the default value.
The serialized PDF does not contain this malformation and can produce reliable
viewer output—since different PDF readers may handle invalid values differently.
Selector
Catalog

Filtering rule

Transformer

Select: PageMode

Replace with:

if not in list

UseNone

In our rule, we select the Catalog object and select the PageMode key in the
Catalog. Since this key is optional, it may not be present—in which case this rule is
not applied. We use an allowlist of the values this key in the Catalog can take. If the
value for this key is not in the allowlist, we replace it with the default value.
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C4: Removing Null References
Let us consider the second object in the running example in Section 5.7.1. In this
example, The Dests, Outlines, and Pages key all have an indirect reference to another
object stored in the same PDF file. However, as we demonstrated in Table 5.6, there
were several cases where these indirectly-referenced objects were missing from the file.
Most PDF readers ignore these keys if they are not mandatory keys. They arrive
at this interpretation following clause 7.3.10 in the PDF 2.0 specification. First, any
undefined object is considered to be a Null object. Furthermore, in a dictionary, if a
key is associated with the Null type, we must treat the dictionary as if this key was
absent.
However, this is not easy to implement in a type checker. Although in the running
example, three keys are indirect references, any key can hold an indirect reference
unless otherwise specified in the specification. For example, the Lang key could be in
its object with the following syntax.
25 0 obj
(en-US)
endobj

To capture clause 7.3.10, we must treat every key as a disjunction between a Null
object and the correct type definition. We must also include a flag to ensure that the
keys that do not need such a disjunction are skipped.
Instead, we rely on creating reducer rules to remove any Null references in a PDF
dictionary. We iterate over every object in the Parsley IR and over every key in the
dictionary to find Null references. These objects are then modified to remove the key
with the Null reference. A drawback of this reducer rule is that we may inadvertently
remove a mandatory key. For example, suppose the Pages key in the running example
holds a reference that does not exist. In that case, our reducer rule may remove this
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key from the dictionary—creating a type check violation since the key is mandatory.

C5: Change PDF version
PDF files contain a version string in the header and a field in the Catalog dictionary.
However, if both of these version strings are not identical, the higher of the two values
takes precedence. If a file’s version needs to be updated, either of these two values
can be updated to a higher version.
We consider the cases of downgrading and upgrading the version number of a PDF
file. For example, we found that the Caradoc PDF parser [87] and PDFCPU [120] do
not accept files that are higher than version 1.7. Therefore, to run a PDF file through
both these parsers, we must downgrade to version 1.7 from 2.0.
We provide two reducer functions—both take a list of old version numbers and a
new version number. We rewrite both the version string in the Catalog and the string
in the header in both cases. We did this to ensure there are no parser differentials if
specific parsers only read one or the other. We demonstrate our reducer rules below.
Selector
Version

Filtering rule

Transformer

Select if not

Replace with:

2.0
Catalog

Select Version
if not 2.0

2.0
Replace with:
2.0

C6: Change values in the Info Dictionary
The Info dictionary in a PDF file contains nine optional fields. It contains metadata
such as the title, author, creation tool, producer, and creation and modification date.
Some PDF creators and conversion tools may add metadata about a user, such as
their name and username, and email ID [197, 25].
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<< /CreationDate (D:20200407135742Z)
/Creator (John Doe; TeX)
/ModDate (D:20200407135742Z)
/PTEX.Fullbanner (This is pdfTeX,
Version 3.14159265-2.6-1.40.20
(TeX Live 2019) kpathsea
version 6.3.1)
/Producer (pdfTeX-1.40.20)
/Trapped /False >>

The above code snippet demonstrates the contents of the Info dictionary for a
file generated from Latex. We see that it can disclose software versions and creator
information in this dictionary.
Hence, we need mechanisms to redact these keys from the Info dictionary to ensure
that such information is not exposed when publishing PDF files. Removing these keys
from the dictionary does not render a file invalid since all of these keys are invalid.
We identify that the author, creator, producer, and creation date keys can be
particularly problematic in exposing details about the origin of a file. Hence, we
design rules to redact these crucial keys to ensure better privacy. Unfortunately,
since the Info dictionary does not have any mandatory keys, we could not use a
selector rule to find it in the IR. Instead, we rely on the trailer of a PDF file to tell us
which PDF object contains the Info dictionary. Below, we demonstrate the reducer
rules to change the Author and Creator keys in the Info dictionary.
Selector
Info

Filtering rule

Transformer

Select Author and

Replace with:

Creator

Manul and
Bobcat
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A1: Adversarial file generation
We propose another application of the Parsley Reducer API—generating files with
deliberate errors to understand if parsers can detect anti-patterns and clear specification violations. For example, we generated a test case to inject an incorrect object
ID in the Kids array of every Page Tree Node dictionary in a PDF file.
Since PDF parsers often ignore missing objects, we did not randomly inject a
nonexistent object ID. Instead, we append the Catalog or Root dictionary ID to the
Kids array. Unfortunately, this action leads to malformed PDFs in three ways.
First, the Kids field in a Page Tree Node must point at other Page Tree Nodes or
a Page object—not a Catalog dictionary. Any parser that checks the well-formedness
of this tree structure must find this error in the syntax of the tree.
Second, a naive PDF parser that recursively walks the Page Tree structure can
enter an infinite loop. As a result, we could trigger a denial of service attack against
PDF parsers that do not keep a list of objects already checked.
Finally, a naive text extraction tool can run into an infinite loop in such an infinite
tree structure and generate the same text repeatedly. This way, the extracted text
would differ from the text extracted from other tools—leading to text-extraction
differentials.
Next, we randomly selected 4200 PDF files from our dataset to evaluate our
adversarial file generation use case. Finally, we ran each generated file through Qpdf
and Mutool clean to see if these tools found our injected malformation.
Table 5.7: Testing files we generated with adversarial rules against PDF parsers.
Dataset included 4200 PDF files randomly selected.
Mutool Qpdf
Cases
Files Rejected previous accepted
3177
221
Files Timed out, previously ran correctly
18
1
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As shown in Table 5.7, we were able to force qpdf to run over the timeout value
(one minute) for one file when the original (unmodified) file runs efficiently within the
timeout. The original file ran in 50 seconds, while the modified file did not terminate
after running over three minutes in multiple tests. Similarly, we found 18 modified
files that caused an infinite loop in the Mutool clean command. Each of these files
ran in less than 10 seconds in the unmodified case.
Upon more investigation, we found that this issue was fixed in the latest Mutool
release 1.19, following a report in 2020 [206]. However, the Mutool shipping with the
package managers on most operating systems is version 1.16. Therefore, all versions
of Mutool before 1.19 are vulnerable to a denial of service attack, where a PDF file
with a wellformed content stream can cause an infinite loop.
However, we also found that Qpdf does not flag most of the adversarial files we
generated as malformed. In contrast, Mutool overwhelmingly finds them malformed
with the error “non-page object in page tree (Catalog).” Qpdf provides a warning
with the message “expected /Type /Pages, found something else” for the files it
rejects.

Developer effort
Table 5.8 demonstrates the lines of code needed to use the Parsley normalization
tools to apply transformations of varying degrees of difficulty. Using the Reducer
API requires some degree of understanding of the PDF specification since we require
the developers to specify the transformed type in cases where data is replaced.
We observe that the harder cases of modifying the Page Tree Nodes using cases C1
and A1 require over 100 lines of code to be added. This is because we must account
for many combinations of missing keys in Page Tree Nodes, causing an increase in
the lines of code. However, the cases of redacting data in objects or replacing them
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require far fewer lines of code.
Table 5.8: Developer effort needed to write reducer rules
Case Lines of code added Complexity
C1
15
Easy
C2
150
Hard
C3
32
Easy
65
Hard
C4
C5
15
Easy
C6
55
Medium
120
Hard
A1

5.7.4. The need for a reducer
Some of the examples we discussed in our case studies were simple—especially the
version editing and fixing page modes. However, C2, C4, and C5 are complex rewriting rules where simple grep- or m4-like expressions would not suffice. For example, to
redact keys from PDF dictionary objects, we need to parse the dictionary as a whole
and then select the keys for modifications. These dictionaries can also be recursive:
dictionaries may contain other dictionaries, streams, or arrays either inline or as a
reference.

5.7.5. Evaluation
We apply the reducer rules for C1, C2, and C3 as a part of the Parsley reducer since
these rules made significant modifications and correct malformed constructs in PDFs.
We evaluate the Parsley reducer and serializer to answer the following questions.
– Does the reducer fix bugs and malformations in PDF files?
– How does the Parsley reducer compare with other PDF cleanup tools?
– Do text extraction tools produce the similar output for the original and transformed PDF files?
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Dataset
We used two datasets of 10,000 files each. Both these datasets contain files randomly
selected from 1 million files collected from GovDocs [78] and CommonCrawl [48].6
These 20,000 PDF files are representative of a real-world sampling—randomly selected
from 1 million files.
We then filtered out the well-formed PDFs from these datasets using the methodology described in Section 5.7.2. As a result, we found that Dataset 1 contained 6753
well-formed files, whereas Dataset 2 comprised 7171 well-formed files. We used the
files from both datasets to evaluate our Parsley reducer and serializer methodology.

Parsley Reducer fixups
This section examines the fixes and changes made by our Parsley reducer. We closely
observe files in each of the categories specified in Section 5.7.3. Unfortunately, most
popular PDF readers cannot render PDF files suffering from C2.
Mutool Clean

MuPDF

PDF File

Parsley reducer and
serializer

Parsley
transformed
PDF file

Is the transformed
PDF file valid?
Qpdf

PDFMiner

Figure 5.9: We attempt opening an original PDF file and the transformed file using
three PDF tools. We log cases where previously malformed files now open using the
various readers.
6

These datasets were collated by Dan Becker of Kudu Dynamics for the DARPA SAFEDOCS
project.
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Figure 5.9 outlines our approach to examining the fixes made by the Parsley
normalization tools. We rely on the Meriadoc recognizer to compare the parser output
of original PDF files and Parsley modified PDF files. After running these PDF files
through the Parsley normalization tools, we tried to open the modified files using
Qpdf [33], PDFMiner [246], and Mutool [23].
Table 5.9: Comparing the output of various parsers on original PDF files and the
Parsley generated files.
Fixups after
Errors after
Evaluation tool
transformation
transformation
Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 1 Dataset 2
48
31
0
2
MuPDF
Mutool clean
726
96
0
0
Qpdf
5
16
1
2
217
401
11
25
PDFMiner
Table 5.9 shows the results of our evaluation. We found that when we ran Mutool
clean on these files, many files in both datasets were fixed. Similarly, PDFMiner also
fixes a number of files in our datasets with malformations—especially ones following
the pattern we described in Case Study C2.
However, we also observe that PDFMiner throws errors on some files that were
earlier valid. PDFMiner errors were ASCII decoding or parser errors exposed in the
parser. None of the other parsers threw errors on the files PDFMiner failed to parse.
We will explore these parser errors in PDFMiner in more detail and suggest fixes in
future work.

Does the serializer work correctly?
In this work, we set out with the goal of achieving safe normalizations. To test
our claim, we compare the text extraction output for the original PDF file and the
transformed PDF file to ensure that our Parsley serializer works correctly. We use
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three PDF to text tools: Parsley’s text extractor, PDFMiner’s pdf2txt [246], and
Ghostscript [22]. Figure 5.10 demonstrates our overall approach of comparing text
output.

ghostscript: compare
text output

PDF File

Parsley
transformed
PDF file

Parsley reducer and
serializer

Parsley text
extractor: compare
output

MuPDF: compare
text output

Figure 5.10: Comparing the text extraction output from the original PDF file and
the transformed PDF file to ensure we did not damage the PDF files during the
transformation.

Mismatches in extracted text There can be two reasons the extracted text did
not match the original text. First, our fixes can provide access to new objects in
the PDF file. The text extraction tool may have encountered errors, skipping these
objects earlier. Second, the modified file could now contain errors we introduced. Our
Parsley serializer could introduce certain bugs in the PDF objects.
Hence, we differentiate between these two mismatches by first comparing the extracted text from the original and modified PDF files. If there was a mismatch, we
see if we extracted more text or lesser text than the original file. If we extracted
more, we would flag this as a fixup. Similarly, we flag cases with lesser text extracted
as errors we introduced.
Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 showcase the results of our text extraction comparison
experiments. Since these datasets contain very dissimilar PDFs, we see a significant
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Dataset 1 Text Extraction comparison
Fixed

Error

250
200
150
100
50
0
Parsley

Ghostscript

PDFMiner

Tool

Figure 5.11: Text Extraction results from Dataset 1 (6753 files). This chart only
displays mismatches between running a text extraction tool on the original file and
running the same tool on the Parsley-modified file.

Dataset 2 Text Extraction comparison
Fixed

Error

500

Number of files

400
300
200
100
0
Parsley

Ghostscript

PDFMiner

Text Extraction tools

Figure 5.12: Text Extraction results from Dataset 2 (7171 files). This chart only
displays mismatches between running a text extraction tool on the original file and
running the same tool on the Parsley-modified file.
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difference in the results. In Dataset 1, we observe that Ghostscript produces more
text in over 200 files while throwing errors in 9 files. In contrast, in Dataset 2, we see
that PDFMiner generates more text in over 400 modified files than the original files.
These text extraction tools use different algorithms to traverse the page tree nodes
and extract text. Therefore, we employed three separate tools to observe different
fixes and malformations. We demonstrate that files we’ve modified generate either the
same amount of text or more text in almost all cases—producing safe transformations.
Why do text extraction tools generate more text. We applied case study
reducer rules C1 to C4 to evaluate our normalization approach. As we discussed
earlier, these rules fix malformations we found in PDF files. For example, C2 finds
page tree nodes that are malformed and missing mandatory keys. However, the
behavior of text extraction tools on these malformed page tree nodes is not defined.
Fixing these malformed page tree nodes allows the text extraction tools to proceed
further down a page tree and render text from more pages in the tree.

Comparing Parsley Reducer with caradoc clean and mutool
clean
Other than using the Parsley reducer, we also ran each file in our Dataset 2 through
caradoc clean and mutool clean. We then validated the transformed PDFs generated by all the three transformation tools through the Meriadoc recognizer. We
designed this experiment to check whether Caradoc and Mutool can fix our identified
issues.
Figure 5.13 shows our experimental approach. After transforming the PDF files
using three different tools—one of which we built—we run the transformed files
through the Meriadoc recognizer with the Qpdf and Mutool parsers.
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Meriadoc
Recognizer
Output
Parsley reducer and
serializer

Parsley
transformed
PDF file

Mutool clean

Mutool
transformed
PDF file

PDF File

Meriadoc
Recognizer
Output

Caradoc
transformed
PDF file

Caradoc clean

Figure 5.13: Comparing the transformed files of the Parsley Reducer to files generated
by Caradoc clean and Mutool clean.
Table 5.10: Comparison of cleanup transformations applied by Parsley, Caradoc, and
Mutool against Qpdf and Mutool on Dataset 2.
Fixups after
Errors after
Serializer
transformation transformation
Caradoc
24
0
24
32
Mutool
Parsley
47
4
Table 5.10 presents the results of our comparison. We find that Caradoc and
Mutool both fix files in our dataset. We also find that our Parsley reducer fixes more
files that were previously rejected by Qpdf or Mutool than Mutool clean and Caradoc.
We investigated the bugs introduced by Mutool clean (32 across Qpdf and Mutool).
We found that several of these files generated by Mutool clean were empty, containing
no data.
Additionally, we found that a particular type of file X1 was initially rejected by
Mutool but accepted by Qpdf. Mutool complains about several issues, ranging from
a broken Xref table, content stream syntax errors, and a corrupt JPEG data segment.
Here is a snippet of the error log from running Mutool on X1 .
$ mutool clean -s -d x_1
error: cannot recognize xref format
warning: trying to repair broken xref
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warning: repairing PDF document
warning: PDF stream Length incorrect
error: syntax error in content stream
error: unknown keyword: 'e'
error: syntax error in content stream
error: syntax error in content stream
error: syntax error in content stream
error: syntax error in content stream
error: syntax error in content stream
error: syntax error in content stream
error: unknown keyword: 'r7529.751'
error: syntax error in content stream
error: syntax error in content stream
error: zlib error: invalid block type
warning: read error; treating as end of
file
error: syntax error in content stream
Corrupt JPEG data: premature end
of data segment
0

Mutool does, however, produce a modified PDF file X1 . Mutool and Qpdf are
both also unable to open the file, saying it requires a password—when Qpdf was able
to process the original file—and several PDF readers could display the original file.
$ mutool clean -s -d x_1_prime
error: cannot authenticate password:
x_1_prime
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Similarly, we also investigated the four files that Parsley produced that were malformed. We found that these files contained referenced objects but were not present
in the file. Mutool rejected these files on these grounds.

Meriadoc recognizer feedback loop
As we discuss in Section 5.7.2, we used the Meriadoc Recognizer to find errors in our
serializer and then fixed them. Table 5.11 shows that the number of errors introduced
by the Parsley serializer according to both Qpdf and Mutool reduced in the second
run, while the number of fixed files marginally increased. This table considers a file
to be fixed if the original file was rejected and the modified version was considered
valid.
Table 5.11: Demonstrating the feedback loop from Meriadoc to Parsley on Dataset 2
Qpdf
MuPDF
Run
Fixed Errors Fixed Errors
1
24
15
33
101
26
1
35
2
2

Summary
In summary, we evaluated our Parsley reducer approach to ensure the following.
– First, we evaluated files generated by Parsley to ensure we do not introduce
many malformations in PDF files as judged by a selection of PDF parsers.
– Next, we ran multiple text-extraction tools on our generated PDF files. We
found that in a vast majority of cases, we generated more text or the same
amount of text as the original file. We have an implementation that is capable
of performing safe normalization.

194

5.7 PDFFixer

SPARTA: A Strict PDF Type Checker

– Finally, we compared the fixing capabilities of the Parsley reducer approach to
popular tools such as Caradoc and Mutool clean.

5.7.6. Discussion
Reducing Parser Differentials
Since more PDFs fail to include the “Creator” and “Producer” tags in the Info dictionary, it is not easy to pinpoint the software used to create a particular file. Therefore,
tools such as the PDF observatory have included a classifier to find the software used
to create a given PDF based on specific structural properties of PDF files [67]. The
Parsley PDF checker is strict and can pinpoint fine-grained malformations such as
missing keys in dictionaries, wrong type implementations, and missing indirect references. Hence, we believe we can use the PDF observatory in conjunction with the
Parsley PDF checker to design Reducer rules to remove entire classes of malformations.
In other words, different PDF tools produce different types of malformations.
Therefore, we can transform the unlabeled dialects of the PDF specifications that
these PDF tools implement and normalize them into a compliant dialect of the PDF
format. By transforming several different malformations introduced by a variety of
tools into a single, normalized form that is compliant with the PDF specification, we
are ensuring that we encounter fewer parser differentials. However, Reducer rules can
be used to formalize the de facto specification implemented by a PDF tool and to
formalize grammar drifts.
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Reducing Developer Effort
Our Parsley Reducer API follows a mechanism similar to a graceful “exception handling” mechanism where we transform data using customized handlers. Large classes
of document malforms can be represented using these reducer rules and would not
require updates to large codebases. Our methodology standardizes the methods of
transforming patterns in documents.
In the future, we wish to explore generating these reducer rules dynamically. We
need to use a PDF type checker to find out where specification deviations occur.
Such a type checker must not stop the type checking process once it encounters an
error—instead continuing to process other objects in the file. Such a process would
allow the ability to find all deviations in a file rather than just the first.
We would then need to understand how to fix a particular error. For example,
if an object is missing a Type key, but holds every other key, essentially allowing us
to predict what the dictionary type is, then we must be able to patch the dictionary
with the Type key. However, if a dictionary holds a key that must hold a value from
a set of values, such as PDF versions, reverting to a default value would be a direct
fix.

Errors that Caradoc and Mutool fix
We closely inspect the transformations Mutool clean and Caradoc apply in their tools.
We find that the fixes by Mutool clean in our dataset fit broadly into three categories.
First, we find that Mutool clean fixes truncated files without a cross-reference table
or trailer. It calculates the correct offsets and inserts a valid cross-reference table and
a trailer.
Second, Mutool fixes files with incorrect string encodings, causing errors. This
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malformation is similar to the ones we introduced in an earlier version of the Parsley
serializer that we subsequently fixed (Section 5.7.2). The Mutool clean command
adds the correct octal encoding to special characters that were previously unescaped.
Finally, we observe that Mutool fixes several off-by-one errors in stream encoding
and compression. Given the number of compression, image, and font libraries, such
off-by-one errors causing parser differentials are fairly common in PDF files.
We found that Caradoc fixed files in which Mutool could not find objects. Caradoc
expands compressed object streams to place all the objects from these compressed
streams in the PDF file. We find that several errors caused by compression errors are
fixed by decompressing object streams.

Comparing visual output
In our evaluation, we compared the text output of the original file and the modified
files to ensure that we did not break the file in a way text extraction tools can no
longer extract any text. Another possible evaluation approach is to compare the
visual output of the PDF files [149, 102, 282]. There have been several attempts
to compare the visual rendering of PDF files using machine learning or a pixel-bypixel comparison. In future work, we will explore such a comparison as an additional
soundness measure.

5.7.7. Related Work
This section relates our Parsley normalization approach and Meriadoc with other
approaches. Caradoc [87] and ICARUS [67] are the closest tools to our approach,
and they set out with similar goals. We ensure that we can support an API to allow
developers to script the rewriting process.
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Caradoc
Caradoc [87] is a PDF parser freely available on GitHub. Caradoc implements three
passes to check PDF files. For lexical analysis and parser generation, Caradoc uses
MENHIR and OCAMLLEX. They implement a strict type checker and a content
stream checker for the other two passes. This way, the Parsley PDF parser follows a
similar overall architecture to that of Caradoc.
Caradoc includes a normalizer to patch broken PDF files. In Section 5.4, we
tested the efficiency of this normalizer by running files through the normalizer in an
additional pass before running the PDF file through various parsers. Additionally, we
also discuss the errors that the Caradoc tools fix in the generated files in Section 6.3.
Caradoc also checks a PDF file for cycles. They implement indirect references in
files as a graph and look for cycles in these structures. A PDF file with cycles can
lead to infinite recursion or nontermination if not handled carefully.
This work goes beyond the normalization work Caradoc does by reducing developer effort by providing a structured format with an API to apply transformations.
We also demonstrate several use cases such as adversarial file creation that Caradoc
does not support.

Other PDF fixing tools
Most of the prior work is focused on detecting malicious PDF files using various techniques such as machine learning [69, 204] and structural features [254, 260]. Cowger et
al. presented ICARUS, a tool to extract the de-facto specification of the PDF format
from a corpus [67]. They also propose converting a PDF file to a safe subset. They
require users to define bi-directional lenses to convert a file from one version of the
specification to another. This ICARUS approach to using lenses is the closest related
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work to our Reducer API. Instead, we take the approach of allowing developers to
transform objects in a file with more flexibility. We also created a new serializer from
the Parsley IR to a PDF file to only serialize objects in use—and to avoid polyglot
files [28, 176].

PDF comparison tools
There are multiple tools available to compare the output of various PDF parsers on
one PDF file. These tools are not much different from VirusTotal—a website that
runs a host of antivirus scanning engines to make a decision [117]. Allison et al. built
a file observatory to analyze the properties and syntax of various PDF files [6, 5]. For
example, they find misspellings of various fields in PDF files by using the Levenshtein
edit distance. They were also able to identify the tools used to create a PDF based
on the syntax it follows.
Cowger et al. presented the PDF observatory—a tool to run a set of parsers
against each file in a corpus [67]. For each file, they then iterate over stdout and
stderr to decide whether the parser rejected a file or accepted it. The Meriadoc
recognizer follows a similar approach to comparing parser output.
Ambrose et al. introduce the idea of topological differential testing, a mechanism
to decipher the behavior of a set of programs on a corpus of inputs [7]. They use
this mechanism to learn the de-facto specification of the input format implemented
by these programs. Meriadoc uses a similar consensus approach to finding patterns
but does not extract a de-facto specification. The PDF observatory and topological
differential testing could be used in place of Meriadoc since all three projects share
similar goals and approaches.
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5.7.8. Conclusions
This section presents a novel approach to a principled, scriptable rewriting of PDF
objects. First, we demonstrated our normalization tool on a set of case studies we
designed—informed by our research on a large corpus of PDF files. Then, we evaluated the normalization tools against two datasets of PDF files and demonstrated
that text extraction tools generate more text from the modified files than the original
files.
Much of the future work remains. As we discussed in Section 5.7.2, our serializer
generates a normalized PDF file that contains all the in-use objects in the original
file. However, we remove linearization and incremental updates, forcing the modified
PDF to diverge significantly from the original file. We will explore how to provide
users with flags to support these features in future work.
We will explore another direction of creating a tight-nit feedback loop between
the format-aware tracing tools of Meriadoc and our Reducer API. With such a tool,
we can dynamically generate these reducer rules with little developer input to fix
commonly seen malformations in PDFs.

Section 5.8

Comparison with Caradoc
Error Type
Name and String mismatch
Missing PageTreeNode keys
Invalid DateString
Invalid PageMode
Indirect Reference Missing
Malformed Fonts

Caradoc
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No

Parsley
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Table 5.12: Comparing Caradoc and Parsley
We ran the Parsley type checker and Caradoc on the same set of files (as outlined
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in Section 5.5.1) to analyze the differences in results. We found that Caradoc does
not catch several errors that the Parsley type checker catches. We detail these errors
in Table 5.12.
We found that both Parsley and Caradoc check the Page Tree nodes carefully
to ensure all the required fields are present. Whereas only the Parsley type checker
carefully enforces mandatory indirect references and date string syntax. Caradoc also
follows a safelist of options for the PageMode and PageModes fields. The specification
clearly says the allowed values for this field, and both Caradoc and Parsley find
violations to this field.
MuPDF
Files Accepted
Files Rejected

9801
199

Caradoc
Strict
3442
6558

Caradoc

Parsley

6483
3517

7010
2990

Caradoc Cleanup
& Parsley
7189
2811

Parsley with
Transformer
7436
2564

Table 5.13: Results of running 10,000 files through these PDF parsers.
We ran every PDF in our 10,000 dataset through five PDF parser configurations.
Next, we used MuPDF to compare the results with the other parsers. Caradoc
provides three modes of operation: strict, relaxed, and cleanup. The cleanup mode
takes a broken PDF file as input and normalizes it to a fixed PDF output. We used
this cleanup mode in conjunction with the Parsley parser.
Table 5.13 shows the results of our experiments. We see that the MuPDF parser
only rejects around 2% of the files. In contrast, the stricter Caradoc parser rejects
around 66% of the files. We also see that the Caradoc cleanup step improves the
number of files Parsley rejects. The fixups by Caradoc alleviate some of the issues
earlier seen by Parsley.
The Caradoc parser results also check for content stream errors other than syntax
and type check errors. However, since it is not in the scope of this chapter, we
suppressed content stream errors in Parsley. Most of the files rejected by MuPDF
were rejected by Parsley and Caradoc, barring around thirty files for each Parsley
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and Caradoc.

Section 5.9

Conclusions
In this chapter, I presented our tool SPARTA, which generates PDF version-specific
Rust code from the Arlington PDF Model. This Rust code invokes the Parsley type
checker that applies types to each object in a PDF file. This process uncovered how
several popular implementations violate the PDF specification and how we can find
such violations by applying our strict parser. Our findings have led to changes and
modifications to the specifications to handle such antipatterns, and modifications to
implementations to conform to the specification.
In the process, we also found that PDFs often contain minor malformations that
can be corrected by implementing rules to fix these PDFs. Subsequently, we build
the PDFFixer, comprising a reducer and serializer, to transform the intermediate
representation and produce serialized PDFs. When we run the PDFs generated by
PDFFixer, we find that we produce more text than the original PDFs.

5.9.1. Future work and open problems
Although SPARTA and PDFFixer have come a long way in improving the accuracy
of the specifications implemented by PDF tools and bringing the specification closer
to how real-world PDF implementations handle the specification, much of the work
remains. The PDF specification has been around for decades without such strict type
checkers to ensure PDF files generated from these tools conform to the specification.
That has led to several different clusters of deviations from the specification.
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Documenting these grammar drifts As we first documented in Section 5.7.6,
it is important that we create an accurate and easily interpreted taxonomy of how
different implementations handle the PDF specifications. The PDFFixer and the
reducer rules provide ways to reverse the errors introduced by a PDF tool. However,
these rules are not comprehensive. One option is to document the differences in the
form of changes to the Arlington DOM. For example, suppose an object type is a Name
object instead of a string in some implementation. In that case, the transformations
are then applied to the Arlington DOM, and we maintain a taxonomy of the deviations
from the specification. I believe this is an achievable follow-on work to this thesis.

Machine-readable syntax definitions This thesis primarily focuses on applying
types to various objects in a PDF file. However, before applying these types, we
must extract the overall syntax and understand the basic types present in the PDF
object. Therefore, we used the Parsley tools to syntactically analyze the file and
extract the Parsley IR. However, the syntax checker was written by hand and can
be prone to errors in the interpretation of a specification. Hence, one direction the
LangSec community must focus its efforts on is building rigorously-tested and accurate
machine-readable specifications.

Detecting cycles in PDF files. PDF files could contain cycles. This is because
several data structures are designed to be like a linked list—with pointers to the
next object. However, after a critical reading of the specification, we observed that
the specification does not explicitly prevent cycles [288]. Subsequently, Muller et
al. [197] also identified that several PDF viewers are susceptible to these infinite
loops. Therefore, we believe that a strong PDF validator must detect such loops. In
the future, such a tool must also check for such loops and cyclic references in PDF
files.
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ParseSmith: Parsing Real-World
Data Formats
Previously, Chapter 4 discussed the parser-combinator approach to building parsers.
As we outlined in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the data description language approach
is different from the parser-combinator approach in that we generate code from a
grammar description rather than implementing the grammar in code. This chapter
describes a parsing toolkit that can generate code in various target languages. Developers can then import the generated parsers into their applications to ensure that
they fully recognize input before using them in their applications.
Real-world data formats—network as well as file formats—use constructs not commonly found in formal grammars. For example, let us consider the Domain Name
Service (DNS) protocol. In this protocol, a client requests IP addresses for a fixed
set of domain names. The client, however, needs to specify in the same packet how
many queries are in the packet before including the queries. With this arrangement,
the server knows how many queries are present and can parse the packet.
The parser reads an unsigned integer n and then expects n domains. Such a
field—commonly called a repeat field—cannot be parsed using the common formal
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language constructs such as regular grammars, context-free grammars, and parsing
expression grammars without a state-space explosion.

Parsing Expression Grammars (PEGs). In 2004, Ford proposed the idea of
Parsing Expression Grammars (PEGs) to avoid the ambiguities in parsing ContextFree Grammars (CFGs) [97, 98, 37]. While parsing CFGs, we often run into certain
ambiguities, i.e., we can construct multiple parse trees from the same string. PEGs
resolve ambiguities by using a prioritized choice. PEGs also implement the and and
not operations that provide lookahead capabilities to PEGs.
The deterministic execution of PEGs and the lookahead capabilities make PEGs
an excellent candidate to model data formats. However, off-the-shelf PEGs do not
make an appropriate candidate for data formats. They do not support contextsensitive constructs often used in data formats such as repeat fields, dependent fields,
and constraints.

Attribute PEGs. Both Mercer et al. [182] and Dos Santos Reis et al. [79] propose
the idea of Attribute PEGs. Dos Santos Reis et al. use properties of YAKKER [138],
such as using attributes as variables in constraint expressions. They also define the
concept of attribute expressions to compute attributes for non-terminals.
This chapter builds on the above fundamentals to design Parsley grammars—
a variation of Attribute PEGs more suited to describing data formats. We also
introduce two algorithms that build on existing algorithms for PEGs.

Parsing PEGs faster. Several researchers have explored improving the speed and
performance of PEG parsing algorithms. Henglein et al. [113] presented progressive tabular parsing (PTP), an execution model for PEGs that resolves the leftmost
expansions of the parse tree dynamically, enabling us to discard the table columns
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corresponding to already resolved portions of the string. In the future, ParseSmith
can leverage a variation of this algorithm to get superior memory performance.
Other researchers focused on how we can leverage the previous memoization table while parsing PEGs if the input changes only incrementally. Dubroy et al. [80]
implemented an incremental Packrat parser for JavaScript that outperformed nonincremental parsers. Guillermo et al. [110] further improve these results by reducing
copy operations and using additional data structures. Yedidia et al. [297] also improve
Dubroy et al.’s results by changing the memoization structures.
Dubroy et al., Guillermo et al., and Yedidia et al. focus on the same application
of incremental parsing. They are interested in a situation where a user makes minor
edits to a program, and the parser must reuse previously memoized data so that the
entire program does not need to be parsed again. Our application differs from this
since each network packet or file data is independent and may not even be similar
in size or structure. Hence, we cannot leverage incremental parsing in ParseSmith to
gain any performance upgrades.

Verified Parser Combinators. The Narcissus parser combinator framework allows developers to specify encoders and decoders in Coq [75]. This framework supports a wide range of network formats and proves that the encoder and decoder are
inverses of each other. In ParseSmith, we focus on using a more usable interface to
the parsing library and supporting software in multiple programming languages to
provide verified libraries in their language.
EverParse also implements verified parser combinators using a combination of Fstar and low-star [226]. They use similar encoder-decoder proofs to ensure that the
parser and serializer are inverses of each other. Additionally, they also prove that
their implementation is memory-safe. Finally, they implemented a zero-copy parser
for better security and performance. We take a broader approach than EverParse,
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implement a more extensive set of combinators, and use a strongly-typed attribute
and constraint system to capture context-sensitive languages.

Data Description Languages. Several types of data-description languages
(DDLs) are available that can capture various properties of languages. For example, Nail supports dependent grammars and dependent fields [27]. In addition, they
use streams and transformations to implement format nesting and demonstrate their
system on the DNS protocol and ZIP file format. Finally, they rely on the Hammer
parser combinator library under the hood to capture the syntax of these formats.
The Data Format Description Language (DFDL) relies on an XML syntax to
capture data format syntax [181]. DFDL supports both text and binary formats out
of the box—and provides the parsed structure in multiple formats to the application.
DFDL also supports serializing the AST—a feature none of the other popular tools
support.
Kaitai Struct relies on YAML syntax to describe formats [295]. In addition, Kaitai
supports user-defined constraints and creates a class with all the corresponding fields
correctly named. However, due to branching, formal grammar schemas in BNF syntax
do not translate well to the Kaitai Struct syntax. Moreover, since they provide a class
instance and not an AST as the parsing output, we cannot easily serialize the Kaitai
Struct output.
PADS is a strongly-typed data description language supporting data-dependent
parsing and user-defined constraints [178]. Parsley grammars use inherited attributes
instead of the let-binding constructs used in PADS. The YAKKER system also supports data-dependent parsing and user-defined constraints and again does not support
attribute definitions the same way as Parsley [138].
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ParseSmith. In this chapter, we design and implement a high-level parsing toolkit
to describe and parse data formats. Developers interact with ParseSmith by defining
Parsley grammars and providing input to parse. The ParseSmith toolkit contains two
parsing algorithms to parse these inputs as per the grammar definitions.
ParseSmith has four high-level goals.
– Security: We provide strong security guarantees using correctness and termination proofs.
– Usability: We help developers by providing better error messages and a debugger.
– Parsed Data Access: Developers can access parsed data via synthesized attributes that are made available. We also provide methods for developers to
read, transform and serialize an abstract syntax tree.
– Code Generation: Finally, relying on Dafny’s code generators, we generate
parsers in various target languages such as C++, Go, and JavaScript.
My contributions.

I present the following contributions in the rest of this

chapter:
– I formalize Parsley grammars: Attribute PEGs that support arbitrary constraints and additional properties that we describe in Section 6.1.
– I present two parsing algorithms: a bottom-up algorithm based on the Packrat
algorithm and a top-down recursive descent algorithm to parse Parsley grammars in Section 6.2.2.
– I implement ParseSmith: a toolkit to parse these real-world network formats.
We produced verified implementations of both the parsing algorithms in Dafny
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proving that the algorithms terminate for well-formed Parsley grammars (Section 6.1.1).
– I demonstrate ParseSmith on the Real-Time Publish-Subscribe wire protocol
and the PFCP protocol and generate Go, C#, and JavaScript parsers for these
protocols using ParseSmith (Section 6.4).
– Finally, I present a first-of-its-kind parser debugger to pause and inspect parser
data structures in runtime (Section 6.3). This debugger supports several operations in runtime that resemble state of the art binary debugging tools, such as
GDB.

Section 6.1

Parsley Grammars
Mundkur et al. [198] proposed Parsley grammars in 2020 to capture the syntax and
semantics of various data formats. They use an attribute and constraint system to
capture context sensitivity. The design of Parsley grammars relies on several prior
works.
Parsley grammars make use of the core PEG and Attribute PEG ideas. In addition, we use L-Attributed grammars to use attributes in constraints and inherited
attributes later in the production. We also build on the YAKKER system to use
user-defined attributes as variables in the parsing context [137]. Additionally, Parsley grammars define several fundamental data types such as integers of a varying bit
length, characters, character strings, and byte strings.
The Parsley language relies on the above fundamentals to describe various data
formats [198]. Specifically, it holds the following properties:
– We use a EBNF notation to describe grammars in the PEG format. As described
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earlier, using the PEG constructs instead of CFGs provides determinism and
results in better formalism.
– The Parsley language uses a standard attribute system and assigns types to
various fundamental non-terminals commonly used in data formats. For more
complex non-terminals, the user must specify how the attributes are assigned.
– Finally, we use arbitrary constraints on attributes to specify various data dependencies. Using such constraints, we can implement various cyclic dependencies
and integrity checks (such as length fields and checksums) commonly found in
data formats.
Definition 6.1. A Parsley grammar is a 6-tuple G = (VN , VT , R, eS , A, P), where:
– VN is a finite set of non-terminals,
– VT is a finite set of terminal symbols,
– R is a finite set of rules, and each rule r ∈ R takes the form A ←
− e,
– eS is the starting expression, and
– A holds the set of attribute types.
– P holds the set of binding variables.
We inductively define expressions e in Parsley grammars as follows. e ∈ VN
(a) , empty strings
(b) (a, assign), where a ∈ VT and assign(a) ∈ A.
(c) (List(sequence), assign), where sequence is in turn defined as:
(i) pi = ei , where ei ∈ VN , and pi ∈ P .
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(ii) constraints(constraint name), where constraints operate on all pi defined
so far.
(iii) pi = (pj

∧

ei ) is the repeat operator, where pj ∈ A and ei ∈ VN . If pj takes

the type Aj , then pi takes the type List(Aj ).
(iv) EN D is a special operator we introduce to denote the end of the input
string.
(d) e1 /e2 /e3 ...en where ∀i ∈ 1 to n, ei ∈ VN , prioritized or ordered choice.
(e) e∗ , and the type the attribute takes is List(Ai ) where Ai is the attribute type
of e. This expression matches zero or more repetitions of e.
(f) e+ , and the type the attribute takes is List(Ai ) where Ai is the attribute type
of e. This expression matches one or more repetitions of e.
(g) &(e), the and predicate does not consume input but attempts to match a string.
This expression can be used as a lookahead operator. This expression returns
an attribute with the same type as e.
(h) !(e), the not operator also does not consume any input and can be used as a
lookahead operator. If e succeeds at the current location, then !(e) fails, and
vice-versa. This expression returns an attribute with the same type as e.
(i) e?, the optional operator. This expression returns an attribute with the same
type as e if successfully matched, else returns N ull.

6.1.1. Well-Formed Parsley Grammars
Although we rely on the Dafny compiler to find syntax errors in ParseSmith grammar
input, grammars can contain other malformations that we must detect to prove properties about the parsing algorithms. Therefore, we implement preconditions to our
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parsing functions. We check these preconditions prior to calling these functions—if
these preconditions are violated, the program must exit early and not call the parsing
functions.
Definition 6.2. A Parsley grammar is well-formed if it satisfies the following conditions:
– Every dependent variable must be defined earlier in the execution model.
– The Repeat construct must include an attribute of an integer type.
– No left recursions must be present. It is impossible to have complete proof
of lack of left recursions. We propose using a check that is sound but not
complete [98].
– Check for cyclic references: two nonterminals may be mutually recursive, making it hard to prove that they will terminate.
– End type must always occur last in a sequence.

Section 6.2

Implementation
We implemented various components of ParseSmith in the Dafny programming language. The Dafny programming language allows developers to annotate functions
and methods with preconditions and postconditions. These annotations enable users
to prove various correctness properties on their code.
The Dafny programming language also supports loop invariants and annotations
for recursive functions. These constructs are vital in proving that a program terminates for all possible input. Most importantly, the Dafny verifier does not proceed
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with code generation if any of the above properties—loop invariants, recursion termination, preconditions, and postconditions—cannot be proven.

Grammar in
Parsley Syntax
Parsley Execution
Model in Dafny

Dafny Verifier:
Validate Grammar and
prove properties

ParseSmith Invoker

Interact with attributes,
debugger, AST, and
serializer

Dafny Code
Generator

C++, Go, Javascript, C# code

Figure 6.1: Workflow of our Dafny ParseSmith implementation. The dotted components show our contributions. Other components use Dafny-provided tools.
Figure 6.1 shows the overall architecture of ParseSmith. The dotted lines show
components we contribute in ParseSmith—the other components are provided by the
Dafny verifier and compiler. The execution model accepts input via Dafny syntax
that closely resembles Parsley grammars.
The execution model implements two parsing algorithms—first, a bottom-up algorithm based on the packrat algorithm. Next, a top-down algorithm that starts
with nonterminals while recursively reaching the terminals needed to parse the input. The second algorithm consumes lesser memory while also supporting inherited
attributes. However, the first algorithm only supports synthesized attributes with
Parsley grammars. We describe these algorithms in detail in Section 6.2.2.
The ParseSmith invoker combines several utility tools we built around the execu213
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tion model to improve debugging and usability of ParseSmith. First, we describe a
serializer. The serializer allows us to serialize an AST back to the input bytes. The
developer can define transformation rules on the AST output. Following this, they
may need to serialize the set of bytes. For example, an everyday use case is that
network packets occasionally contain confidential data that may need to be redacted
before packets or files leave the network.
Next, the invoker includes a parser debugger. This debugger provides functionalities for users to pause and examine the parsing table at any given step and then
step through iterations of the various algorithms. In addition, the user can place
breakpoints on nonterminals and input locations. This tool is hugely vital to aid in
debugging grammars on large inputs.
Finally, the invoker provides access to the synthesized attributes to the start nonterminal. Using the API, users define this start nonterminal. Subsequently, the
invoker provides access to the synthesized attributes and the AST for this nonterminal. The serializer and the transformers previously described can be called from
this AST. The synthesized attributes provide a developer-defined attribute structure.
Developers can invoke this structure to gather file metadata and contents from their
target programming language.
Figure 11 shows the datatypes we use to implement Parsley grammars in ParseSmith. We used inductive datatypes in Dafny to closely model our Parsley grammar
inductive definition in Definition 6.1. F terminal, star plus f, and update attr
are all function types used to assign attributes to non-terminals. A comprehensive
list of these function types are in Table 6.1.
Dafny does not contain integer types for integers of varying lengths. It also does
not contain types for unsigned and signed variants of integers—the int type is signed.
We created the type int8 to add an additional constraint on the int type to create
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datatype grammar = epsilon
| any(update_terminal: F_terminal)
| terminal(a : int8, update_terminal: F_terminal)
| range(a : int8, b : int8, update_terminal: F_terminal)
| sequ(assignments: seq<sequence>, update_attr: F)
| star(f1 : string, update_attr_ter: star_plus_f)
| plus(f1 : string, update_attr_ter: star_plus_f)
| opt(f1 : string)
| notP(f1 : string)
| andP(f1 : string)
| prior(f: seq<string>)
datatype sequence = Sequence (d1: string, f1: string)
| Constraint (con: constraint)
| Repeat(d1: string, f1: string, f2: string)
| SequenceWithError(d1: string, f1: string, error: string)
| RepeatWithError(d1: string, f1: string, f2:string, error: string)
| ConstraintWithError(con: constraint, error: string)
| End(error: string)

Code Snippet 11: ParseSmith implementation of Parsley grammars
unsigned 8-bit integers (i.e., 0 to 255). The int8 type can be used to denote a byte
of input.
The sequence datatype defines how we can concatenate productions. The grammar format covers all the types present in parsing expression grammars, including
and, not, star, plus, and prioritized choice. Additionally, we also support additional
annotations in the sequence type.

End type. PEGs can consume input while not matching with the entire input. As
a result, the parsing may not fully fail but partially fail. A common way is to check
if the entire input was consumed by comparing the number of bytes consumed to the
input size. The execution model supports such execution; however, we also support
a different construct.
The End construct takes a string as an input. When the parser encounters this
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construct as part of a sequence, it checks if we have reached the end of the input. If
we still have input when encountering this operation, we stop parsing and print out
the string given as an argument. Therefore, this operation must appear only at the
end of a sequence.

WithError versions. We add support for these operations extending the simple
Constraint, Sequence, and Repeat operations. The WithError format of these operations provides additional help for developers to debug their parsers with meaningful
errors. For example, instead of the parser stating that a constraint at a certain byte
and nonterminal failed, we can print out a meaningful error message with a byte number and nonterminal. The developer can use this information to debug the grammar
using the ParseSmith debugger.

Attribute system. Users define the attribute types needed for each non-terminal
in ParseSmith using an inductive data type in Dafny. For example, the following
code sample shows the attribute definition we used to capture the language L =
an bn cn , ∀n ≥ 0.
datatype Attributes = AStar(size: int) |
BStar(size: int) |
CStar(size: int) |
Nil |
Byte(val: int8) |
Int(intval: int)

Users must also define a function to define these attributes for each non-terminal.
The function type definitions for each of the different non-terminal types are defined
in Table 6.1. The other grammar types— optional fields, and, not, and prioritized
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choices—do not take these assignments. Instead, they assign the same attribute as
their argument to the defining non-terminal.
Non-terminal type
Terminals
Any
Sequence
Constraints
Plus
Star

Function type
(int8) -> Attributes
(int8) -> Attributes
(map<string, Attributes>) -> Attributes
(map<string, Attributes>) -> Attributes
(Attributes, Attributes) -> Attributes
(Attributes, Attributes) -> Attributes

Dafny Name
F terminal
F terminal
update attr
update attr
star plus f
star plus f

Table 6.1: Type definitions for attribute creating functions.

6.2.1. Parsley ASTs
Parsley ASTs form the backbone of our Completeness proof. For each expression
type in Parsley grammars, we define a rule to create the AST and a subsequent rule
to serialize the AST to bytes. Figure 12 demonstrates the inductive datatype we use
to define Parsley ASTs.
This AST follows closely from the ASTs in Bleadeau et al. [37]. We store the
successful and the unsuccessful paths in the prioritized choice or sequences. Each
node in the AST stores the number of bytes consumed and whether it corresponds
to a successful or failing expression. A sequence parser stops when it encounters a
failing non-terminal. The AST corresponding to the failing non-terminal would be
the last AST in the list corresponding to all the non-terminals in a sequence.
Similarly, the prioritized choice parser tries the choices in order—following the
prescribed sequence. We store the AST at each failure case. The prioritized choice
parser halts once a successful case is found. Hence, the successful AST is always the
last node in the list of ASTs in a prioritized choice AST type.
The terminal types—ast terminals, ast any, and ast range—include an additional parameter value that holds a byte. These terminal types form the leaves of the
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AST. We do a depth-first search (DFS) on the AST to find the bytes corresponding
to the string. This DFS ignores all the nodes where the success flag is set to false.
datatype ast = ast_nil(consumed: int, success: bool)
| ast_epsilon(consumed: int, success: bool)
| ast_any(consumed: int, success: bool, value: int8)
| ast_terminal(consumed: int, success: bool, value : int8)
| ast_range(consumed: int, success: bool, value : int8)
| ast_sequ(consumed: int, success: bool, T: seq<ast>)
| ast_repeat(consumed: int, success: bool, T: seq<ast>)
| ast_prior(consumed: int, success: bool, T: seq<ast>,
choicename: string)
| ast_star(consumed: int, success: bool, T1 : ast, T2: ast)
| ast_plus(consumed: int, success: bool, T1 : ast, T2: ast)
| ast_opt(consumed: int, success: bool, T : ast)
| ast_notP(consumed: int, success: bool, T : ast)
| ast_andP(consumed: int, success: bool, T : ast)

Code Snippet 12: Dafny inductive datatype showing our Parsley ASTs

6.2.2. Parsing Algorithms
To interpret Parsley grammars, we create an interpreter model with a relation ⇒G
that maps an expression (e, x), where e ∈ G and x ∈ VT∗ . e is one of the inductively
defined expressions in G, whereas x is a subset of the input string. The relation ⇒G
maps each (e, x) to a tuple (n, Ae , T ), where n ≥ −1, Ae ∈ A, and T is a welldefined abstract syntax tree (AST). We inductively define ⇒G following the syntax
in Definition 6.1 as follows.
To evaluate each expression, we use an input string x ∈ VT∗ . We use the N il
attribute type to capture failure cases in the AST.
(a) Empty strings: (, x) ⇒ (0, N il, ast epsilon(consumed : 0, success : true)),
where N il ∈ A.
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(b) Terminals:
– Success: (a, ax) ⇒ (1, T (a), ast terminal(consumed : 1, success : true,
value : a)), where T (a) ∈ A.
– Failure: (b, ax) ⇒ (−1, N il, ast terminal(consumed : 0, success : f alse,
value : a)), where N il ∈ A.
(c) Sequences: If e = e1 e2 ....en and x = x1 x2 ....xn . And the substrings x1 ...xn
hold the length s1 , s2 ... sn . Then,
– Success case: If (e, xy) ⇒ (s1 + s2 + .... + sn , Seq(dependent variables),
ast sequ(
s1 + s2 + .... + sn , success : true, T : seq < ast >))
– Failure case: If (e, xy) ⇒ (−1, N il, ast sequ(s1 + s2 + .... + si ,
success : f alse, T : seq < ast >)), where the last value in the sequence T
is the failing AST. We can reach a failure if ∃ei ∈ e, s.t. (ei , xi y) did not
lead to a successful parse.
(d) Prioritized choice: If e = e1 /e2 /..../en ,
– Success case: If (ei , xy) ⇒ (si , typeof (e), ast prior(si , success : true, T :
seq < ast >)), where ei is one of the choices in e. ei is tested if ∀jin1 to i−
1, (ej , xy) led to a failure.
– Failure case: If (e, xy) ⇒ (−1, N il, ast prior(−1, success : f alse, T :
seq < ast >)), where the every value in the sequence T is a failing AST.
(e) Star: This operation can consume , and hence cannot fail. If e = e∗1 and
(e1 , x1 x2 y) ⇒ (s1 , typeof (e1 ), T : ast1 ) and (e1 ∗, x2 y) ⇒ (s2 ,
seq < typeof (e1 ) >, T : ast2 ).
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(f) Plus: If e = e∗1 and (e1 , x1 x2 y) ⇒ (s1 , typeof (e1 ), T : ast1 ) and (e1 ∗, x2 y) ⇒
(s2 , seq < typeof (e1 ) >, T : ast2 ).
– Success: If both the above tests succeed, we will return the following
(s1 + s2 , P lus(dependent variables), ast plus(consumed : s1 + s2 , success :
true, T 1 : ast1 , T 2 : ast2 ))
– Failure: If the first test does not succeed, then the operation fails. We will
return the following (−1, N il, ast plus(consumed : −1, success : true, T 1 :
ast1 , T 2 : ast2 )). ast1 here must be a failure case.
(g) And: If e = &(e1 ) and (e1 , xy) ⇒ (s1 , typeof (e1 ), T : ast) then,
– Success: (e, xy) ⇒ (0, typeof (e1 ), ast andP (consumed : 0,
success : true, T : ast)), where ast is the same as the ast matched for e1 .
– Failure: (e, xy) ⇒ (−1, N il, ast andP (consumed : −1, success : f alse,
T : ast)).
(h) Not: If e = (e1 ) and (e1 , xy) ⇒ (−1, N il, T : ast) then,
– Success: (e, xy) ⇒ (0, N il, ast notP (consumed : 0, success : true, T :
ast)).
– Failure: (e, xy) ⇒ (−1, typeof (e1 ), ast notP (consumed : −1, success :
f alse, T : ast)), where ast is the same as the ast matched for e1 .
(i) Optional: If e = e1 ? and (e1 , xy) ⇒ (s1 , typeof (e1 ), T : ast) then,
– Success: (e, xy) ⇒ (s1 , typeof (e1 ), ast opt(consumed : s1 , success : true,
T : ast)), where ast is the same as the ast matched for e1 .
– Failure: (e, xy) ⇒ (0, N il, ast opt(consumed : 0, success : f alse,
T : ast nil(0, true))).
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We use three scaffolds to store the bytes consumed (similar to a standard Packrat
algorithm), attribute generated from the expression, and AST corresponding to the
expression. We keep three large scaffolds of size (n + 1) × k, where n is the input
size, and k is the number of productions. We use the above inductive definition to
compute the entries for our scaffold tables.

Bottom-up algorithm
Our bottom-up algorithm implements an algorithm similar to Packrat [97]. The
algorithm needs the order in which the non-terminals must be evaluated. We rely on
the user to specify this order in the current implementation. If the input size is n, we
use columns from 0 to n. Additionally, we use 0 to k − 1 rows for the non-terminals.
We fill the scaffold from right to left, the rightmost entry (column n) signifying —and
bottom to top.
For both the loops, we implement loop invariants to cover all the paths our parsing
function can take based on the inductive definitions described earlier. In addition, we
use invariants to ensure our completeness property—by ensuring that if the AST value
in the scaffold holds a success value of true, then the serialized output corresponds
to the substring matched.

Top-down algorithm
An evident problem of using our bottom-up algorithm is that we fill every entry in
the scaffold despite using only a tiny portion of them to compute the final scaffold
cells. Hence, we implement a top-down algorithm that uses a stack to implement
the parsing algorithm. Using this version of the algorithm means we do not need to
specify the order of the non-terminals anymore.
This approach leverages a stack. Our stack only contains the starting non-terminal
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and the input location we attempt to match. For example, if the non-terminal is S
and the location is 0 (this would be the starting state for any parser), then we place
(S, 0) in the stack before calling the parser.
The parser pops the stack and checks for all the dependencies needed to fill this
scaffold entry. Next, we place the popped entry back in the stack and push each
dependent entry onto the stack. As it may be evident, left recursions and cyclic
references would mess up the scaffold computations.
The parsing function stops when the stack is eventually empty. Most importantly,
the stack may only contain one copy of an entry. As the parser completes, we check
the (S, 0) entry in the scaffolds to extract the parsed attributes or AST. The topdown algorithm drastically reduces memory coverage and CPU time by not filling
every unnecessary cell in the scaffolds. We use a targeted approach by only filling the
cells necessary to get to the (S, 0)th location.
Complexity analysis. We compute three scaffold tables during our parsing functions: the usual packrat scaffold, an attributes scaffold, and an AST scaffold. Our
bottom-up algorithm computes every location in each scaffold and hence consumes
much space and time. If we have k productions and the input size is n, both the
algorithms follow a space complexity of O(n × k). However, the algorithms differ in
the time complexity due to the Repeat operator. The bottom-up algorithm requires
O(n2 × k) time. Whereas the top-down algorithm uses the same O(n × k) time.
However, in practice, the top-down algorithms save far more space and time by only
computing needed entries.

6.2.3. Properties
We prove the following properties for our implementation:
– Termination: For a well-formed grammar, our parser terminates on all in222

6.2 Implementation

ParseSmith

puts [152, 37]. We rely on the Dafny verifier to prove termination. In ParseSmith, we use user-defined functions to define constraints and attribute declarations. Therefore, the Dafny verifier forces the user to prove termination for
each function—user-defined or a part of the ParseSmith library.
The Dafny verifier requires that we provide “decreases” clauses for recursive
functions. Although we do not implement many recursive functions in ParseSmith, we use a recursive implementation to serialize ASTs. Therefore, we
had to annotate the serializing functions to ensure that the AST supplied continuously decreases in size. We also annotate loops using invariants to prove
termination.
– Completeness: A traversal of the AST produces the same input string [226].
Each cell in the AST scaffold contains a tree of the AST type. Furthermore,
each tree datatype contains a field to denote the number of bytes that were
consumed to form that subtree. For example, let us consider that at cell (S, 5),
the “consumed” field in the AST shows 6. It implies that the non-terminal S
consumed 6 bytes to form that AST. Hence, the serialized form of the AST
must contain the substring starting with location 5 and ending with location
10.
To verify completeness, we use loop invariants to ensure that the serialized
version corresponds to the correct substring for every cell in the AST.
– Correctness: We prove that we implement all the parsing rules for Parsley
grammars. We do this by specifying loop invariants for all expressions in Parsley
grammars. We use a correctness clause for each expression type defined in the
earlier inductive definitions. The program only invokes the parsing function and
the loops if the pre-conditions for the grammar well-formedness are met. Hence,

223

6.3 Parser Debugger

ParseSmith

the correctness clause only holds if the parser’s pre-conditions are satisfied.

Section 6.3

Parser Debugger1
Developing grammars for data formats is an iterative process that may require trial
and error. Since specification documents are long and verbose, developers may misinterpret portions of the specification and not implement them correctly. Therefore, to
ensure that most cases in a specification are implemented correctly, we must construct
a large corpus and test our grammar on it.
As we noted earlier in Chapter 5, two outcomes may occur from running our
parsers on data. First, data constructed by tools in the wild may be producing
malformed data. Second, the developer could have introduced errors in the grammar.
To help developers debug parsing errors that may arise from malformed input or
grammars, we provide debugging options with ParseSmith.

Print columns after update We support this operation in ParseSmith. Our
algorithms match every nonterminal to an input substring starting from an input
location. Then, we print the values computed corresponding to a nonterminal after
matching an input location. This approach does not pause the execution but instead
prints these values for debugging logs.

Supporting breakpoints We also support a separate debugging mode, where users
can place a breakpoint on a nonterminal. Each time the parsing function is computing
this nonterminal, our parsing halts for user input. At this point, a user can choose
to inspect specific memory locations in the scaffold or continue the execution. The
1

Patrick Norton helped build the ParseSmith Debugger over the summer of 2021, when he interned with our group before joining college that fall.
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execution will pause again when it reaches the same nonterminal for another input
location.
Command
b
c
p
s

Arguments
Nonterminal name
None
Input location and nonterminal
Number of steps

Function
Add a breakpoint at a nonterminal
Continue execution
Prints the values in the table
Take steps and pause again for input

Table 6.2: Commands supported in the ParseSmith debugger
Figure 6.2 provides a complete list of commands we support in debug mode. In
addition to adding breakpoints and continuing execution, we also support printing
and stepping through the parsing function sequentially.
Our debugger helped us debug several errors in our ParseSmith specifications and
helped us identify the root causes of why we rejected some RTPS packets in our
case study. Furthermore, by allowing users to step through the nonterminals and
their assignments, we provide the first-of-its-kind parser debugger that exposes the
internals of the parsing data structures.

Section 6.4

Case Studies
To evaluate ParseSmith, we conducted two case studies. We implemented a parser
for the Real-Time Publish-Subscribe and the Packet Forwarding Control protocols.
We evaluated our parsers on an Intel i7 4th Generation Processor with 16 GiB RAM.

6.4.1. The Real-Time Publish Subscribe Protocol (RTPS)
The Object Management Group (OMG) released the first version of the Real-Time
Publish-Subscribe (RTPS) protocol in 2006 [262]. The current active version of the
RTPS specification is version 2.3, and it was released in 2018. Publish-subscribe
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protocols such as RTPS are used to transmit data unilaterally. Several users subscribe to a server (subscribers). Whenever users (publishers) publish data, the server
broadcasts this data to all subscribers.
Each RTPS packet includes a 160-byte header followed by multiple sub-messages.
Additionally, each sub-message ends on a 32-byte boundary. There are thirteen submessage types of which only the Data and the DataFrag sub-message types vary in
length—all other types are fixed-length messages. RTPS messages and sub-messages
do not contain length fields—hence, Data and DataFrag sub-messages must always
occur last in the sub-message list.
People have explored building parsers for the RTPS protocol in the past. For
example, ElShankiry et al. [86] use the Structure and Context-Sensitive Language
(SCL)—an extension to the ASN.1 description format—to describe various binary
protocols. SCL adds additional types and markups to support more constructs found
in network protocols. They demonstrate their approach to generate LL(k) parsers
using SCL on the RTPS protocol.
Lavorato et al. [160, 159] built a technique to optimize LL(k) grammars that
are used to describe network protocol formats. They produce parsers that perform
better than ElShakankiry et al. [86] by optimizing backtracking using lookaheads.
Their focus was to improve the performance of LL(k) parsers, and they used RTPS
to demonstrate their techniques.
We implement the RTPS protocol syntax for all submessage types in ParseSmith.
We describe these packets entirely in Dafny. This format does not require any inherited attributes but very strongly relies on synthesized attributes to pass values to the
end-user.
Figure 13 shows the overall syntax of RTPS packets in ParseSmith. Packets here is
the starting nonterminal. The equivalent Parsley grammar is shown in Figure 14. As
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we have previously covered, ParseSmith provides additional syntax to describe better
error strings and using the End construct to denote reaching the end of a packet.
The sub-messages nonterminal is defined using the plus construct. Let us consider
the following packet structure.
Header
GAP submessage
DataFrag submessage
A DataFrag sub-message follows a GAP sub-message in the above structure. If
the DataFrag sub-message is malformed, the sub-messages nonterminal still succeeds
since it parsed with one sub-message. Hence, we include an additional End construct
to ensure that when we encounter this construct in the sequence, we have reached
the end of the packet—implying that we have parsed the DataFrag sub-message.
peg := peg["Packets" := sequ([
SequenceWithError("r", "R", "Did not match magic character R"),
Sequence("t", "T"),
Sequence("p", "P"),
Sequence("s", "S"),
Sequence("version", "Int16"),
Sequence("vendor", "Int16"),
Sequence("guid", "GuidPrefix"),
Sequence("submessages", "SubMessages"),
End("Expected more characters reached end")],
update_packet)];

Code Snippet 13: Code sample showing the RTPS packet structure in ParseSmith.
We will evaluate the performance of our RTPS parser using a dataset of RTPS
packets we generated using open-source tools in Section 6.6.
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Packets p {s: Submessage, v: int} := r=!"R"!
t=!"T"!
p=!"P"!
s=!"S"!
version=Int16
vendor=Int16
guid=GuidPrefix
submessages=(Submessage)+
{
p.v := version ;;
p.s := submessages
} ;;

Code Snippet 14: Code sample showing the RTPS packet structure in the Parsley
language syntax. This code represents the same structure shown in Code Snippet 13.

6.4.2. Packet Forwarding Control Protocol (PFCP)
The Packet Forwarding Control Protocol (PFCP) plays a crucial role in the 5G Next
Generation (5GC) suite of protocols [155]. Earlier, it found a prominent role in
worldwide implementations of the 4G/LTE protocol to implement Control and User
Plane Separation. Essentially, packets between control and user planes are processed
and forwarded or discarded depending on PFCP connections. The PFCP protocol is
UDP based and uses the reserved port 8805 for its communications [266].
We chose this protocol for our case study given its wide-ranging application and
increased adoption. The use of CFCP in cellular networks increases throughput in
several ways:
– By separating the control plane and user plane, we reduce latency.
– We can use software-defined networking to deliver user plane data more efficiently.
– The evolution of control plane protocols is independent of the user protocols—
not all control plane nodes need to be updated time and again.
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Additionally, attacks against CUPS systems can lead to significant network degradation [187]. Therefore, not only will users be directly affected by such an attack,
but such an attack can lead to violations of quality of service (QoS) requirements
and service level agreements (SLAs), potentially costing a service provider millions
of dollars. Ensuring the syntactic validity of packets in this protocol would go a long
way to eliminating certain classes of vulnerabilities from code.

Syntax Code Snippet 15 demonstrates a portion of the syntax to describe the
PFCP protocol in ParseSmith. PFCP packets start with a 1 byte header. The
header specifies the version and holds flags. We check the header separately using
the constraint check first byte. A PFCP packet comprises several information
segments. Each of these information segments follow a specific type and structure.
Since we use the star operator to match information segments, we may end up with
bytes remaining at the end of the buffer that have not been matched. To ensure that
the length field is set correctly, we use a validate length constraint and a End type
at the end to ensure we have to trailing bytes. The information segments contain
more length fields that need to be thoroughly validated.
peg := peg["PFCP" := sequ([
Sequence("b", "Byte"),
Constraint(check_first_byte),
Sequence("length", "Int16"),
Sequence("s", "Int24"),
Sequence("z", "Zero"),
Sequence("infopackets", "PFCPInformationMultiple"),
Constraint(validate_length),
End("Unmatched bytes at the end present")
], update_seq)];
peg := peg["PFCPInformationMultiple" :=
star("PFCPInformation", info_packets)];

Code Snippet 15: Code sample showing the PFCP packet structure in ParseSmith
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Section 6.5

Testing the generated parsers
In building ParseSmith, we relied on the Dafny verification toolkit and compiler to
produce code in Go, C#, and JavaScript. However, the generated code may, in turn,
contain bugs that were introduced by the code generator. We conducted two sets of
experiments to test the generated code to look for errors, bugs, and security issues.

6.5.1. Static Analysis
Static analysis is the process of evaluating code and checking for common antipatterns and bugs without actually running the code. Static analysis engines are
usually rule-based and parse the code and check for patterns. Static analysis tools
construct code graphs to performs various analyses. We use these techniques on our
generated code to ensure that the code is bug-free and provides the required guarantees for the rest of the application.

Go Static Check The Go-tools Static Checker [119] uses the single static assignment (SSA) syntax produced by Go binaries. This tools contains more than 150 patterns designed to find common bugs, performance issues, and vulnerabilities. This
tool can find misuses of standard library functions, errors in regular expressions,
improper variable use, and several other common errors observed in Go production
code.

Insider Insider [129] focuses on covering the vulnerabilities in the OWASP Top 10
list.2 These vulnerabilities are commonly occurring and, can quite often, be exploited
with not much difficulty. Although we used the command-line tools available, devel2

https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/
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opers can also set up a continuous integration pipeline on GitHub to run the Insider
tests every time someone commits to a repository. Insider supports JavaScript, C#,
and Java source files for analysis. Hence, we use Insider to analyze our generated C#
and JavaScript code.

Findings Go Static Check found that six variable were initialized in the generated
code for the RTPS and PFCP files each that were never used in the code. In addition
to a Go file for the general repository, Dafny also generates internal files containing
helper functions. These files do not change between projects, and also contained six
variables that were initialized but never used.
Insider contains rules for each programming language in its set.3 We tasked Insider
with scanning the folders containing generated JavaScript and C# code for our RTPS
and PFCP case studies. Insider checked for 76 known anti-patterns and vulnerabilities
in C# code and 56 rules in the JavaScript code and found no violations in the code
generated by Dafny.
Based on the static analysis tools that we used, the generated Go code contained
some minor bugs—some variables that were initialized were never used in the code.
As a result, memory allocated for these variables could be misused by an adversary
modifying the program’s address space. The fix for this bug is straightforward. Our
tools did not find issues in the C# and JavaScript code, indicating that the code
produced by Dafny is generally of high quality.

6.5.2. Fuzzing
Fuzzing or fuzz testing is a testing paradigm where a program is supplied with random
input to try to reach not-so-well-tested code paths that may contain crashes or bugs.
3

We also found that Insider requires a tech flag to choose a set of rules to apply. However,
a folder containing code from multiple programming languages, for example, C#, Java, and Go,
Insider still applies the correct rule set based on the file extension.
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Fuzzing tools are extremely effective in finding memory corruption, integer overflows,
and other common bugs seen often in C and C++ applications. However, the use
of fuzzers in other languages requires additional effort. For example, in Python and
Rust, fuzzers are used to find paths to exceptions.
Go Fuzz The Go programming language happens to be one of the few in the world
that supports fuzzing as a part of the language [118]. Go Fuzz requires a corpus
that is then mutated to find interesting new paths. Like Python fuzzers, Go Fuzz is
designed to find panics, stack overflows, paths to exit functions, and timeouts.
Go Fuzz requires that we declare a fuzzing function using the following syntax.
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, orig string) {
...
}
We then invoke the testing function using the Go module system with the following
command and the expected output is shown below.
go test -fuzz=Fuzz
fuzz: elapsed: 0s, gathering baseline coverage: 0/3 completed
fuzz: elapsed: 0s, gathering baseline coverage: 3/3 completed,
now fuzzing with 8 workers
fuzz: elapsed: 3s, execs: 418168 (139372/sec), new interesting: 0
(total: 3)
fuzz: elapsed: 6s, execs: 844639 (142172/sec), new interesting: 0
(total: 3)
Approach We invoked Go fuzz on the ParseSmith engine by defining the input
to be Go arrays that we can then transform into a Dafny sequence. In the Dafny232
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generated Go code, we need to use the following syntax to define sequences to seed
our fuzzer.
_dafny.SeqOf(uint8(82), uint8(84), uint8(80), uint8(83), uint8(2),
uint8(4), uint8(1), uint8(3))
A Go array containing [82, 84, 80 ...

1, 3] needed to be converted to the

above Go-Dafny syntax in a function. In our test harness, we tested this function
and the core parsing functions called with the transformed arrays. We fuzzed the
generated Go code for 24 hours and found no crashes or exceptions.

6.5.3. Discussion
Verifying the correctness of the generated code from the Dafny compiler is difficult.
The discussion of whether the generated code and the original Dafny code are equivalent leads to another discussion to understand the trusted computing base [234] of
the ParseSmith project. We inherently assume that the operating system and the
compiler we use on the generated code are trusted and secure.

Verifying the verifier The Dafny compiler and verifier are written in C# and
comprises thousands of lines of code. Therefore, verifying this would be a massive
undertaking. For example, the CompCert compiler, a C compiler verified in Coq, contains over 200,000 lines of code [165]. C compilers have not, however, been without
errors. In 2008, several C compilers were found to misinterpret the volatile keyword
and erroneously compiled it [85]. Hence, verifying compilers, verifiers, and code generators is a worthwhile pursuit.

A possible approach One approach that would also require a significant engineering effort is to guarantee the same invariants in the generated code as in the original
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Dafny code. For example, the Viper project includes verification tools for the Go
language [284], Rust, Python, and several other commonly used languages.4 The
Viper project uses a similar set of invariants, pre-conditions, and post-conditions in
our Dafny implementation. Support for a mapping from the invariants and pre-and
post-conditions would greatly increase the trust in the generated code since it would
then guarantee the same properties in the generated code and the original Dafny
source.

Section 6.6

Performance Evaluation
The Dafny command-line tool provides numerous options to customize the output.
For example, we can opt to generate code in a target language or directly execute
the code. In addition, we can also verify the code to check if all the proofs are valid.
As we discussed earlier, Dafny also provides several options for target languages. We
chose C#, JavaScript, and the Go runtimes for our evaluation. The C++ runtime
for Dafny has been abandoned and is no longer usable.

Input selection We computed the median size of packets for PFCP and RTPS
using datasets containing over one thousand packets each of both these protocols.
We found that the median packet size for RTPS was 120 bytes and for PFCP it was
35 bytes. We set these packet sizes for our performance evaluation.

Lines of code After running the Dafny code generator for three programming languages, we computed the lines of code generated for our ParseSmith input. Table 6.3
showcases the results of our study. We found that Dafny generates the fewest code
for JavaScript and the most lines of code for Golang.
4

https://github.com/viperproject
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In addition, we also found that the Dafny compiler does not generate code from
separate Dafny source files into separate target code files. Instead, it places the entire
codebase in one file in the target language. This pattern significantly complicates
debugging.
Format
RTPS
PFCP
ParseSmith Library

Dafny
230
107
727

C#
5350
4378
-

JavaScript
2286
2224
-

Golang
10486
4760
-

Table 6.3: Lines of code for different target languages in ParseSmith
Task

RTPS
Verification
Verification
Verification
Verification
Exec
PFCP
Verification
Verification
Verification
Verification
Exec

Go version
Memory CPU time
(KiB)
(s)

JavaScript version
Memory CPU time
(KiB)
(s)

C# version
Memory CPU time
(KiB)
(s)

+ CodeGen
+ Exec
+ CodeGen + Exec

177201.16
176826.60
177305.20
177480.68
42970.50

14.76
14.81
15.00
15.03
0.14

176768.36
176681.04
176899.64
177051.32
41180.56

14.52
14.54
14.63
14.59
0.14

219812.52
219899.36
222192.32
221912.56
46072.71

18.67
18.66
18.80
18.80
0.15

+ CodeGen
+ Exec
+ CodeGen + Exec

144815.52
144786.72
144869.16
144703.64
41764.12

10.90
10.91
11.04
11.06
0.14

144038.20
144116.08
144072.32
143973.88
41936.36

10.38
10.46
10.42
10.50
0.14

181891.40
181123.08
177710.36
181033.92
46156.72

14.58
14.64
14.68
14.72
0.15

Table 6.4: Comparing the performance of the Dafny-generated code for the RTPS
and PFCP parser across target languages.
To make our performance measurements, we ran the Dafny executable with the
configurations in Table 6.4 1000 times each, with different data packets of the same
fixed size. These performance numbers reflect successful parses—our top-down algorithm can terminate earlier if it encounters errors. The default compiler option
included in Dafny verifies, generates code, and then executes the generated code.

Memory Usage In Table 6.4, we see that the memory usage of our verification
process is significant, but it is one time. Once we have run our verifier and generated
code, we do not need to verify the code again. However, the memory usage of the
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verification and code generation operations is over 170 megabytes for RTPS and over
140 megabytes for the PFCP packets. On the other hand, we find that the memory
consumption during execution is only around 42 megabytes for Golang and JavaScript
and around 46 megabytes for the C# code. We believe the memory consumption is
reasonable for a scaffold-based algorithm where we use three scaffolds to prove strong
guarantees.

CPU Time We note that the JavaScript and Golang version of code consume a
lot lesser memory and take slightly lesser time than the C# version of the code. We
believe this results from the Mono runtime used in Linux, which may be slower than
the native code generated by Golang or the Nodejs runtime.

Section 6.7

Conclusions
This chapter presented ParseSmith, a parsing toolkit that can handle real-world data
formats. To build ParseSmith, we first designed Parsley grammars and described
two network protocol formats in the Parsley grammar syntax. We then designed two
algorithms to parse data in the Parsley grammar syntax.
We implemented ParseSmith in Dafny to verify the correctness and termination
properties we were interested in. For all well-formed Parsley grammars, we can prove
the traversal of the AST produces the original input, the algorithm is implemented
correctly for all the conditions in the grammar, and the algorithm terminates for any
input.
We demonstrated and evaluated ParseSmith using two case studies: the RTPS and
the PFCP protocol. We found that the verifier and the construction of three scaffold
tables are very cumbersome and memory intensive. The issues we encountered in our

236

6.7 Conclusions

ParseSmith

experience with ParseSmith leads us in several future directions.

Runtime interpreter for Parsley DDL Currently, we modeled our input grammar language to resemble Parsley grammars closely. Creating a compiler and an
interpreter for the entire Parsley language still requires some effort. The Parsley language supports extensive cursor and view operations that we do not support yet. The
PEG-based algorithms we adapt in this chapter are not amenable to view and cursor
modifications.

Backend for Parser Combinators Another potential future direction is to use
the ParseSmith interpreter as a backend for the Hammer or Nom parser combinator
toolkit [66, 214]. Unfortunately, neither of these parser-combinator toolkits are verified for correctness or termination. Hence, a way to invoke ParseSmith via parser
combinators would be a good addition to Hammer and Nom.

Designing more efficient algorithms As we noted in the evaluation, one of
the significant issues with our two algorithms is that they have significant memory
requirements [199]. For most network protocol formats, simple recursive descent
parsing algorithms with backtracking would suffice. Hence, we believe that supporting
a simpler algorithm as default would significantly improve performance and lower
memory requirements.
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Chapter 7

A Systematic Comparison of Data
Description Languages
Earlier, in Chapter 4 we studied the parser-combinator approach and built several
parsers for network protocols and file formats. Later, in Chapter 6 we build a parsing toolkit that can generate code in multiple languages. This chapter studies Data
Description Languages (DDLs) in detail. DDLs present one of the most comprehensive methods to enforce various LangSec principles. More importantly, by generating
parsers in multiple languages from the same source, we minimize parser differentials.
This chapter aims to systematize knowledge about state-of-the-art DDLs.
DDLs are a means to describe data formats such as network protocols and file
formats. DDLs often involve three components: the description format, the parser
generator, and generated code. Developers describe grammars in the description
format and use the parser generator to generate executable code. Figure 7.1 shows
how developers interact with these DDL and the parser generation tools. Typically,
DDL users are developers.
Although some DDLs can also be used to describe programming language structures, they are relatively domain-specific and designed to capture properties in net238
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Generated Parser in
Language L
Language L

Figure 7.1: An overview of how developers interact with DDLs and their corresponding parser generation tools.
work protocols and data formats. Network protocols are often driven using an overall
protocol state machine to ensure that the correct parser is used for the expected
packet.
Similarly, network protocols also include repeat constructs or length fields. For
example, in the DNS protocol, the header specifies a question count (QDCOUNT), a
16-bit value [271]. The header is followed by QDCOUNT number of questions in the
DNS packet. Such constructs are not easily represented in formal grammars.
The tag-length-value (TLV) construct provides another similar example. In these
constructs, a tag is followed by a length l, and l number of bytes follow. Unfortunately, such TLV formats are also not representable in formal grammars (Chapter 6).
Therefore, any dedicated format used to describe network protocols must support at
least these two formats to capture binary network protocols successfully.
On the other hand, file formats use different constructs to describe data. For
example, let us consider the Portable Document Format (PDF) [216]. To parse a
PDF file, we scan the file backward from the end of the file till we encounter a %EOF
239

DDL Comparison

DDL Comparison

tag. We then locate a cross-reference table (xref table). This xref table holds the
locations of the objects present in the PDF file. The parser must then jump to each
of these offsets and parse the PDF objects present there.
Using offsets and seeking to various locations is extensively used in other file
formats such as TIFF, ZIP, and ICC (Chapter 4). Hence, the parsing library must
control the cursor and provide support for creating smaller parsing buffers. The
parser cursor needs to be moved to parse additional constructs at another offset in
the file. To this end, several DDLs were created to tackle various constructs in data
formats. Most DDLs can support the TLV format and repeat constructs. Support
for controlling cursors and seeking to offsets in the files are much rarer features in
comparison.
The primary object of using DDLs and parser generators is to reduce the parser
code developers write by hand. Using a code generator that has been extensively
tested, we ensure that common human errors can be minimized. There are two relatively popular DDLs—Kaitai Struct [295] and DFDL [181]—and several other relatively lesser-known ones, such as PADS/ML [178], SCL [225], and RecordFlux [228].
DFDL has several applications in military domains where serializing bytes from the
parsed syntax is critical. Unfortunately, the other DDLs do not offer serialization
functionality. However, developers often design their own domain-specific language
to parse a format of their interest rather than rely on general-purpose DDLs.
This chapter describes an expert elicitation study we conducted to understand
various features that must be present in usable DDLs. First, we transcribed interviews
with 15 experts who answered questions about DDLs they built or DDLs they used.
They also spoke about what features they expect to see in any usable DDL. Finally,
we propose using the list of features provided by various experts to categorize these
DDLs.
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Next, we compare various DDLs based on several factors. First, we compare them
based on the data format features they support. For example, we describe whether a
DDL can support network protocols or file formats. This comparison provides insight
into which DDLs can be used to describe complex formats.
Last, we also evaluate DDLs and their parser generator implementations using
provided image format descriptions. As shown in Figure 7.1, the generated code
parses the input based on the format descriptions provided in DDL syntax. Kaitai
Struct and DFDL provide descriptions of various image formats such as JPEG, GIF,
BMP, and PNG as a part of their format galleries. We generate code using these
descriptions as input and perform two sets of evaluations on the parser code generated.
(a) We measure the accuracy and correctness of the descriptions provided for various image formats. Then, we use a large corpus of image files to compare
the results of the DFDL- and Kaitai-generated parsers with open-source image
processing libraries available in Python.
(b) We fuzz the DFDL- and Kaitai-generated parsers for all the image formats using
AFL++ [94] and apply various static analysis tools to point out weaknesses in
code.
My contributions in this chapter are as follows:
– First, my collaborators and I conducted the first expert elicitation study to
understand the design of data description languages and parser generators. We
believe that this study can aid future data description language developers
to understand vital features in DDLs and design decisions made by previous
developers (Section 7.1).
– Next, we produce the first taxonomy and categorization of multiple DDLs based
on common DDL properties and supported features (Section 7.2).
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– Finally, we compare implementations of various DDLs and their corresponding
parser generators by conducting a case study of several image formats (Section 7.4).
Related Work. Levillain et al. [166] present a preliminary design for a platform
to compare binary parser generators. This work proposes comparing these parser
generators’ efficacy, robustness, and expressiveness. However, they do not evaluate
their technique against one of the most popular data description languages available—
DFDL. Also, this paper only focuses on the DNS protocol and does not tackle any
file formats. They measure the time taken by the parser to evaluate performance.
This chapter goes beyond the work of Levillain et al. by conducting a user study
and picking file format descriptions and network format packets to evaluate and fuzz
the DDL implementations. They use Nom and Hammer that are parser-combinator
libraries and not DDLs. We do not include these libraries in our evaluation because of
two reasons. (1) We are primarily focused on DDLs. (2) These parser-combinator libraries do not provide sufficient documentation or examples to describe file formats—
they focus primarily on network protocols.

Section 7.1

Expert Elicitation Study to Understand
Important Features1
Data formats, such as PDF, have complex structures that cannot be described easily using formal language theory. Section 2.6 and Section 5.2 provided additional
information on such complexities in data formats. Nevertheless, there are at least
two popular DDLs that programmers extensively use to describe these data formats.
Therefore, we wish to understand which DDL features affect usability.
1

For this work, I collaborated with Vijay Kothari, Ross Koppel, and Sean Smith.
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7.1.1. Objectives
This section presents a novel and first-of-its-kind expert elicitation study solely focused on getting the perspectives and thoughts of experts who create specifications,
develop new features for DDLs, or implement parsers for various protocols and file
formats. We started this study with various goals in mind.
First, we would like to gather a consensus on what features must be present
in a DDL. Creators of DDLs have made different design decisions—included some
features, excluded a few others—we gather reasons for some crucial design choices
made in these DDLs.
Second, we investigate whether there are certain features or patterns in DDLs
that make them easier or harder to use. For example, DDLs often use a generalpurpose data-encoding format such as XML or YAML to encode the format. However,
developers may not be very familiar with tools that make it easier to describe and
use XML schemas.
Finally, we want to understand what resources developers look for when they want
to start using a DDL. Participants provided insight into what resources they provide
as part of their DDLs or what resources they find helpful when trying to pick up
something new.
In the rest of this section, we describe our methodology and summarize the results
from our study.

7.1.2. Recruitment
We use the Snowball sampling technique [104, 56]. In this approach, we begin with
a small pool of participants, and each participant is asked to suggest additional participants. Typically, this technique is used to make statistical inferences about relationships in the population.
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However, we use this approach differently. We first approached five data format
and parser experts and sought their answers to our questions. At the end of our
interview, we asked them to suggest more people to interview. Each interviewee
suggested 1-3 participants who we then contacted with information about the study.
We totally contacted 35 people and 15 of them participated in our study.

Minimizing community bias
The first five participants we chose were from different industries and fields. We made
sure that they did not know each other, and if they were academically inclined, we
made sure they published in different subfields. These five participants were experts
concerning different parts of the specification writing to parser development life cycle
of data formats. They, in turn, provided contacts of participants who mainly worked
in their closed subfield. This approach ensured that we got participants for a wide
range of subfields.

Participant Demographics
Table 7.1 provides participant demographic details. Most of our participants were
software developers or researchers in the industry who worked on parsers and data
format specifications. Based on their answers to our question asking them to describe
their role relating to DDLs, we see that most of our participants have implemented
parsers for file formats. In contrast, a few have worked on standardization committees
to develop specifications and create new parsing algorithms better suited to data
formats.
Our participants also have varying education levels. For example, two-thirds of
our participants did not have a Ph.D. Our participants also demonstrated varying
levels of experiences with parsers. For example, we had users building a DDL for
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15 experts
Professional Role

Roles pertaining to DDLs

Education

Experience pertaining to parsers

Government:
1
Industry:
12
Academia:
2
Writing Specifications:
2
Writing parsers for a specific protocol/file format: 13
Developing better parsing methodologies:
4
Other:
2
Completed high school:
1
Completed College:
5
Completed Masters:
4
Completed PhD
5
30+ years:
5
25-30 years:
2
20-25 years:
2
10-15 years:
3
Less than 5 years:
3

Table 7.1: Summary of participant demographic characteristics. The rightmost column shows the number of participants who fall under that category.
their use case last year, and they had not encountered DDLs and parser combinators
prior to that. On the other end of the spectrum, we had participants who have
focused on defining specifications for file formats and network protocols and parsing
data formats for over 30 years.

7.1.3. Ethics and Anonymity
We are committed to ensuring that the benefits of this expert elicitation study outweigh the privacy risks posed to the participants. We have taken steps to ensure
the anonymity of our participants by removing any references to their employers or
projects directly. All our quotes are accounts of participants documenting their experiences interacting with or building DDLs. We altered some word choices to ensure
that unique word choices would not reveal the participant’s identity.
We believe that these experts building DDLs could use findings from our study
to improve upon their tool to provide more tools. Also, improve the usability and
accessibility of their tools by using insights from our study.
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Our meetings were recorded locally using Zoom. We transcribed our meetings and
anonymized any references they made to their employer or affiliation. We are storing
our transcripts and audio recordings to comply with GDPR. Dartmouth’s Committee
for Protection of Human Subjects (CPHS) approved our study on April 10th, 2021.
As part of CPHS’s requirements, we needed to provide participants with an information sheet with information about the study and our practices. Additionally, to
comply with GDPR, we needed to provide European participants with an additional
information sheet with compliance information. Each user was compensated for their
time using a $30 Amazon gift card.

7.1.4. Approach
Before starting our semi-structured interviews, we asked several research questions
that we wanted to explore. Parser experts have made several unique contributions
to parsing algorithms, methodologies, and data description formats. Therefore, we
designed questions to help us document their insights, design choices, and knowledge
in general.

Research Questions
RQ1: What are aspects in DDLs experts like? We asked participants to list
DDLs they have used and then talk about the aspects of these DDLs that they liked.
Most participants went beyond the list of features we had accumulated. Instead, they
described features they desired in DDLs but have not found any that matched their
requirements.
RQ2: What are aspects in DDLs experts dislike? Similarly, we asked participants to describe any DDL features that they disliked. We prompted the users to
discuss difficulties with the language and the tooling built for parser generation.
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RQ3: What learning resources do experts think are necessary? We provided participants with a list of learning resources such as tutorials, IDE integration,
descriptive errors, and Web IDE support. Then, we asked them to specify which of
these resources they find valuable and necessary. Some of these learning resources,
such as Docker containers and Web IDE support, aim to provide a simple way for
someone new to try the DDL in an accessible setup environment. Other features such
as IDE integration, error reporting, and tutorials may help users dive into specifying
formats using the DDL by easing the learning curve.

Hypotheses formed
We also created several hypotheses informed by our research questions and our experiences with DDLs and parsers. We list our hypotheses and describe each of them.

H1: Experts would like to have control over underlying parsing algorithms.
Parsing algorithms differ in the class of grammars they accept and the space and
time complexity. For example, the Packrat algorithm is designed to accept parsing
expression grammars (PEGs) and runs in O(n) time and consumes O(n) space. On
the other hand, the CYK algorithm can recognize arbitrary context-free grammars
and runs in O(n3 ) time while consuming O(n2 ) space.
Some tools, such as Hammer, allow developers to switch between these parsing algorithms. Given that different algorithms can recognize different classes of grammars,
we set the hypothesis that developers want to describe a data format and prescribe
a particular parsing algorithm to be used with it.

H2: Experts prefer dedicated data description languages over general-purpose data encoding languages such as JSON/YAML/XML. The two popular DDLs—Kaitai Struct and DFDL—both rely on general-purpose data encoding
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standards (YAML and XML, respectively). However, other languages such as Nail,
RecordFlux, and PADS/ML use dedicated syntax that a developer must learn from
scratch.
Given that describing a data format in a general-purpose data encoding standard can make the syntax verbose, we hypothesized that developers would not mind
learning new syntax to achieve their task of parsing a data format.

H3: Experts expect a “proof of termination” in DDLs. DDLs are used in
conjunction with code generation tools. Developers can then use the generated code
to parse untrusted input. Most such programs do not provide any guarantees that a
given function will terminate. However, using various formal methods tools (such as
the one we used in Chapter 6), we can argue that provided a set of preconditions are
met, we can prove that a function will terminate.
Such guarantees are pivotal to a program’s correctness. For example, any parsing
function can take several branches, and each branch can lead to various paths. A
formal “proof of termination” ensures that the function always terminates irrespective of the path taken. We hypothesize that developers require such guarantees in
generated parser code.

H4: DDLs must support module systems. Module systems allow users to build
data-format specifications compositionally. There are two major applications to a
module system. First, a specification in a DDL could get extraordinarily large if the
format is complex. Second, some complex formats, such as PDF, contain several other
embedded formats. A PDF file relies on correct implementations of image format
parsers, font parsers, Javascript parser, string encoders, and compression algorithms.
A module system would let developers import other previously defined specifications to simplify an overarching specification, such as PDF. Hence, we hypothesize
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that developers would think that a module system is critical to any DDL.

H5: Parsers must implement zero-copy parsing. Zero-copy operations help
improve the performance of any software. A zero-copy parser would not copy any
parse buffer content from its original location. Instead, it would directly operate on
the original parse buffer to provide the security guarantee—the untrusted input is
not being copied multiple times in the program’s address space. Also, it can improve
performance since copying memory is a time-consuming process [59]. We hypothesize
that zero-copy parsing is a crucial DDL feature given these two properties.

7.1.5. Qualitative Codebook
Our interviews resulted in 13 hours of audio recordings that were transcribed to 40
pages of transcripts. These transcriptions were done manually. Three of our participants said they preferred a chat-based or email-based interview. We accommodated
the requests of these participants and had them participate in our study. For the
email participants, we sent another follow-up email to clarify any confusing answers
they gave.
We used an inductive approach to analyze our data. Since our interview was
semi-structured, we extracted specific codes for each question in our interview (for
example, “XML is verbose,” “roundtripping from grammars to parsers,” and “serialization.”). As a result, our analysis of the transcripts resulted in over 50 codes across
all questions.
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7.1.6. Results of our expert elicitation study
Hypotheses
After transcribing and coding our interviews, we analyzed our data to test our hypotheses. Table 7.2 summarizes the results of our study. Of our five hypotheses, only
three were valid based on our interviews. However, the experts also provided more
profound insight into why they thought two of our hypotheses were incorrect.
Hypothesis
H1: Experts would like to have control over different underlying parsing algorithms
H2: Experts prefer dedicated DDLs over generalpurpose JSON/YAML/XML
H3: Experts expect a “proof of termination” in
DDLs
H4: DDLs must support module systems
H5: Parsers must implement zero copy parsing

Result
False
True
True
True
False

Table 7.2: Results of our hypotheses. This table shows the hypotheses that evidence
we collected support.

H1: Experts would like control over parsing algorithms (False). We found
that experts did not find this factor very important in DDLs. For example, Participant
P 1 said,
I wouldn’t necessarily think about it like that. PDF, SVG, we are switching between different parsing algorithms. But we are switching between data streams.
Our code might call out to another library and calling out things. I don’t think
worrying about which type of algorithm is that important. We do it sort of
accidentally. (P 1)

As we noted earlier, different parsing algorithms are used to recognize different
classes of grammars. By supporting different parsing algorithms, we inherently support different languages classes and assume that the syntax is at the intersection of
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these language classes. For example, as P 2 notes, a programmer may not notice how
the behavior of the underlying parsing algorithm has changed unless they run into
corner cases.
Other than to compare formats, why should you? It sounds like a nice thing
to have, but usually you just settle on one and set it forever. As long as you
can do it transparently, it is great. Packrat and CYK parse different language
classes, if you switch out then you need to make sure that you are operating on
the intersection of the two. The programmer may not realize that they switched
from ordered choice to unordered choice. As a testbed for underlying algorithms,
it is great. (P 2)

Since most developers do not have a deep understanding of the language classes
and their corresponding algorithms, it might be wise for a DDL to stick to one as
default (Hammer uses the Packrat backend as default). However, only provide other
algorithms as options for more advanced users who know what they are doing. P 4
said,
Leave other options apart and stick to one. Most developers don’t understand
the meaning of these algorithms. (P 4)

Most data formats use sequential structures that can be recognized using straightforward parsing algorithms. Moreover, for most grammars, these parsers can run in
linear time. Some experts, such as P 5, noted that they have never had to use anything
more complicated than a recursive descent backtracking parser.
For most binary formats, you can just use a recursive descent backtracking
format. You shouldn’t need anything more complicated. So I wouldn’t say this
is super important. (P 5)

H2: Experts prefer dedicated DDLs over general purpose syntax (True).
We found that this hypothesis was valid. Even though DFDL currently uses concrete
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XML syntax to describe formats, developers expressed interest in taking it towards
a concrete syntax based on a domain-specific language. In addition, the verbosity of
XML, JSON, and YAML was a common complaint among our participants. Participants P 6 and P 2 said,
I find XML schema, as annoying and verbose as it is, I am used to it now. The
future of DFDL is that it is going to be a domain-specific language. It is going
to be its own thing with its own syntax. It can really be specific towards what it
needs to be and nothing else. (P 6)
I prefer that the specifications should be in some easy to understand or slurp in
format. But what I’ve noticed in my work is that people want a concrete syntax
and an interface where people can type in a data structure which is indeed a
data description. For users you want a concrete syntax, but for underlying
representations we need some abstract syntax. (P 2)

Using general-purpose serialization formats to describe data formats give programmers two opportunities to make errors. First, errors can occur in the data-encoding
formats, such as YAML/JSON/XML. Second, errors may occur within the correctly
encoded general-purpose serialized data. For example, they may miss mandatory
keys or incorrectly nest structures. Using a dedicated language with its syntax to describe the data format means that we must build a compiler to describe this format
sufficiently. Participant P 15 explained this by saying,
I personally prefer dedicated languages. Composition is really important in
defining parsers. To me, XML and JSON aren’t really all that well situated.
Everything kind of blurs together. XML schemas have their advantages. But
most of the bugs that arose out of that were basically just because an element
that was supposed to be nested in one place got accidentally nested in another
place. That ended up producing errors later on in the pipeline. The verbosity
is not only bad with XML, but really anything in Java. (P 15)

On the other hand, a minority of experts insisted on using general serialization
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formats since they can use parsers for that format in any language to extract the
syntax. Participant P 14 said,
I prefer DDLs based on a general serialization formats, because it greatly simplifies interfacing with custom tools. I think of such grammars not as of ”grammars based on YAML”, but as of ”grammars based on other grammars”. (P 14)

H3: Experts expect a “proof of termination” in DDLs (True). Experts
believe this is a crucial feature irrespective of the language class and the corresponding parsing algorithm. If a parsing toolkit advertised this feature, developers could
assume that this property holds across multiple algorithms they can invoke using the
toolkit—and not be bothered by the fine print. As participant P 4 notes, it is important not to have a switch to disable the proof of termination, as developers may
create code without this guarantee and not realize it.
If I assume that the very secure parser always terminates, I will assume it as
a developer. You have to ensure this. Don’t give them the option to switch
termination on or off. They will create insecure parsers and forget about it.
(P 4)

Similarly, participant P 2 notes that proving termination is primarily a formal and
academic experience. However, defining termination for streaming formats—where
data is not available all at once but in chunks—is a research problem.
Yes. I can see that when it is possible it is important. It is a formal experience.
When you do stream parsing, you do not have proof of termination. But if it
is possible, it should be there. (P 2)

It is critical to have deterministic algorithms that terminate for the set of expected
input and reject the unexpected input. Participant P 5 said that their government
clients do not allow them to add any new features to their parsing toolkit that would
remove the proof of termination guarantee.
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It is certainly something important to our government customers that we can
ensure that things always terminate. Customers have also said that we cannot
make any changes that will remove the proof of termination. (P 5)

H4: DDLs must support module systems (True). Importing different DDL
specifications to construct a larger specification is an essential factor. Our hypothesis
was valid—almost all the experts agreed that module systems are vital in any DDL.
Some experts who primarily work on network formats and not file formats noted that
they have not have run into this issue.
Application-layer network protocols do not commonly embed other formats in
them. However, in some rare cases, such as using the real-time publish-subscribe protocol (RTPS, Chapter 6), you can embed other image and video formats. Embedding
other formats within a format is a much more common occurrence in file formats.
Participant P 2 said,
We haven’t needed it. But it is an issue in computer science when you scale.
You want to reuse code and not have multiple different copies of the same thing.
(P 2)

Programmers often apply the paradigm Do not Repeat Yourself (DRY) [26].
Hence, reuse and composition are important to developers. Participant P 4 who has
interacted with many developers notes,
Reuse is always important, but for DDLs it is even more important. For example, reusing UTF8 can be nice. (P 4)

H5: Parsers must implement zero-copy parsing (False). We found that
this hypothesis was not valid. Experts do not believe that zero-copy parsing is an
important factor in the generated parser code. Although when we asked this question,
we believed that the security and performance benefits of using zero-copy parsers
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would outweigh not having it. We found that most experts only associated zero-copy
parsing with its performance benefits. For example, participant P 2 said,
We should strive for zero-copy recognition. Minimal copy is desirable. Parsing
of any language class requires a stack. Is a stack copy? Can you run it in
constant space? That is a criteria that is useful I guess. (P 2)

Participant P 2 draws an interesting difference between input recognition and input
parsing. They claim that checking if the algorithm runs in constant space is a more
useful metric. Similarly, participant P 5 said,
I don’t think that is actually a requirement. The requirement is speed. This is
one way to try to achieve that speed. Some people will say this is the only way
that I can get the speed, nothing else can be fast enough. (P 5)
DFDL does not do it at all. There is a lot of copying going on. That is one of
the biggest performance issues. It is not necessarily critical. (P 6)

Parsers for context-free grammars (CYK, Earley, etc.) and parsing expression
grammars (Packrat) often rely on memoization tables to recognize input. These
memoization tables help reuse previously computed values. However, it is unclear if
zero-copy implementations of these algorithms are feasible. Participant P 15 added,
Packrat requires so much memoization that the only way to do zero-copy packrat
would be to throw pointers to the input stream everywhere. Which I think is
kind of dangerous. We found that hashing functions are far more expensive that
doing copies. (P 15)

7.1.7. Detailed results
Data Description Languages participants used. Although we were familiar
with the most commonly used DDLs and some lesser-known academic work, it was
enlightening to ask experts to list all DDLs they have used. In addition, we learned
about several other DDLs that we were not familiar with. For example, although we
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were familiar with the Flex/Bison tools used in parsing programming languages, we
were unaware that developers still used these tools to parse data formats.
Another toolkit we were unaware of as being used to recognize data formats was
Antlr. Antlr provides robust tools to generate parsers in various target languages.
Synalysis provides an interface to visualize data formats. For example, developers
specify a grammar in XML syntax and provide data files as input. The Synalysis tool
visualizes the data and dissects it into its correct fields.
I am also somehow familiar to Synalysis grammars (I have implemented a converter from them into Kaitai Struct specs). (P 14)
I’ll just add that my best/most productive experience was with ANTLR up until using Daffodil. I’ve used DFDL. And I’ve used IDL (interface description
language) a long time ago, for wire protocols. (P 3)
I would count Hammer a data description language. The BNF format of bison
and antlr are data description languages. I’ve also used PADS. (P 15)

Aspects of DDLs they liked. Experts provided accounts of their experiences
interacting with various DDLs. Participant P 1 said,
I like ones that are very concise. You don’t have to spell everything out. I guess
I come with more baggage of existing knowledge and understanding. I also like
DSLs that don’t build in platform or language specifics..... That is where XML
and DFDL fail me. Lots of tags and attributes and it is not succinct. Not really
tied to how a human would read XML. (P 1)

Another participant (P 4) states that they trust parsers that implement complex
constructs like lookaheads. Lookaheads and backtracking are needed to parse certain
classes of languages, and can be particularly hard to implement from scratch.
I always trust those that take care of special cases. I don’t want to do those
lookaheads and stuff by myself. (P 4)
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Finally, DFDL users describe that they have used DFDL to describe both text
and binary protocols and found the same ease of use while using it in either context.
For example, text-based network protocols primarily use ASCII strings to describe
protocol messages. In contrast, binary protocols may or may not be human-readable
since they focus on using binary representations to encode data.
The aspect I like most about DFDL is that it’s nearly an universal data format description language - it’s powerful enough for both text and binary data
formats. (P 3)

Aspects of DDLs they disliked. In contrast to the features experts liked, most
experts focused on three categories of DDL features they disliked. First, experts
spoke about the verbosity of some DDLs since they use XML syntax. Synalysis and
DFDL both use XML syntax. For example participant P 13 said,
I had known about DFDL a while before I discovered Kaitai Struct, but it completely overwhelmed me with its long-winded syntax with lots of keywords, attributes and namespaces, so I rejected it as unusable, compared to the brevity of
the Kaitai Struct language. I tried to read the BMP specification in the DFDL
language, but I can’t clearly see the structure like I can in a .ksy file — I’m
constantly distracted by the unnecessary ballast around. (P 13)

Second, code generation is a hard problem. DDLs often include code generation
to generate usable parsers. Since such code generators are not as thoroughly tested as
compilers, their errors may be harder to surface. Using a code generation step means
that the generated code and the original specification essentially implement the same
thing, and the code generation process is correct. To this effect, participant P 4 said,
You have two places that is the truth, not just one place. The problem is that
the generator has bugs. No one says that a compiler has bugs. You don’t really
care about compiler bugs, because they get fixed all the time. (P 4)
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Finally, some formats may not be very appropriate to be parsed using DDLs. One
common format many experts discussed was PDF. Several experts believe that it is
very difficult to capture the syntax and semantics of PDFs using DDLs, and hence,
we must not set the bar so high.
Some formats cannot really be parsed with DDLs. (P 14)

Bidirectional change propagation from DDL to programming language and
reverse. In our interview with participant P 1, they mentioned that they would like
to see a DDL supporting bidirectional change propagation. Often, the generated code
contains bugs. Fixing these bugs directly in the generated code must also lead to the
bug fixes in the DDL specification. Bidirectional programming presents a mammoth
research and engineering challenge. However, we asked subsequent participants what
they thought of this feature.
We found that DDL creators do not envision that users would be making changes
to the target code. Instead, if they spot a bug, the expectation is that the users
would fix the bug in the DDL specification and regenerate the code. Participant P 6
described this saying,
The output of our specification compilation is not human readable or human understandable in any way. Generated code is usually pretty complicated, I would
not want someone modifying that. I would be concerned that the modifications
are wrong and have security implications. Every time someone needs to make
a change, they would change the specification, and regenerate code. (P 6)

As the participant notes, the generated code is often not human readable, and
hence not an appropriate candidate to edit. Therefore, experts believe that a developer must resort to changing the target code only as a last resort. Participants P 13
and P 14 say,
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I don’t think that Kaitai users make changes to the target code too often, they
usually try to avoid it and take advantage of the automatic compiler generation.
Editing the generated code is of course a possibility when the automatic parsing
code would be limited by some missing Kaitai Struct features, but I believe it
should be the last resort. (P 13)
I guess instead the language should be designed the way eliminating the need in
such changes completely. (P 14)

As more developers interact with a DDL and use additional DDL features, we
will uncover more errors and corner cases. Although thorough testing and formal
methods tools can help uncover some of these issues, they will not eliminate them.

Serialization. Several participants discussed that serializing or unparsing data is
critical for them in DDLs. As a participant noted, although modifying the intermediate AST to redact certain information has its uses (also seen in Chapter 5.7), there
may be certain cases when serializing intermediate parsed data to raw bytes may still
be necessary.
Another thing interesting in DFDL is the unparse option. We can modify an
infoset and unparse to bytes. The inability to round-trip that data is a nonstarter for us. We get data that is untrusted coming from a foreign country.
We parse that data to an infoset. We remove the data we consider a problem
or dangerous. We then write it back to bytes. We have data generated by the
American military. We want to share this data with some allies. We want
them to know within a single latitude-longitude precision, but not exactly where
the plane is. We send the redacted data to our allies. They don’t know it has
been converted. We’ve fuzzed the data a little bit in a way that they don’t know.
Redaction is the another common use case. Another case is when we take data
from an unclassified domain to a classified domain—the only way to take the
data across the domain is through XML. We send a parsed XML across the secure channel. On the other end we unparse it back to the original byte format.
XML is an intermediary language here. (P 6)
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The ability to reuse the same spec for generating libraries for multiple programming languages, and the ability to map AST nodes to raw bytes, allowing
creation of rapid prototyping and analysis tools. (P 14)

On the other hand, a network filter that parses and serializes data can be susceptible to covert side-channel attacks where people can observe the packets before and
after the network filter to infer security rules. Additionally, attackers can observe how
long a network filter takes to change the data and serialize it to find the network’s
bandwidth.
Data can be used to exploit all kinds of security holes. The data can crash
a system, its not malware... Just causes a crash. It is still bad. A lot of
people don’t want the network security to change the data. A secure system will
canonicalize the data and remove leading zeros. Suddenly, you could have a
covert channel where people can figure out the bandwidth. (P 5)

Although the above two participants (P 5 and P 6) mention that a DDL without
a serializer is a nonstarter for their use-cases, they are also cognizant of the security
risks posed by an AST modifier tool.

Key properties. We asked participants to talk about each of the factors in Table 7.3. We covered the proof of termination, module systems, control over parsing
algorithms, and zero-copy parsing results in the hypotheses. As shown in the table,
we found that experts support code generation in many languages. Programmers look
for code generation support in the language of their choice. All experts mentioned
that it would be good to support many languages.
Although most experts mentioned that they expect the code generator to produce
memory-safe code, a minority of experts mentioned that they do not expect a code
generator to do this. The developers need to test their code to find such issues
thoroughly.
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Finally, experts do not believe DDLs need to support arbitrary regular expressions.
DDLs usually support syntax that goes beyond regular expressions. Developers need
to transform their regular expressions into something that the DDL can accept. Four
of our study participants mentioned that a subset of regular expressions could be
good to include, but the performance costs can be pretty massive.
Feature
Proof of termination
Module system
Code generation in any language
Memory safety
Arbitrary regular expressions
Switch between parsing algorithms
Zero-copy parsing

Vital
10
12
10
12
0
1
1

Good to have
0
3
5
0
4
0
3

Not important
5
0
0
3
11
14
11

Table 7.3: Summary of technical features from our study. The columns show number
of participants who said a particular feature was vital, good to have, or not important.
We prompted each participant to comment on every feature.

Asynchronous operations such as jumps and offsets. Asynchronous operations such as jumps and offsets pose a tough problem. We asked experts if they
prefer specifying these operations within their DDL or would they rather call these
operations from within a programming language. The second approach would involve specifying only portions of the data format using the DDL and relying on the
programming language to glue the offsets together. We found that of the 15 participants, two did not have an opinion on this. Additionally, two participants said they
would keep these operations in the programming language. Finally, the remaining 11
mentioned that they expect the DDL to support these definitions.
Participant P 13 mentions that the stateless principle in Kaitai Struct has been
sufficient to describe data formats thus far.
It would be nice to have, but the simple stateless concept in Kaitai Struct is
usually enough for the vast majority of purposes. There are only very specific
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cases where you would truly need synchronous operations. I also haven’t heard
of any language supporting this. (P 13)

Participant P 14 added that they do not have a strong opinion on this but mentioned that you could achieve this by modifying the Kaitai Struct runtime. The Kaitai
Struct runtimes are in programming languages of a developers’ choice. So, essentially,
this proposal is the same as relying on a programming language for these operations.
I have no opinion on that since I don’t write apps based on event loops much.
In the case of KS I guess that this can probably be achieved by customizing the
runtime. (P 14)

Participant P 15 defined jump and offset operations as a semantic operation and
not a syntax check. They mention that they prefer keeping their semantic operations
in the programming language.
This is a tough question because it is right on the boundary between syntax and
semantics. It is much better to keep it in the programming language. I would
like to say that I want to keep my semantics in the programming language.
Jumps and offsets are semantic operations. (P 15)

Feature
IDE support
Docker containers
Tutorials to build real-world formats
Web IDE/compiler
Descriptive syntax and type errors

Vital
10
0
8
0
15

Good to have
3
2
2
5
0

Not important
2
13
5
10
0

Table 7.4: Summary of our learning curve and usability factors. The columns show
number of participants who said a particular feature was vital, good to have, or not
important. We prompted each participant to comment on every feature.

Learning curve and usability. We formed a list of usability features informed
by existing DDLs we came across. Then, we asked participants to speak about what
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they think of each of these features. Table 7.4 summarizes the participant responses
for various usability factors we put forth.
Most participants rated IDE support as either “good to have” or “vital.” The
two participants who said this was not important mentioned that there are commercial tools and IDE tools available to write better XML and YAML. For example,
participant P 3 said,
You can buy commercial off the shelf tools to make writing XML Schemas easier
for DFDL. (P 3)

Docker containers. Docker containers provide an easy interface for new users
to try a DDL and explore its features. Most of our participants agree that Docker
containers are not very important in DDLs. It is more important to have an easy build
system and ensuring that the software can compile easily on most systems without
much difficulty.
Tutorials. Our participants differentiate strongly between tutorials, reference
manuals, and examples of real-world formats. We found that although most participants mention that these tutorials are important, they also believe that the other
resources are vital.
Most participants believe that all three of the above resources are important from
an onboarding point of view. In contrast, some participants believed that tutorials
are not very important if you had a comprehensive reference manual and real-world
examples. For example, participant P 4 said,
Just show developers some example code, and include a proper documentation
for all the standard libraries. You don’t need to write tutorials. (P 4)

Web IDE/compiler. We found that most participants did not think a Web
IDE was useful. However, some users said that it could be handy from an onboarding
perspective when some people want to try the DDL out without installing it.
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Descriptive errors. All our participants overwhelmingly supported this category. For example, participant P 13 said,
It is inevitable that users make errors in the language, and it’s great when the
compiler can be a bit smart and assist at least in the most common cases of
mistakes - try to guess how the error happened, provide a clear human-readable
error message and even suggest a fix if it’s possible. (P 13)

Descriptive errors are the backbone of any compiler. The user would have no idea
how to fix an error if the error is not descriptive and does not accurately pinpoint
where the parser syntax error occurred. However, the compiler only catches errors
in the DDL syntax themselves. Therefore, another category of errors to tackle is the
syntax and semantic errors in the data input. Parser libraries must support runtime
debugging tools that can help identify root causes of errors in data concerning the
DDL specifications.
Interesting errors introduced in parsers. We asked users to talk about some
parser bugs they or their colleagues introduced while interacting with a DDL. The
most exciting bugs fall into two categories. First, how thorough should a parser for
data formats be?
The very first DFDL schema someone wrote for the JPEG format, they didn’t
really look inside the bytes of the segments. That is when we learned our lesson
that not only do you have to accept what the specification accepts, but more
importantly you have to reject what the specification rejects too. (P 5)

These DDL-generated parsers need to implement a format specification as closely
as possible. In addition, a parser must accept well-formed input and, more importantly, reject malformed input that can cause various security issues.
Although various DDLs rely on generic data-encoding standards and use their (of
the data-encoding standard) parsing libraries to parse specifications, these standards
often follow rules that may not be very obvious to a new user.
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Usual problems on Kaitai Struct are with not understanding YAML - people do
not often realize that YAML doesn’t allow duplicate map keys, or that they have
to wrap a string value containing a colon “:” into the quotation marks. (P 13)

Using generic standards saves development time for the creators of the DDL.
Likewise, it also makes things more accessible for people already well-versed with
standards. However, for users unfamiliar with the rules of the data-encoding standard
and the DDL, the learning curve is much harder.
Other interesting features. Finally, we asked participants if they could think of
any other DDL feature that would make them want to try something new. Multiple participants mentioned that a comprehensive format library with many alreadydefined formats would be a feature. If developers are already familiar with a particular
data format and its specification is already available as a part of a DDL, they would
be able to incorporate the generated parser into their codebase a lot more easily.
Also, developers can familiarize themselves with the syntax more quickly if they see
formats they recognize.
If they could find schemas already written for their data formats, they would
want to try a new DDL. (P 3)
A large standard library with a bunch of format implementations and protocol
message implementations would be really good for someone to get started. (P 15)

Moreover, DDLs solve a very niche problem. Most programmers attempt parsing
data formats without using any parsing tools—either relying on regular expression
libraries or by parsing the format manually. Both these approaches have their drawbacks. Regular expression libraries are often overused and misused. It can be hard
to implement all the constraint checks correctly and recognize the full syntax.
I was unaware of DDLs until a year ago. You need to have access and motive.
When the problem comes along you look for DDLs. (P 2)
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Parsing algorithms that memoize previous results consume space that is in the
order of the input size. For example, the Packrat algorithm consumes O(n) space.
Let us consider a situation where this input of size n is in the order of gigabytes
or terabytes. The parsing algorithm, in turn, would consume as much memory to
memoize prior results. This nature of parsing algorithms presents a research challenge.
We must support streaming formats, where the entire data is not available when the
parser is called, but the parsing must be completed chunk by chunk.
I was playing with the idea of adding support for buffered/asynchronous reads.
For example, to allow reading large files (like 4 GiB) over the HTTP protocol
with range requests, transferring only the data that need to be....This feature
alone would probably make me to want to try a DDL. (P 13)
A killer feature would be that a DDL is integrated into a major programming
language. For example, I use Java a lot. Whatever DDL is integrated in Java,
is the best for me. When developers choose a framework, they see what the
programming language can give them. Then they scan the first page of the
Google search. (P 4)

7.1.8. Discussion
Since we interviewed a diverse set of experts with varying background and expertise,
we received results from our study that was also rich and diverse. We started with
five hypotheses and three research questions for this expert study. Unfortunately,
only three of our hypotheses were verifiable from input from our experts.

Emerging Trends. Although there were some outliers in our study results, we see
that several exciting trends emerge that open up avenues for compelling research.
First, switching between parsing algorithms is not considered an essential feature by
our experts. We found two lines of reasoning for this when we probed our experts
further. (1) Experts would like to consider parsers the same way cryptographic al266
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gorithms are considered. “Just the way we do not roll out our own crypto today, we
must not roll our own parsers.”
Hence, we must not place the burden of understanding the algorithms on the
developer and instead set good, fast, and reliable defaults. (2) Some experts do not
see why this is useful. Differentiating parsing algorithms are more valuable to parse
programming languages and natural languages. Our experts hypothesize that simple
recursive descent algorithms should suffice for data formats.
Although memory safety stands out as an essential property on its face, this
concern can be alleviated easily using memory-safe programming languages. Code
generation is another property that is worth discussing. Most experts believe a DDL
must support code generation in as many programming languages as possible. However, this presents a challenge. Developers usually only write code generators for the
languages they would use. Supporting a large set of popular programming languages
presents a mammoth engineering challenge.

Section 7.2

Categorization of DDLs based on Features
Before starting our study, we considered the DDLs of interest to be DFDL, RecordFlux [228], and Kaitai. To the best of our knowledge, these are the DDLs actively
used in the industry. In our study, participants pointed us to Parsley, DaeDaLus,
EverParse, ANTLR, PADS/ML, and Synalysis and told us they use these tools to
parse data formats. We subsequently added these also to our list of DDLs.
We will now compare these 9 DDLs (DFDL, DaeDaLus [111], EverParse [226],
Parsley [198], RecordFlux [228], Kaitai Struct, ANTLR, PADS/ML [178], and Synalysis) across all of the features extracted from our study. The features are separated
broadly across advanced user features and learning resources.
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Table 7.5 summarizes the status of these 9 DDLs we study. Only EverParse and
RecordFlux include a verifier and produce code with property guarantees. Synalysis
and PADS/ML are open-source projects that are not maintained as of May 3rd, 2022.
Languages
DFDL
RecordFlux
Kaitai Struct
Synalysis
EverParse
ANTLR
Parsley
PADS/ML
DaeDaLus

Verifier
7
3
7
7
3
7
7
7
7

Active
3
3
3
7
3
3
3
7
3

Table 7.5: Data Description Languages: which ones include verifiers of some sort,
and which ones are actively maintained.
Languages
DFDL
RecordFlux
Kaitai Struct
Synalysis
EverParse
ANTLR
Parsley
PADS/ML
DaeDaLus

Formats Supported
File Formats, Network protocols
Network protocols
File Formats, Network protocols
File Formats
Network protocols
Programming languages
File Formats, Network protocols
Serialized Data (such as CSV)
File Formats, Network protocols

Table 7.6: Data Description Languages and the types of formats they support

7.2.1. Code Generators
DDLs traditionally include code generators (as shown in Figure 7.1 earlier). The generated parsers can be incorporated into an existing application in the target programming language. Hence, we studied the code generators and the languages supported
by each parser generator of interest. Not every DDL had a corresponding code generator, but several DDLs supported code generators in multiple languages. Table 7.7
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DFDL
RecordFlux
Kaitai Struct
Synalysis
EverParse
ANTLR
Parsley
PADS/ML
DaeDaLus
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Languages Supported
C, Java
SPARK
C++, Python, JavaScript, Java, Go, C#, Ruby
- (only visualization)
C, F*
C++, Java
- (only interpreter)
OCaml, C
C++, Haskell

Table 7.7: Code generators that ship with DDLs and the languages they support
summarizes our findings.
Although DFDL supports C and Java, the runtime2 implementation of DFDL
only implements a small subset of the entire language. In addition, we found that
none of the image format descriptions available for DFDL complied with the runtime2 syntax for DFDL. Hence, although a C++ code generator is available, it is not
fully functional. Kaitai supports the broadest range of code generators and format
descriptions. The code generated by the Kaitai compiler is easy to use and can be
incorporated into existing applications without much difficulty.
Parsley supports an interpreter model—where you can provide data and an input format description. The interpreter then parses the data based on the format
description. The parsed data is available for an application to use in the form of a
data structure.
Unlike Parsley and other DDLs, Synalysis uses only a graphic interface to provide
the output of parsed data on a particular grammar. This GUI is helpful to visualize
the fields present in data. It can also point out data malformations using error
messages showing data failed to render. However, without any code generated and
command-line output, the Synalysis tools are harder to incorporate into existing
applications.
The PADS/ML project has been inactive for the last 11 years—the compiler and
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language have not been altered. The PADS/ML project includes code generators for
two languages.

7.2.2. Properties Proven
As we saw in Table 7.5, only two of the DDLs we studied included a verification
component. In this section, we study the properties these verification tools prove.
RecordFlux RecordFlux provides an Ada-like syntax to describe message format
specifications. The RecordFlux syntax primarily focuses on network formats. They
use the rflx tool to generate SPARK [2] code with invariants that ensure strong
properties such as lack of runtime errors [227]. They verify the following invariants
using the rflx tool.
– Field conditions must be mutually exclusive and not contradict each other
– No field condition must be statically false, and every field must be reachable on
some path
– The size of each field must be non-negative
– All bits in the message must be accounted for in the message description on all
paths.
EverParse EverParse is a toolkit comprising a set of parser combinators written
in Low* and a formalization of these parser combinators in F*. The Low* compiler,
Kremlin, generates C code that is verified not to contain common bugs such as useafter-free, buffer overruns, and integer overflows. Additionally, the formalization in
F* proves properties such as the parser and the serializer are inverse functions. Lowlevel protocol developers can implement parsers and serializers using EverParse by
interfacing with the verified C code generated.
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Most recently, in EverParse3D, the authors of EverParse have presented an extension of the original work while adding more combinators and applying it to the
Hyper V virtualization framework in the Windows environment [267].

7.2.3. Grammar Syntax
We found a diverse set of grammar syntax as seen in Table 7.8. Most DDLs have
designed their own syntax, not relying on traditional data storage formats such as
JSON, XML, or YAML. However, the more popular DDLs, DFDL and Kaitai, use
XML and YAML to store their grammars. EverParse uses grammars in BNF form
that are defined in RFC documents. Synalysis uses XML as well but allows users
to define functions in Python inside the definition files. Parsley and ANTLR adopt
formal grammar-like notations to describe formats. Whereas DaeDaLus, PADS/ML,
and RecordFlux have adopted an approach to specifying the fields in the format
sequentially, rather than going for a syntax that looks like formal grammars.
Languages
DFDL
RecordFlux
Kaitai Struct
Synalysis
EverParse
ANTLR
Parsley
PADS/ML
DaeDaLus

Syntax Format
XML/XSD
Dedicated
YAML
XML
RFC Packet Descriptions
Dedicated
Dedicated
Dedicated
Dedicated

Table 7.8: Syntax used by DDLs
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Section 7.3

Categorization based on Expert Study properties
In our expert elicitation study, we discussed several features of DDLs and the tools
associated with them. Experts generally had an overwhelming opinion about specific
properties, such as proof of termination and module systems. Similarly, experts also
thought that good error reporting and IDE support are crucial for DDL usability.
This section categorizes DDLs and their associated tools based on whether they
offer the features we discussed with experts. Unlike the previous section, where we
discussed what languages and formats these DDLs support, we emphasize the expert
features in this section. We discuss whether a DDL provides a particular capability
or not. We separated our features into two categories: DDL features and usability
features.
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7.3.1. DDL Features

Languages

1

Proof of

Module

Code

Memory

Zero-Copy

Regular

Serialization

Termination

System

Generation

Safety

Parsing

Expressions

DFDL

7

3

3

7

7

3

3

RecordFlux

7

3

3

?

7

7

7

Kaitai Struct

7

3

3

7

7

7

7

Synalysis

7

7

7

?

7

7

7

EverParse

3

7

3

3

3

7

3

ANTLR

7

3

3

7

7

31

7

Parsley

7

3

7

?

7

3

7

PADS/ML

7

3

3

7

7

7

7

DaeDaLus

7

3

3

7

7

7

7

Some regular expressions are supported in the Lexer.
Table 7.9: Comparison of DDLs based on Expert Study Features

Table 7.9 presents the results of our categorization. We discuss each of these features
in detail.

Proof of termination Although most developers want to empirically ensure that
their program terminates for all input, only one implementation—EverParse—was
verified to guarantee this property. RecordFlux is another implementation that was
verified to ensure other properties, but termination is not guaranteed.

Module System Any DDL that needs to be able to capture complex formats such
as PDFs must be able to support a module system. The PDF format uses numerous
embedded formats that can be imported using the module system syntax of the DDL.
DaeDaLus uses the import keyword to include other descriptions in the current format. In Kaitai, the imports tag under the meta field specifies a list of subformats to
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import. Parsley uses the keyword use to include other specifications. RecordFlux uses
the keyword with to include other specifications. DFDL also supports importing modules using an XML syntax: <xs:import schemaLocation="imported type.dfdl.
xsd"/>. Most interestingly, the PADS/ML language follows a “types as modules”
paradigm. They rely on the OCaml module system by generating an OCaml file for
each data description file. ANTLR also uses the import keyword to include nonterminals from a file.

Code generation DDLs often have adjacent tools that can be used to generate code
in various target languages. Earlier, Table 7.7 discussed the languages supported by
each code generation tool. Of the DDLs under consideration, DFDL includes a C
code generator for a subset of the language and an interpreter written in Scala for the
entire language. Parsley, in its current stage, only supports an interpreter. Similarly,
DaeDaLus includes a Haskell-based interpreter and a C++ code generator. The
other DDLs, RecordFlux, Kaitai Struct, EverParse, ANTLR, and PADS/ML focus
on generating code in some target language. A complete list of languages supported
by each DDL is in Table 7.7.

Memory Safety Memory unsafe languages such as C, C++, and assembly allow
out-of-bounds reads and writes. The Low* compiler guarantees that the C code it
generates is memory safe. EverParse exploits this feature in Low* to ensure that the
parser code generated is memory safe. Unfortunately, other applications using C or
C++ do not provide this guarantee. We use the “?” symbol to denote that either no
code is generated or the generated code is in a memory safe language.

Zero Copy Parsing Zero-copy parsing is recognizing an input without making any
copies of it. However, most parsing algorithms that are commonly used keep track of
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a scaffold table and make copies of either input or metadata. Therefore, a zero-copy
parser needs to be efficient in keeping track of the data locations and would need
to use pointers extensively. Only one DDL implementation claims to use zero-copy
parsing to achieve better security and superior performance. Previously, in Table 7.3,
we had identified that experts did not think that the zero-copy parsing property was
vital to a DDL.

Regular Expressions We explored the reference manual for each of the DDLs
under consideration. We studied whether there is direct support to describe regular
expressions using the particular DDL. The reference manual will usually contain an
entry or at least references to regular expressions if these are supported. DFDL allows
the use of regular expressions using a special XML tag. ANTLR supports the use
of some regular expressions in the Lexer. Parsley supports some restricted regular
expressions to aid developers. Supporting arbitrary regular expressions presents the
risk of a developer trying to do “.∗ ” leading to the entire remaining input buffer to
be matched to the regular expression.

Serialization Serialization is the process of generating binary output from the
parsed data structure. Traversing the parsed structure should produce the original input format again. We may need to modify the parsed structure to redact data
or change the syntax in some cases. For example, if this redaction happens in a network filter, we may need to generate binary input from the parsed data. EverParse
includes such functionality. In fact, in EverParse, the authors include proof that the
parsers and serializers are inverses of each other with no transformations. DFDL also
includes an “unparsing” functionality, where we convert the parsed infoset back to
data.
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7.3.2. Usability Properties
People learning new DDLs may require plenty of resources to get started and familiarize themselves with describing formats in these DDLs. In our expert study, we
had asked experts to talk about which resources helped them and why. Furthermore,
what resources do they make sure to include in DDLs where they have contributed.
Table 7.10 summarizes our survey of DDLs and the resources currently available with
each of them.

Languages

IDE support

Docker containers

Tutorials

Web IDE

Descriptive Errors

DFDL

31

7

3

7

3

RecordFlux

3

7

33

7

3

Kaitai Struct

72

3

3

3

3

Synalysis

7

7

7

3

7

EverParse

7

7

7

7

3

ANTLR

3

7

3

7

3

Parsley

3

7

3

7

3

PADS/ML

7

7

7

7

3

DaeDaLus

3

3

33

7

3

1

IDEs are easily available for XML syntax.

2

IDEs are easily available for YAML syntax.

3

DaeDaLus and RecordFlux include comprehensive reference manuals and usage

guides, but not tutorials.
Table 7.10: Comparison of DDLs based on Usability Features
IDE support We surveyed the website of each of these parsing tools and searched
for a language server implementation, an IDE plugin, or an extension to an existing
IDE. Parsley, DaeDaLus, and RecordFlux include a Language Server implementation
that makes it easy to build plugins for various IDEs. ANTLR provides an IntelliJ
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plugin to aid with developing grammars in the Java API. DFDL provides a VSCode
IDE plugin. In addition, since DFDL relies on core XML/XSD syntax, we could use
IDEs and IDE plugins designed for XML development.

Docker containers Docker containers make it easy for people starting work on a
new DDL to try things out without bothering with the installation. Often, developers
try things out on the Docker container available to familiarize themselves with the
environment and ensure the tool is appropriate for their requirements. We reviewed
the source code repositories and websites of DDLs to check if they provide Docker
containers to help developers try the DDL. Upon review, we found that only Kaitai
Struct and DaeDaLus included Docker containers. In addition, the Kaitai Struct
Docker image has not been updated in over three years, whereas DaeDaLus provides
simple scripts for us to build the Docker images.

Tutorials and Reference Manuals Tutorials, reference manuals, and examples
are great stepping stones for any new developer. A good manual for the standard
libraries allows any developer to understand the true extent of the DDL and all the
features it supports. Tutorials, where you can build gradually more difficult formats,
are another useful way to allow people to explore the features of a DDL. Finally, an
extensive gallery of example formats where many language features are exercised also
allows developers to find use cases for various features.
Different DDLs support a different set of these features. Most implementations
include a reference manual for the standard library and language features. In particular, DFDL, Kaitai, Parsley, and ANTLR include comprehensive, progressive tutorials
for real-world examples. In addition, DFDL and Kaitai contain the most extensive
format galleries supporting a wide range of file formats and network protocols.
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Web IDE Web IDEs, just like Docker containers, provide an easy way to try out
features of a language. These IDEs also provide syntax highlighting and error detection. Web IDEs also help visualize data files based on a grammar file, which can
help debug malformed input and inadequate grammars. Synalysis and Kaitai Struct
provide Web IDEs and a visualization component. When given a grammar and a
data file, these tools can visualize the data file and separate it into the correct fields.
Descriptive Errors Since error descriptions are subjective, we marked this field as
valid if the compiler or code generation toolkit provided syntax errors or type errors
that would aid in debugging the error. A comprehensive user study would be needed
to understand genuinely how usable these parser generation tools are. Since Synalysis
does not have an offline compiler, only a visualization tool, it does not provide any
information on syntax errors in the grammar descriptions. We found that all other
tools provide some error description.

7.3.3. Discussion
This section categorized DDLs based on properties we considered in the expert elicitation study.

DDL Features
In our study, experts concurred that proof of termination, module system, and code
generation are essential features that a DDL must include. Additionally, regular
expression and serialization support are features that would be good to have in a DDL.
However, when we studied the popular DDLs, we found that proof of termination is
not provided in most popular DDLs today. Most DDLs support module systems and
code generation, but not all. Support for regular expression and serialization is still
very limited.
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Our study highlights that to increase adoption in the parsers and file formats
communities, researchers must focus their efforts on providing these functionalities in
DDLs. In addition, serialization is a critical feature for those filtering and redacting
packets in network middleboxes.

Usability Features
In addition to the core features of DDLs, usability features determine what resources
are available to make it easier to learn a new DDL or try its features. We found
that the results of our categorization lined up very well with the results of the expert
study in Table 7.4. Most popular DDLs included some IDE support, tutorials, and
descriptive errors.
Some of the IDEs also included web compilers and support for Docker containers.
However, more DDLS must provide tutorials, comprehensive reference manuals, and
a library of data formats. We believe that IDE support and a collection of formats
would propel the adoption of these DDLs.

Section 7.4

Case Studies and Evaluation on Image Formats2
Of the DDLs we’ve considered so far, we looked through the format galleries of these
DDLs to find formats they all support. Unfortunately, we did not see much of an
overlap. Kaitai, DFDL, and Synalysis provide descriptions for several image formats
commonly used.
First, we analyzed these specifications to compare the lines of code. Table 7.11
shows the lines of code for each image format in the three DDLs we consider. Next,
we built a corpus of images across these formats from CommonCrawl and evaluated
2

I collaborated with Kris Udomwongsa for this section of the thesis.
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these DDL implementations.
Parser
DFDL
Kaitai
Synalysis

JPEG
836
221
3153

PNG
730
428
386

GIF
398
203
1086

BMP
601
590
-

Table 7.11: Comparing image format descriptions in various DDLs lines of code

7.4.1. Constructing the dataset
To evaluate the image specifications in various DDLs, we first set out to extract
sufficient image files. The GovDocs1 corpus released by Digital Corpora [78] contains
109,282 JPEG files. Unfortunately, this dataset does not contain other image formats
at all. Hence, we had to seek other sources for image files.
We built scripts to extract images from the Common Crawl dataset [48]. This
dataset is organized in the form of web crawling results based on individual months.
To gather images for our study, we must extract all the data (stored as WET
files) for each month and then look through the HTTP MIME headers to find
the images. Additionally, the dataset also contains numerous duplicates. Therefore, we build an SQLite database with SHA256 hashes to ensure that we can find
unique pictures. Our scripts are available with instructions at https://github.com/
Dartmouth-Trustlab/commoncrawl-images.
These WET files are databases containing URLs. After analyzing all the WET
files from one month’s captures, we gathered unique, reachable URLs corresponding
to each file of our file types of interest. Table 7.12 shows the number of images we
were able to gather from one month of common crawl data.
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PNG
GIF
BMP
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Unique Images
78591
50260
974
211

Table 7.12: Number of files captured from one month of Common Crawl data and
GovDocs. We used the GovDocs corpora for JPEG images, and the CommonCrawl
dataset for other formats.
DDL
Kaitai Struct
DFDL

Source
https://formats.kaitai.io/
https://github.com/DFDLSchemas/

Table 7.13: DDLs and the source of the image format descriptions for JPEG, PNG,
GIF, and BMP.

7.4.2. Evaluation
To look for parser differentials between the DFDL and Kaitai implementations of
various formats, we first identified descriptions of image formats in these languages
that are available as a part of the official projects. The sources of these descriptions
are listed in Table 7.13.
Next, we created a testbench in Python to run each file through Pillow, Apache
Daffodil, and Kaitai with the corresponding descriptions. Pillow is an image library
in Python that can detect the image format using an internal parser. We use Pillow
as ground truth to detect differentials.

7.4.3. Case Study Results
We investigated the mismatches we found between Pillow (served as our ground
truth), DFDL, and Kaitai. These mismatches were an indication that the specification did not implement all the cases required to comply with the format rules.
After documenting these errors, we investigated the source of these mismatches and
proposed fixes to format descriptions to improve compliance. Table 7.14 displays the
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File Format
JPEG
PNG
GIF
BMP

¬Vkaitai ∧¬ VDF DL
100
1336
87
19

Vkaitai ∧¬ VDF DL
3212
1844
10
0

DDL Comparison

¬Vkaitai ∧ VDF DL
66
8
0
0

Total Files
78591
50260
974
211

Table 7.14: Examination of differences in output from DFDL and Kaitai image format
specifications
results of our case study evaluation.
Definition 7.1. We define VDF DL (x, f ormat) to be >, if according to the DFDL
specification for the f ormat, file x is valid. For simplicity, we will shorten this notation
to say VDF DL , without the arguments to the predicate functions explicitly stated.
Similarly, we define extensions for Vpillow and Vkaitai .
Table 7.14 demonstrates the results of our case study. Our JPEG evaluation
was the most comprehensive one given the abundance of data available. The Kaitai
implementation of JPEG failed in several instances where the Pillow implementation
did not throw errors. A deeper examination of these errors led to a major fix to the
Kaitai JPEG specification. Similarly, we also examined the errors exposed by DFDL
and the issues in the specification.

7.4.4. Fixes to descriptions in Kaitai
JPEG JFIF/JFXX not implemented in Kaitai Upon closely examining the
JPEG specification evaluations, we found that the Kaitai Struct implementation does
not handle the JFIF/JFXX fragments correctly. First, the Kaitai specification does
not check any of the magic strings. These fragments start with the magic string
JFIF\x00 to denote a JFIF segment.
JPEG APP0 segments can also contain an optional JFXX fragment.3 Making
these changes to the Kaitai Struct specifications to make it more accurate presented
3

https://www.w3.org/Graphics/JPEG/jfif3.pdf
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segment_app0:
seq:
- id: magic
type: str
encoding: ASCII
size: 5
(a)

DDL Comparison

segment_app0:
seq:
- id: magic
type: str
encoding: ASCII
size: 4
- id: extra_null
contents: [00]
- id: body
type:
switch-on: magic
cases:
'"JFXX"': segment_app0_ext
'"JFIF"': app0_jpeg_format
(b)

Code Snippet 16: (a) The original Kaitai Struct JPEG code, (b) Modified Kaitai
Struct JPEG code
challenges. First, the Kaitai struct syntax does not allow for a mix in the cases of
hex and ASCII text. Therefore, we had to create a workaround to handle the ASCII
and the hex characters separately.
Next, Kaitai Struct syntax does not allow for a single optional nonterminal. So,
for example, in the BNF notation, it would follow the following syntax.
APP0 → JFIF ( JFXX ) ?
The above syntax implies that the JFXX nonterminal is optional, and may not
need to be matched. However, the Kaitai Struct syntax does not allow for such
an option. We created workarounds to handle the above two issues by treating the
construct as the following:
APP0 → JFIF | JFXX
Code Snippet 7.4.4 demonstrates our additions to the Kaitai JFIF additions. First,
we add a switch case to check for the magic string. Next, we add a test for the null
character. And finally, unlike the original Kaitai specification, we handle the JFXX
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extension and the JFIF APP0 objects separately. Our parser correctly parsed the
JPEG files that followed this syntax. We will submit our Kaitai Struct descriptions
to the Kaitai community for review soon.

Shortcomings of the DFDL JPEG schema The authors of the JPEG schema
for DFDL acknowledge that their parser is over permissive and accepts files that may
not be JPEG.4 They explain that they do not validate the data inside the JPEG
tags, instead only focusing on the different types of packets available. We found the
following error frequently occurred while invoking the JPEG parser on valid JPEG
files (marked valid by Pillow and Kaitai Struct).
[error] Parse Error: Assertion failed: Does not end with an EOI segment.
Schema context: sequence[2] Location line 63 column 18 in file jpeg.dfdl.xsd
Data location was preceding byte 57278

Upon further investigation, we identified that the length field in the JPEG segments is not sufficiently implemented. Other than the start and end of image segments, each JPEG segment includes a length field specifying where the packet ends.
In addition, the scanning function incorrectly identifies this location as the end of the
buffer. With the features currently available in DFDL, it would be a monumental
task to implement the correct specification in DFDL. Hence, we leave this exercise to
future work when hopefully, the DFDL creators adopt a more expressive language or
provide additional functionalities.

The need for parser debuggers
Debugging the JPEG errors and finding the causes these tools reject a particular
JPEG file presented significant challenges. Unfortunately, these tools do not include
4

https://github.com/DFDLSchemas/JPEG/issues/2
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good debugging tools. Using traditional debugging tools such as GDB does not
provide an easy interface to debug parser errors and the values in parsing tables.
Our experience of using these tools motivated us to build the ParseSmith debugger
in Chapter 6.3. It provides a more straightforward interface to interact with a parser
and provides ways to inspect the parser’s internal data structures to understand errors
faster. We believe that these commercial tools would benefit from providing such a
debugger. In fact, it would be good to have a single set of debugging operations and
options that all parser tools follow to provide a unified interface across tools.

Discussion
Specifications written in various DDLs must be evaluated thoroughly using an extensive dataset of valid data to ensure that all the features commonly used in a message
or network format are handled correctly. Our experience in evaluating these specifications on image formats has revealed that these specifications are made available
but not thoroughly evaluated. Several constraints were left unevaluated, and several
features were not handled correctly—leading to several parser differentials.
We believe our evaluation framework provides an extensible framework to evaluate
future specifications to find differentials. We hope the community of DDL users use
our framework to evaluate their tools and compare their specifications against other
implementations of the same protocol or data format.

7.4.5. Fuzzing
Fuzzing or fuzz testing is an approach to ensure software resiliency to crashes and
semantic issues [168]. The method uses randomly generated input that may be known
to be invalid to stress different paths in an application. Fuzzing has been extremely
effective in finding bugs in various software because it exercises boundary and corner
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cases in applications to find crashes, memory leaks, and infinite loops.
The term fuzzing was coined in 1988 by Barton Miller in a class project where
they exercised many Unix utilities with random character streams in the commandline arguments [185]. Subsequently, AFL and AFL++ have become the go-to fuzzing
tools for C and C++ applications and have found numerous popular vulnerabilities,
such as Shellshock and in Firefox.
Most recently, Google and Microsoft provided fuzzing-as-a-service to fuzz opensource software using libfuzzer and AFL++ continuously [244]. AFL++ operates
in a black-box or grey-box mode by either randomly mutating input or tracking the
program’s control flow based on instrumentation [94]. Libfuzzer also instruments code
to mutate input to gain more code coverage [243].
Symbolic execution approaches, in contrast, analyze the program to understand
what input would execute branches in the program [219, 167]. Instead of real input,
the program is supplied symbolic input, and a program tracks the changes to this
symbolic input. Using these symbolic expressions, we can define what inputs need
to be used to arrive at a particular branch in the code. Symbolic execution engines
require access to source code and code changes. Additionally, they require enormous
memory since it leads to state-space explosions.
Hence, in our evaluation, we used fuzzing approaches to ensure the resilience of
the generated code. We used the AFL++ fuzzer against the C code generated from
DFDL (Apache Daffodil), DaeDaLus, and Kaitai Struct. In addition, we ran PythonAFL against the Python code of RecordFlux. Unfortunately, the fuzzers for other
programming language targets are not well maintained, and hence, we could not fuzz
them. Table 7.15 discusses the fuzzing tools and static analysis tools we deployed
against generated code for various DDLs.

286

7.4 Case Studies and Evaluation on Image Formats
Languages
DFDL
RecordFlux
Kaitai Struct
DaeDaLus

Fuzzing tools
AFLPlusPlus
Python-AFL
AFLPlusPlus, Python-AFL
AFLPlusPlus

DDL Comparison

Static analysis
Infer, CppCheck, FlawFinder
Bandit
Infer, CppCheck, FlawFinder, Bandit
Infer, CppCheck, FlawFinder

Table 7.15: Fuzzing tools used against code generated from these DDLs
AFLPlusPlus We ran AFLPlusPlus against the C source code generated from
DFDL and Kaitai’s various image formats. After running for 24 hours AFLPlusPlus
did not find any vulnerabilities in either implementation.

Python-AFL Python-AFL uses AFL++ under the hood to fuzz Python applications. We must import the AFL library and call an init function. Subsequently, we
invoke the py-afl-fuzz binary on the Python code. Unlike AFL++, the Python
code does not have to be explicitly instrumented to run with Python-AFL. Although
we were able to run Python-AFL against RecordFlux source code, the generated code
uses the SPARK programming language, that we were not able to fuzz.
Python-AFL is designed to tweak input to find paths to exceptions within the
source code—since, in Python, we cannot reach memory safety violations. However,
when we ran Python-AFL against Kaitai-generated code and RecordFlux, we found
numerous crashes since every path to an exception is marked as a crash. To ensure
that we find true crashes, we need to define a list of paths to exceptions that are valid
and the exceptions that we must not reach because they expose issues in the core
parser libraries.

7.4.6. Static Analysis
Programs may contain bugs. A compiler may uncover syntactic and semantic bugs,
but more complex bugs that are syntactically valid but can produce runtime errors
in some cases are harder to identify. Static analysis tools can automatically reason
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about the runtime properties of code without actually executing it. Instead, they traditionally build a call graph or an AST and reason about conditions the programmer
may not have envisioned. Of course, no static analysis tool is perfect, and hence we
deploy a host of these static analysis tools against code generation tools to identify
errors. Table 7.15 summarizes the static analysis tools we use to evaluate code generated using DDLs. We will first discuss these tools and then look at the results of
running these tools on generated code.
Infer Infer is a static analyzer for Java, C, and C++ applications written in
OCaml [51]. Infer effectively identifies commonly occurring problems such as nullpointer dereferences, memory leaks, and sources of potential buffer overflows. Hence,
Infer provides a way to statically analyze programs to find sources of input-handling
vulnerabilities.
We statically analyzed code produced using DDLs where C, C++, and Java were
involved. Hence, we were not able to target all the languages proposed. DFDL’s
runtime1 uses sbl to build the JVM based Scala code—and this command is not
supported by the infer toolkit. Instead, we analyze the C code generated using Apache
Daffodil’s runtime2.
infer -- make
We need to make sure that all the library dependencies needed by the make
command are satisfied. We used the Infer docker container to run our experiments.
FlawFinder FlawFinder is a simple static analysis tool that checks for library functions that can lead to input-handling vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and string
formatting attacks [283]. FlawFinder recursively checks all the C and C++ files in a
folder to find these security issues. We invoke FlawFinder using the following command:
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flawfinder /path/to/code
CppCheck This is a static analysis tool that is focused on finding undefined behavior caused by various pointer operations [179]. The premium (paid) version can
detect infinite loops as well. Cppcheck internally implements unsound flow-sensitive
analysis, where the data flow is bidirectional. Like other static analysis tools, it can
find null pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds checks, integer overflows, and divisionby-zero errors. We invoke CppCheck using the following command:
cppcheck --force /path/to/code
Bandit The Bandit tool is designed to analyze Python code for security issues [223].
Bandit builds ASTs for each Python file in the directory and scans them for common security issues. These security issues include weak cryptographic algorithms,
antipatterns, dangerous functions such as exec and eval, and allowing new processes
to start with a shell. We ran Bandit on RecordFlux and Kaitai Struct’s Python
implementation. Bandit is invoked with the following command:
bandit -r /path/to/python/code

Results
In this section we summarize the results of running various static analysis tools on
code generated for DDLs under consideration.
DFDL We relied on the Apache Daffodil runtime2 implementation, which uses C.
Since this format only supports a subset of the entire DFDL standard, we could not
incorporate the image formats to comply with runtime2. So instead, we relied on the
corpus of examples in the runtime2 library, which generated between 400 and 1300
lines of C code.
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FlawFinder reported 19 weaknesses in C code generated by Apache Daffodil. Most
of it were warnings on the use of functions that can be dangerous. Attackers would
use functions such as strlen and the statically-sized arrays to trigger buffer overflows.
Weaknesses
Format Strings can be exploited
Buffer overflows possible in getopt
Use of fopen
Statically sized arrays can lead to overflows
Use of strlen
Dead code: variable assigned never used

Reported by
FlawFinder
FlawFinder
FlawFinder
FlawFinder
FlawFinder
Infer

Count
4
1
1
10
3
1

Table 7.16: Weaknesses reported by various tools in Apache Daffodil generated C
code
Infer produced only one alert, and CppCheck failed to find any issues with the
runtime2 C code generated. Upon further examination, we found that the alert
produced by Infer was incorrect. The C code used the following syntax:
char* nibble = text;

*(nibble++) = '\0';
return text;
The infer engine pointed out that the variable nibble was modified, but never
read. For those familiar with C pointers, this error is not valid—the pointer nibble
modifies the input in text.
DaeDaLus To evaluate DaeDaLus, we used a description of the Musical Instrument
Digital Interface (MIDI) format. This description was provided as a part of the
DaeDaLus code distribution. We generated code using the daedalus executable using
the following command.
daedalus tests/midi/midi.ddl --compile-c++ --out-dir=generated-c/
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open can be exploited with a symlink
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Reported by
FlawFinder

Count
1

Table 7.17: Weaknesses reported by various tools in the DaeDaLus generated C++
code
Next, we ran the static analysis tools on the generated-c folder. The tools
analyzed 14545 lines of code each. Table 7.17 demonstrates the results of static
analysis.
CppCheck and Infer did not find any issues with the generated C++ code.
FlawFinder found one minor weakness: an alert to ensure that developers check
the file being opened using the open system call.
Kaitai Struct The Kaitai image format descriptions and the C++ runtime parsing
library accounted for 3559 lines of C++ code. Table 7.18 demonstrates the results of
our evaluation of Kaitai generated code and the Kaitai C++ standard library.
CppCheck and Infer did not find any weaknesses in the Kaitai-generated code
or the C++ library. The weaknesses identified using FlawFinder were in the Kaitai
Struct C++ library that contains the core parsing functions. FlawFinder did not find
bugs in the C++ code generated from image format Kaitai specifications. Similarly,
Bandit analyzed 322 lines of Python code and did not find any issues.
Weaknesses
Should check buffer boundaries in read
Statically-sized arrays need bounds checking

Reported by
FlawFinder
FlawFinder

Count
20
2

Table 7.18: Weaknesses reported by various tools in the Kaitai Struct generated C++
code

RecordFlux We studied the RecordFlux Python source code and code generated
for a TLV format provided with the distribution. Invoking Bandit on these Python
sources produced 1427 warnings: of which 1425 were low severity issues involving
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uses of assert in code. One medium severity issue was on using the MD5 hashing
algorithm—which is known to be vulnerable [255]. Finally, a severe issue was concerning using “shell=True” when creating subprocesses in Python. If attackers can
control the input sent to this function, they can gain shell access.
Most of the issues found in the generated code are warnings or alerts asking a developer to be careful when using certain functions or patterns. There were no serious
security or LangSec anti-patterns uncovered that need to be patched immediately.

7.4.7. Summary
In this section, we evaluated the runtime implementations of various DDLs for the
reliability of the code generated and the accuracy of the descriptions of various image
formats. To do this, we first built a corpus of image files and evaluated the image
format descriptions in DFDL and Kaitai against our corpus. Next, we statically
analyzed and fuzzed the code generated from DDLs to find security issues in the
implementations. Finally, we cataloged the issues we found, but none of these issues
were major and needed to be fixed urgently.

Section 7.5

Conclusions
In this chapter, we conducted an expert elicitation study where we interviewed parser
experts with varying backgrounds to understand what features must be present in
DDLs to support a wide range of data formats and for adoption. We then studied
the popular DDLs through the lens of these features to deduce if these DDLs satisfy
the requirements of the experts.
We then conducted case studies to generate code using these DDLs where various
image formats were described. First, we evaluated the correctness of these specifi292
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cations using a large-scale study from data collected from CommonCrawl. Next, we
evaluate the reliability of these tools by running fuzz testing and static analysis tools
on the generated code.
As we observe in this Chapter, no DDL available today supports all the features
and usability tools that experts wish to see. A DDL must support several of these
features and support several data formats commonly used. DaeDaLus and Parsley
are tools that have come a long way: designed to support network protocols and
complex file formats such as PDFs. However, based on our expert study and the
categorization using the features from the expert study, a few trends emerge, paving
the way for future work.

Bidirectional Programming and Parsing Data Formats Bidirectional programming has been studied quite extensively in programming languages, where transformations made to one version of the code must automatically translate to another
version [95]. UML tools such as Rational Rose provide another example of such bidirectional programming where an addition to the diagram in the form of new functions
must translate to the Java class definition [224].
Given that code generation tools are often buggy—producing incorrect code—
developers would benefit from having bidirectional tools that can modify the source
data description when the generated code is modified. Most of the experts in our study
mentioned that the generated code is so complex that they did not envision that any
developer would want to modify it directly—instead, changing the description and
regenerating code from it.
One specification → Multiple versions in DDLs → Multiple parsers At a
glance, this seems like a good paradigm. Once a specification is released, different
developers read it and describe it in the DDL of their choice. We then run code
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generations on the data description to generate parser code. However, our study
shows that the same format is described differently by different parsers, leading to
numerous parser differentials.
One proposed solution followed by the PDF Association is to use machine-readable
specifications. For example, the PDF association used a TSV format to describe
constraints on the complex data types in PDFs using the Arlington PDF Model.
This solution, however, does not extend well to other formats. For example, the
image formats we studied in this thesis do not follow a syntax that can be easily
captured using only TSV files.
DDLs can be used to serve as the tool to describe these complex data formats in
a machine-readable format. Additionally, we would benefit from tools to translate
specifications in these global DDLs to the other commonly used DDLs.
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Conclusions
Given the Coronavirus pandemic for the last 2-3 years, our society is increasingly
embracing remote work and automation, which means industries and devices previously working offline must support Internet-connected technologies. These computers
increasingly provide convenience and efficiency through the Internet of Things (IoT)
technologies.
Over time, Internet access has gradually increased in the developing world. As a
result, more and more people in the developing world now own multiple computers
and smartphones. Additionally, the cost of these devices has also been lowered—
allowing lower-income societies to embrace these new technologies. However, as IoT’s
scale reaches the order of billions of devices, the threat to human life and digital
privacy also increases as nation-states devote more and more resources to adversarial
research.
As I discussed in this thesis, parsers are the first line of defense for any software
application. Since we now use Internet-connected devices in critical situations such as
delivering life-saving drugs like insulin or controlling dangerous remote machinery, we
must ensure that these devices have well-written parsers that can protect the devices
from malicious input.
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This thesis considered the various threats posed to software and discussed how
parsers are the most targeted portion of any software system—a vulnerable or insufficient parser exposes the entire system to attacks. Studies examining how vulnerabilities are traditionally patch bugs demonstrate how we still follow a reactionary,
band-aid approach to fixing bugs. Such approaches are undesirable since they do not
address root causes and parsers remain challenging to audit.

Contributions This thesis aimed to understand what tools are needed to protect
systems from input-handling vulnerabilities and how we can build robust, performant,
and verified tools that developers can use. This thesis covered four major chapters,
each of which takes a step towards demonstrating how we can achieve our grand
objective.
Chapter 4 I discussed parser-combinator tools in detail and how they can be used to describe various data formats. This chapter presented a first-of-its-kind parser
and protocol state machine for the Industrial IoT protocols XMPP and MQTT.
We also built CVD, a communications validity detector for SCADA networks.
CVD was deployed to real power grid substations and was able to detect attacks and events in real-time. Finally, we demonstrated how we could use parser
combinators effectively to describe file formats such as iccMAX. I believe our
experiences using parser combinators to describe various network protocols and
file formats can motivate more work in this direction.
Chapter 5 We built the Parsley PDF checker, which included a comprehensive type
checker. We generated type checker code directly from the machine-readable
PDF specification—the Arlington model. As a result, our type checker was
able to find several errors in popular PDF implementations—leading to numerous bug fixes and major specification changes. This work demonstrates
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that using machine-readable specifications accelerates the process of getting
parser and validator implementations right. Additionally, it also reduces the
possibility of parser differentials if each parser is generated from the exact
machine-readable specification. We hope that future specification creators design machine-readable specifications, given their benefits.
Chapter 6 I built ParseSmith, a parser interpreter for formats described in the Parsley Data
Description Language. Our parser interpreter builds on traditional Parsing Expression Grammar (PEG) parsing algorithms to capture complex constructs
commonly used in data formats. I demonstrate how to argue about various
correctness properties in these parsers and how to build an effective debugger
for parsers. I believe that developers can use ParseSmith to generate efficient,
verified parsers for various data formats. I also hope that the ParseSmith debugger will serve as a case study on building practical parser debuggers that
can inspect the internal data structures of parsing machines.
Chapter 7 We provided the first comprehensive categorization and evaluation of data description languages. The metrics for this categorization were inferred based
on an expert elicitation study we conducted. We interviewed 15 experts who
are well-versed with data formats and parsers. Our evaluation explored implementations of various data description languages and the descriptions of image
formats in these languages. We found that different languages include varying
versions of image formats, covering different portions of specifications. Our experiments have led to corrections to format descriptions in Kaitai Struct and
DFDL.
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Section 8.1

Future Work
Moving forward, I envision research examining parsers and better parsing methodologies to continue in full swing. Each of my chapters outlined some future work
(Sections 4.6, 5.9, 6.7, and 7.5). In the rest of this section, I summarize broad future
directions and open problems for the field to explore.

Parsing Abstract Machines
Parser implementations follow different algorithms with differing guarantees. Parsing
functions can be standardized using a dedicating parsing machine that can be isolated
using sandboxing techniques to ensure that exploitation of this machine does not affect
the rest of the program’s address space.
We must create an instruction set that can implement the core parsing functions,
such as matching a nonterminal to a location in the input. Data formats also require
operations on the buffer—where we create a window or view into a buffer to perform
parsing operations. A parsing machine would need to keep track of a stack of views
and instructions and write output to attributes and abstract syntax trees.
Such an abstract machine could serve as a backend for multiple parsing combinator
toolkits and data description languages. Additionally, by verifying components of this
abstract machine, we can ensure correctness, interoperability, and isolation.

More user studies
In this thesis, we conducted a user study to understand experts’ experiences working
with Data Description Languages (DDL). Experts, however, discuss their goals and
ideas concerning what they want to see in DDLs and what they think is useful.
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Their view of DDLs and combinators may not translate directly to the developers’
experiences.
Additionally, DDLs and their tutorials may set expectations on what a developer
must know to be able to use it. Deep knowledge and familiarity with formal language theory and compiler design concepts are not common among computer science
graduates.
Hence, there is a need to conduct a large-scale study on programmers to understand how they implement parsers for data formats. Furthermore, a user study would
need to compare the usability parser combinators and data description languages and
the current common methodology of building parsers from scratch. Such a study
could set a clear standard on what users find useful and how DDL toolkits must
structure their tutorials to ensure developers adopt them and do not commit many
errors while developing parsers.

Hardware parsers
I also envision research implementing hardware parsers to continue. Pegmatite places
a foot in this direction, implementing parsers for Calc-Parsing Expression Grammars [171]. Parsers implemented in FPGAs can be more performant and efficient
than those implemented in software. Hence, such FPGA-based parsers can be a good
candidate for resource-constrained IoT devices. Such FPGA-based parsers have been
used in printers for data formats such as PDF and Postscript for specific purposes
and can be used in updateable IoT devices.
FPGA-based parsers also serve as an avenue for intrusion detection and packet
filtering on the router level. Wang et al. [279] described an approach to generate
FPGA code using P4 descriptions—where network headers are described in P4, and
the packets are parsed at line speed. Programmable network forwarding planes also
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serve as an avenue for future research where line-speed parsers could be deployed to
filter packets in a network [221, 123].
Additionally, most prior work focused on hardware parsing focus on network protocols. The following future directions could be useful avenues to explore for the
community.
– Building a framework to parse file formats in FPGAs: Firewalls processing email attachments for malware are often pattern- or signature-based. As a
result, they may miss zero-day exploits since they will not meet any known patterns. To catch exploits in file formats such as image and document formats, we
need to parse them fully in the network endpoint firewalls. Generating FPGA
parsers from syntax, such as Parsley and Kaitai, that already support file format
descriptions, can be a significant first step in achieving this goal.
– Formalizing how streaming formats should be parsed: Streaming formats often use delimiters to denote where new packets begin, and the previous
ones end. A full data frame, such as a video file, could be spread out across numerous network packets. Most parsing tools available today cannot handle such
chunked data that needs to be reassembled. This problem is exacerbated in FPGAs, forcing a need to understand how we can formalize principled streaming
format parsing and how the buffer must be controlled in hardware.
– How would a parsing abstract machine map to FPGAs: In a previous
section, we discussed how parsing abstract machines provide an avenue to formalize parsing algorithms and isolate parsers. However, such machines do not
translate well to FPGAs and would be incredibly inefficient. Compiler tools,
such as Xilinx Vivado, perform several rounds of optimization to ensure that the
circuits generated are efficient and match timing requirements. Understanding
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the circuits for various standard parsing operations in abstract machines is a
natural step in that direction.

Parser Differentials and Symbolic Execution
In Section 7.4, we found that image format specifications in DFDL and Kaitai differed for several constructs in various formats. We compared these interpretations
to a ground truth implementation to determine which of these two implementations
misinterpreted the specification. However, pointing out accurately why a particular
implementation is incorrect involves a lot of manual debugging and finding the right
inputs.
I believe we can automatically determine differences between implementations.
– The first approach to tackle this problem is to a symbolic execution engine.
Linda Xiao explored this approach in [292]. They used the KLEE engine [50]
to construct grammar inputs that conform to a grammar specification. KLEE
could be a useful symbolic execution engine to generate input that satisfies one
parser but not another.
Unfortunately, most constructs in the DFDL format are not supported by the
C-code generator. To define a constraint such that a parser P 1 accepts an input
while parser P 2 rejects it in KLEE, both the parsers need to be in C or C++.
Hence, we need to create a client-sever protocol to pass input to parsers of any
programming language. We need a grammar-based engine that can pass input
to these implementations exploring different paths in the grammars.
– The second possible approach is to define a grammar format as an intermediate representation. For example, the Parsley language [198] encompasses the
features offered by other grammar formats. We need to build compilers that
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can convert DFDL, Kaitai, and other specifications to a Parsley language. A
normalized or uniform representation of grammars allows us to formalize and
point out where grammars differ by generating input.

Formalizing evolution of formats as grammar drifts
In chapter 5, we studied how different tools implement major portions of the PDF
specification incorrectly. Also, in chapter 7.4.3, we explored how different parsing
tools contained incorrect representations of various image format syntax. Both these
chapters motivate us to understand how grammars and data formats evolve.
When we parse an input on a grammar, we build an abstract syntax tree describing how the input was parsed. We can formalize how one interpretation differs from
another by defining transformations on the AST. For example, suppose an implementation P 0 incorrectly implements some fields and another implementation P serves as
the ground truth. We can create transformations from the AST produced by P 0 to a
normalized AST produced by P .
By creating a tree of transformations on where these implementations differ from
one another and a ground truth implementation, we can create a genealogy chart of
the evolution of a data format since its inception. Creating such a chart would serve
several purposes.
First, it allows us to understand how humans make mistakes and introduce errors
and typos in data format parsers and creation tools. Understanding this would help
us build tools to detect human errors and produce patterns to detect them. Second,
it can allow us to fingerprint software. By traversing the tree and applying transformations, we can guess which software was used to produce a certain incorrect AST.
Argyros et al. [21] used a similar approach to fingerprint web application firewalls
based on their regular expressions rules and the errors in them.
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Ensuring generated parsers are readable
Currently, Kaitai Struct, DFDL, and Dafny do not generate human-readable code
(Chapters 6.5 and 7.4.3). This paradigm forces the user to generate code again
whenever a specification is incorrect as a part of the development process. In most
cases, a significant portion of the generated code is the same, and a small portion of
code is rewritten.
This process of debugging and re-generating code is slow and inefficient. Additionally, developers need to trust code they did not directly write but generated from a
grammar specification. The generated code might also contain implementation errors
that the developer does not foresee. Ensuring the human readability of the generated
code should hence, be of paramount importance. A developer must be able to debug the generated code and have the changes propagated to the original specification
(bidirectional programming).

Learning File Formats from Input Samples or Code
Prior work in grammar learning has focused on learning network protocols and formal
languages—and not on learning data formats such as PDF or image formats. More
recent work on learning data formats focuses on building a format recognizer using
machine-learning techniques [67]. However, much of the work on learning file formats
remain. This is because file formats often include complex constructs such as offsets
that are not traditionally found in network protocols or formal grammar.
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Section 8.2

Final Remarks
In closing, I believe the contributions of this thesis are vital and will aid developers
in designing better parsers, which would help reduce bugs and vulnerabilities in code.
Furthermore, since Smart Buildings, Smart Cities, Driverless cars, and Internet-ofBattlefield-Things are all up and coming concepts that people seem to be very invested
in, the need to secure communication endpoints with parsers is more serious than
ever.
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[166] Olivier Levillain, Sébastien Naud, and Aina Toky Rasoamanana.
in-Progress:
tors.

Work-

Towards a Platform to Compare Binary Parser Genera-

https://paperstreet.picty.org/yeye/resources/conf-spw-LevillainNR21/

document.pdf, May 2021.
[167] Guodong Li, Indradeep Ghosh, and Sreeranga P Rajan. KLOVER: A Symbolic
Execution and Automatic Test Generation Tool for C++ Programs. In International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, pages 609–615. Springer,
2011. DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-22110-1 49.
[168] Hongliang Liang, Xiaoxiao Pei, Xiaodong Jia, Wuwei Shen, and Jian Zhang.
Fuzzing: State of the Art. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 67(3) pages 1199–
1218, 2018. DOI 10.1109/TR.2018.2834476.
[169] Zhiqiang Lin, Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu, and Xiangyu Zhang. Automatic
Protocol Format Reverse Engineering Through Context-Aware Monitored Execution. In NDSS, volume 8, pages 1–15. Citeseer, 2008.
327

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[170] Nuno Lopes, Nikolaj Bjørner, Nick McKeown, Andrey Rybalchenko, Dan Talayco, and George Varghese. Automatically verifying reachability and wellformedness in P4 Networks. Technical report, Technical Report, 2016.
[171] Zephyr S Lucas, Joanna Y Liu, Prashant Anantharaman, and Sean W Smith.
Parsing PEGs with Length Fields in Software and Hardware. In IEEE Security
and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 128–133. IEEE, 2021. DOI 10.1109/
SPW53761.2021.00026.
[172] Stefan Lucks, Norina Marie Grosch, and Joshua König. Taming the Length
Field in Binary Data: Calc-Regular Languages. In IEEE Security and Privacy
Workshops (SPW), pages 66–79, 2017. DOI 10.1109/SPW.2017.33.
[173] Chi-Keung Luk, Robert Cohn, Robert Muth, Harish Patil, Artur Klauser, Geoff
Lowney, Steven Wallace, Vijay Janapa Reddi, and Kim Hazelwood. Pin: Building Customized Program Analysis Tools with Dynamic Instrumentation. SIGPLAN Notices, 40(6) page 190–200, jun 2005. DOI 10.1145/1064978.1065034.
[174] Lucas Lundgren. Light-Weight Protocol! Serious Equipment! Critical Implications! DEFCON, 2016.
[175] Greg MacManus. CVE-2013-2028 Nginx HTTP Server 1.3.9-1.4.0 Chunked
Encoding Stack Buffer Overflow. Available from Rapid 7. Online at https:
//www.rapid7.com/db/modules/exploit/linux/http/nginx chunked size.
[176] Jonas Magazinius, Billy K. Rios, and Andrei Sabelfeld. Polyglots: Crossing
Origins by Crossing Formats. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer Communications Security, CCS ’13, page 753–764, New
York, NY, USA, 2013. Association for Computing Machinery. DOI 10.1145/
2508859.2516685.
328

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[177] Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Simon Rohlmann, and Jörg Schwenk.
Attacks Bypassing the Signature Validation in PDF. Technical report, RuhrUniversität Bochum, March 2020.

https://www.nds.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/

media/ei/veroeffentlichungen/2019/02/12/report.pdf.
[178] Yitzhak Mandelbaum, Kathleen Fisher, David Walker, Mary Fernandez, and
Artem Gleyzer. PADS/ML: A Functional Data Description Language. In Proceedings of the 34th Annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT Symposium on Principles
of Programming Languages, POPL ’07, page 77–83, New York, NY, USA, 2007.
Association for Computing Machinery. DOI 10.1145/1190216.1190231.
[179] Daniel Marjamäki.
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